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ALIENATION AND SELF-PRESENTATION

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> Egocentricity [Ich-Bezogenheit] is not an original property of the basic elements of the given.
>
> Carnap, R. *Logical Construction of the World*

The self is, puzzlingly, both the most certain of things and the most elusive. Its certainty derives from, amongst other things, the Cartesian indubitability of my own existence, and from the Kantian recognition that the 'I think' is capable of accompanying my every conscious state. Its intangibility is manifest in Hume's insight that, upon introspecting, no self is given among the multitude of conscious states, of which we are so certain that it owns. But that Hume's insight is in fact insight not confusion, is contested. Indeed, its meaning is less than transparent. My broad aims in what follows are, first, to articulate Hume's insight in such a way that the question of its veracity becomes tractable; second, to offer an empirically grounded reason to accept it; and, third, to point out that this in no way impugns, as some have contended, a certain respect in which the self is certain—that a class of judgements about ourselves are immune to a certain sort of error.

1. Self-presentation and the self *qua* self

> For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch *myself* at any

> time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception […] If anyone upon serious and unprejudic'd reflexion, thinks he has a different notion of *himself*, I must confess I can no longer reason with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continu'd, which he calls *himself*; tho' I am certain there is no such principle in me. (Hume 1739, 252)[1]

Hume's notorious challenge to locate the self amongst the stream of experience was echoed by Kant, in slightly different language,

> this identity of the subject, of which I can become conscious in every representation, does not concern the intuition of it, through which it is given as object (Kant 1781/1787, B408)

Kant's suggestion here can be understood as the claim that, in introspection, we are not presented to ourselves as objects, that experience is, at we might put it, subjectless. Schopenhauer concurs, in an unpublished manuscript, in the strongest possible terms with his contention that, "That the subject should become an object for itself is the most monstrous contradiction ever thought of" (quoted in Janaway 1989, 120). In the Twentieth Century, whilst Russell (1910) favours the idea that we are acquainted with ourselves, by (1921: 141) he seems to endorse a subjectless view. Husserl's philosophical development seems to have taken the opposite trajectory, with his (1900, Investigation V, §8) endorsement of a subjectless view being subsequently revised (Husserl 1913,

[1] It is not immediately evident which philosophers Hume takes himself to be opposing. It is sometimes assumed that Hume's main target is Descartes (e.g. Prinz 2012, 125), but is not obvious that Descartes really fits the bill. It seems to me that Locke (Locke 1690, Bk.IV, Ch.IX, §3) is more likely to be the immediate target. On Hume see (Pitson 2002, 18), on Descartes (Hintikka 1962).

§57).[2] Sartre (Sartre 1936) takes Husserl's later view to task, arguing for a subjectless view, at least for 'unreflective' experience.

The subjectlessness or otherwise of experience remains disputed. Those siding with Hume and Kant include Shoemaker (1986), Martin (1997), Howell (2010) and Prinz (2012). Those opposing them, or at least seeming to, include Chisholm (1976, Ch.1), Cassam (1995), Strawson (2009), Damasio (2012) and Rosenthal (2012).

One line of thought that might be thought to show that Hume is wrong, that experience is not subjectless, would be the following: we are aware of bodily sensations such as pains through introspection, but pains are presented as located in the body and, since each of us is identical to our body, we are presented to ourselves, in introspection, as (bodily) objects. But, as is widely recognised, even were these premises true, the conclusion would be only that we are introspectively aware of an object, which is the self. But, plausibly, what we are after is an introspective awareness of the self *as the self* or, as it is sometimes put, *qua* self. Through bodily sensation I am aware of my body, and aware of it as an object. Furthermore, it may be that I am identical to my body. However, it is a further claim to suppose that through bodily sensation I am aware of my body *qua* self. As Bermudez puts it, "The simple fact that bodily awareness involves perceiving something that happens to be the self is plainly not enough for it to count as an interesting form of self-consciousness. Self-perception falls short of self-consciousness, since one can perceive oneself without being aware that it is oneself that one is perceiving." (Bermúdez 2011, ??). The view that we are aware of the self *qua* self, the denial of the subjectless view suggested by Hume and endorsed by Kant, I will refer to as the self-presentation thesis.[3] As the above discussion indicates, the self-presentation thesis is relative to different sense modalities. That is, it may be that self-presentation is false as a claim about bodily-awareness, but true as a claim about some other form of experience.

[2] Although Husserl's early view is, in fact, less straightforward than this brief survey suggests. Compare, for example, (Husserl 1900, Investigation I, §26).
[3] This is to be distinguished from Chisholm's (1976) notion of a self-presenting state.

There are, then, a number of distinct claims to the effect that some or other form of experience is self-presenting.

How might we further articulate this idea of self-presentation, the notion of being presented to oneself *qua* self as an object? One idea is to think of self-presentation as a form of awareness that is both analogous to the sensory perception of objects, and serves to ground first-personal (*de se*) thought. Shoemaker takes this line when, commenting on defenders of Humean subjectlessness, he writes,

> What these philosophers have wanted to deny, and rightly so, is that [...] there is an experiencing or perceiving of one's self that explains one's awareness that one is, for example, in pain in a way analogous to that in which one's sense perception of John explains one's knowledge that John has a beard. (Shoemaker 1968, 562)

The reason that Shoemaker believes Hume to be right in denying such a form of self-presentation lies in the fact that the sensory perception of objects provides *identification information* about them and that this cannot be the case with respect to a self-presentational grounding of first-person thought. The idea that Shoemaker wishes to reject is that in self-presentation I am aware of some object whose presented properties serve to identify it as myself. This picture faces, on Shoemaker's view, a dilemma. Either the property in question cannot, in principle, be possessed by something other than myself, or it can. If it cannot, then self-presentation cannot ground all first-person thinking, since it must presuppose some. If, on the other hand, another than myself can possess the property in question, then self-presentation allows for the possibility of a certain type error through misidentification, but such errors are not possible.

To see the first horn of this dilemma, suppose that self-presentation is such that it,

> guarantees that the perceived self would have a property, namely, the property of being an object of *my* inner sense, which no self other than myself could (logically) have and by which I could infallibly identify it as myself. But of course, in order to identify a self as myself by its possession of *this* property, I would have to know that *I* observe it by inner sense, and *this* self-knowledge, being the ground of my identification of the self as myself, could not itself be grounded on that identification. (Shoemaker 1968, 562–3)

The second horn of the dilemma is that, were the self identified via a property that could, in principle, be possessed by something other than oneself, then it would be possible to mistakenly judge that one was, say, in pain, because whilst one knew, of some entity *a*, that it was in pain, one mistakenly took *a* to be oneself. That is, first-person judgements based on self-presentation would be subject to errors through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun. But, Shoemaker (1968, 557) points out, it is not coherent to suppose that, when made in the ordinary way, a judgement to the effect that I am in pain could be subject to such an error. That is, such judgements are immune to error through misidentification (IEM).

The conclusion here is not that there is no such thing as self-presentation. It is, rather, that if there is it could not explain our capacity for first person thought. Still, such a diminution of the explanatory power of the self-presentation thesis will be unwelcome to its proponents. Shoemaker's full case against self-presentation rests on his claim that the self-presentation view is properly understood as the view that the self *qua* self is the object of a quasi-perceptual inner sense, and so must be rejected on the grounds that there is no such inner sense (1968; 1986). However, I suggest that there is a way for the proponent of the self-presentation thesis to resist Shoemaker's dilemma argument, and in such a way as to inoculate self-presentation against any argument against a quasi-perceptual, inner-sense model of introspection.

Shoemaker's argument can be resisted by giving a slightly different gloss on what it is to be presented with the self *qua* self. Consider linguistic entities representing oneself. Some of these, including "Smith", pick out the person producing them but, as Perry (1979) has shown us, in such a way that the utterer can fail to recognise this fact. Others, the first-personal pronouns, do not allow for such ignorance. In uttering, "I am *F*" I cannot rationally fail to recognise that I thereby refer to myself. Such linguistic entities, one might say, represent the self *qua* self. Now consider the possibility that a similar distinction holds at the level of experience, of *presentations*, of the self. On the one hand we have presentations of the self that are such that one can fail to recognise that it is oneself that is presented. The sight of oneself in a mirror provides a familiar example. However, it may be that there are presentations of the self that are such that, in being so presented with oneself, it is manifest to one that it is oneself with which one is presented. That is, one is presented with oneself *qua* self. On this construal, self-presentation is presentation with first-personal content.[4] To continue with the example of pain, the experience itself would include the content that it is oneself that is in pain. This construal of the Humean denial of self-presentation accords with Wright's characterisation, as the view that, "The subject of an experience *qua* subject — the experiencer — is not normally represented in an experience: the content of my experience when I see a pair of blue tits on a bird feeder, is: *there are blue tits on that bird feeder*, and not: *I am seeing blue tits on that bird feeder*." (Wright 2012, 264)

Shoemaker's case against self-presentation is undermined by this construal. This is because, on this understanding, the self-presentation view is not committed to the view that one must identify the presented self as oneself by means of some presented property. Rather, in order to ground one's first-

[4] This interpretation of the self-presentation thesis might be disputed by Bermúdez. Whilst no friend of subjectless experience, in discussing visual experience, he writes, "Neither the first person pronoun nor the first person concept appear in an experience. It would be more accurate to say that experiences have certain features that warrant certain types of first person judgment. Experiences are properly described as first person when they have those features." (Bermúdez 2011, 173). This seems to be an attempt to steer a middle way between subjectlessness and self-presentation. However, depending on how the claims about both warrant and the content of the warranting state are fleshed out, this may end up amounting to a subjectless account after all.

personal thought, one would simply need to take the content of one's first-personal experiential state, one's self-presentation, at face value. Thus, the view does not face Shoemaker's dilemma. Nor does it rest on a quasi-perceptual, inner sense, view of self-awareness. It is consistent, for example, with Peacocke's (1999, Ch.5) view according to which conscious states are reasons for their own self-ascription. Indeed, the self-presentation view might be thought to come to the aid of such a position, offering a simple explanation, sameness of content, of why such a transition would be rational. Judgements grounded in this way would be, in Peacocke's (1999, Ch.6) phrase, representationally dependent. As such, Shoemaker's more general case against perceptual accounts of self-knowledge need not concern the proponent of self-presentation.

2. Self-presentation and transparency

Howell (2010) has recently based an interesting argument against self-presentation based on the transparency of perceptual experience. Transparency is, roughly, the view that whilst perceptual experiences are properties of oneself, reflection on them reveals only the objects and properties that they represent, not the states themselves, and their features. As Tye puts it, regarding vision, "When you introspect your visual experience, the only particulars of which you are aware are external ones making up the scene before your eyes." (Tye 2002, 139).

Howell's claim is that, being transparent, such states are not 'object presenting', where a property is object presenting if an experience of it is an experience of it *as* a property of the object that possesses it (2010, 474).[5] Typically, according to Howell, properties are object presenting. One experiences shapes, colours, etc. as properties of their objects. Not so with conscious states,

[5] This departs from Howell's formulation, which requires that object-presenting properties present themselves as *proper parts* of their bearers. I rather doubt that any property is object presenting in exactly that sense.

> from the unreflective first-person perspective, a subject's mental properties do not present themselves as properties of the subject. While he is aware of them in some sense, they are not in fact salient to the subject *as his properties*: they are phenomenologically exhausted in their presentation of the world [...] Mental properties are intrinsic properties of the self, but awareness of those properties does not generate perception of the self because unlike most intrinsic properties, the mental properties are not object-presenting. (Howell 2010, 476)

Since conscious states are transparent, not object presenting, in being aware of them we are not thereby presented with ourselves. We can thus move from the transparency of perceptual experience to the Humean insight that reflection reveals no self-presentation.

Since this argument does not rely on Shoemaker's assumptions about identification information, it would appear to have the potential to show that even the first-personal content version of the self-presentation thesis is false. Such an appearance is misleading, however. There are at least two difficult cases: bodily sensation and visual experience. Taking pains first, a plausible assumption is that, in Howell's sense, they present my body. That is, in being aware of a headache am presented with a particular part of my body (cf. O'Shaughnessy 1980, Vol. 1, Ch.5). But many philosophers believe that I am identical to my body. If so, then a pain would present my self. Of course, as we have already rehearsed, this would not thereby amount to self-presentation, since we would need to know whether the self was presented *qua* self. So we need to know whether the presentation of my body in bodily experience a presentation of myself *qua* self, i.e. whether bodily experience has first-personal content. This is, of course, an instance of the more general question of whether there is self-presentation, and it seems that the transparency argument has done nothing to answer it.

A similar point applies to visual perception. We are aware not only of the shapes, sizes and colours of visually presented objects, but also of their locations. Indeed, one of the most striking features of the visual scene is that it is egocentric

(Campbell 1994, Ch.1). The objects that I visually experience are presented as occupying locations relative to mine. Some are near, some are far, some are straight ahead, some are to the left, etc. These spatial relations relate experienced objects to the location that I occupy. Some hold that they relate them to me. For example, Bermúdez claims that, "Vision presents the world in a fundamentally egocentric and perspectival way. The embodied self appears in visual perception as the origin of the field of view." (Bermúdez 2011, ??)

On such a view, the transparency of visual experience to its objects would appear to mandate the inclusion of the self in the content of visual experience, since the self would be presented as one of the things to which experienced objects are spatially related. Of course, once more, this would only amount to self-presentation if the self is presented *qua* self. The transparency considerations, however, do nothing to answer this form of the self-presentation thesis.

3. Alienation and self-presentation

There is a good reason, however, to suppose that the self-presentation thesis is false, at least relative to a number of forms of experience; that the Humean insight that experience is subjectless really is an insight. A number of empirical cases in which people appear to be alienated from their own conscious states give reason to think that the experiential states in question are not first-personal. More specifically, cases of 'alien limb' give reason to think that bodily awareness is not self-presenting; cases of 'anarchic hand' give reason to think that action-awareness is not self-presenting; cases of what we might call 'anonymous memory' give reason to think that memory is not self-presenting; and cases of 'thought insertion' give reason to think that what we might call 'intellectual experience' is not self-presenting. I will briefly describe each of these, but a pattern will very soon emerge.

'Bodily-awareness' names a group of forms of experience—including proprioception, kinaesthesia, bodily sensation and the sense of balance—unified by the fact that they present one's own body 'from the inside' (Martin 1995).

Typically, we experience a sense of ownership with respect to our own bodies. It is manifest to one that the body one is aware of through bodily-awareness is one's own. For some people suffering from so-called 'alien hand syndrome', however, this experience is disrupted. That is, whilst they feel, from the inside, sensational properties of their alien limb, it does not appear to them as their own. As Moro and colleagues write,

> stimuli were detected in all trials even though the hand was still felt as belonging to another person. Specifically asked about how it was possible to perceive stimuli delivered to another's hand, the patient reported that "many strange things can happen in life." (Moro, Zampini, and Aglioti 2004, 440).

Taking at face value their subjective reports, such people experience bodily sensation in a limb that they do not experience as their own. That is, they possess bodily-awareness without a sense of ownership.

'Action-awareness' names the source of our knowledge of our own actions (O'Brien 2007, Ch.9; Peacocke 2010, 246–9). Exactly what action-awareness is need not concern us. The crucial point is that it provides us with a sense of ownership with respect to our actions. If I am consciously typing then it is manifest to me that it is *me* that is typing. For some people suffering from so-called 'anarchic hand syndrome', however, this is experience is disrupted. That is, whilst they feel, from the inside, some action being executed by their anarchic (but not alien) hand, that action does not appear to them as their own (Marchetti and Della Sala 1998). Often the anarchic limb will act directly contrary to the person's explicit aims. One patient, for example, "noted that one hand tried to turn left when the other hand tried to turn right while driving a car." (Doody and Jankovic 1992, 807). Once more, taking at face value their subjective reports, such people experience an action from the inside without experiencing it as their own. That is, they possess action-awareness without a sense of ownership.

In episodic memory I relive past events that I have witnessed (Tulving 1972). As with both bodily-awareness and action-awareness, these episodes are recalled with a sense of ownership. When I episodically remember eating breakfast, it is manifest to me that it was *me* eating breakfast. For at least one person suffering from 'anonymous memory', this experience is disrupted. That is, he relives episodes from his past, but does not experience them as being things that *he* did, experiences that *he* had. As he describes it,

> I can picture the scene perfectly clearly…studying with my friends in our study lounge. I can 'relive' it in the sense of re-running the experience of being there. But it has the feeling of imagining, [as if] re-running an experience that my parents described from their college days. It did not feel like it was something that really had been a part of my life. Intellectually I suppose I never doubted that it was a part of my life. Perhaps because there was such continuity of memories that fit a pattern that lead up to the present time. But that in itself did not help change the feeling of ownership. (Klein and Nichols 2012, 483)

Taking at face value his subjective reports, he recalls a past experience through episodic memory, but does not experience it as his own. That is, he possesses episodic memory without a sense of ownership.

By 'intellectual experience' I refer to the experience of consciously thinking. Some will perhaps be sceptical of such a thing, but for present purposes I will simply assume that there is something it is like to consciously entertain a proposition, remaining neutral on how it is to be accounted for (for a variety of views, see (Bayne and Montague 2011)). When I think through a problem I am aware of the problem itself, but it is also manifest to me that it is *me* that is thinking about it. That is, there is a sense of ownership over my episodes of conscious thinking. For some schizophrenic people suffering from 'thought insertion', this experience is disrupted. That is, they are aware of thoughts 'from

the inside', but those thoughts do not seem to be their own (Mullins and Spence 2003). In one of the most widely discussed cases, the subject reports,

> I look out of the window and I think the garden looks nice and the grass looks cool. But the thoughts of Eammon Andrews come to my mind. There are no other thoughts there, only his. He treats my mind like a screen and flashes his thoughts onto it just like you flash a picture (Mellor 1970, 17)

Taking at face value their subjective reports, such people experience a thought 'from the inside', but do not experience it as their own. That is, they possess intellectual experience without a sense of ownership.

The interpretation of each of these types of case is a delicate and controversial matter (as Zahavi (2005, 145–6) rightly points out). Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to say that, *in some sense* at least, people can become alienated from their own bodily experience, action, memory and conscious thought. What is the significance of this? It has sometimes been suggested that such alienation cases show the judgements based on the relevant types of experience are not immune to error through misidentification (Campbell 1999; Marcel 2003; Lane and Liang 2011).[6] Recall Shoemaker's claim that were self-presentation to involve an identification of the self via some property that could, in principle, be possessed by some entity other than oneself then it would allow for the possibility of misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun. That is, say, I could wrongly judge that I was thinking on the grounds that I knew, via intellectual experience, someone to be thinking but mistakenly thought that person to be myself. It might, at first glance, seem that alienation cases show such errors to be possible. For what is the subject of thought insertion doing if not misidentifying the subject of an introspected thought? This is how, using an alien limb example, Lane and Liang argue,

[6] For responses, see (Gallagher 2000; Coliva 2002; Peacocke 2003)

> It is then empirically possible for a subject, while introspecting a mental state (and thereby knowing that someone is undergoing that state), to be in error with regard to who is experiencing that particular mental state. Admittedly, this is counterintuitive. The Wittgenstein-Shoemaker intuition— it is absurd to inquire of the person who introspects and reports a toothache whether it is indeed that person who has the ache— strikes all of us as correct. But empirical inquiry has ways of upsetting the apple cart: it would by no means be absurd to ask of FB whether it is she who has the tactile sensations, even though it is she who produces the introspectively based report. (Lane and Liang 2011, 87–8)

This conclusion, however, that alienation cases show that the relevant forms of experience do not ground IEM judgements, is unwarranted. To see this, we need to distinguish between two sorts of misidentification. On the first, call it *self-misidentification*, I judge that I am *F*, although it is some thing other than my self, *a*, that I know to be *F*. A familiar example of self-misidentification occurs in *Duck* Soup when Groucho sees Harpo in the mirror and, at least at first, mistakenly judges it to be himself that he sees. It is at least natural to think that when it comes to judgements based on bodily-awareness, action-awareness, memory and intellectual experience, such errors are not possible. If, for example, I judge, based on the typical grounds, that I am thinking, then I am right that it is *me* that is thinking.

On the second, call it *other-misidentification*, I judge that some other entity *a* is *F*, although it is in fact myself that it is *F*, not *a*. A familiar example of other-misidentification occurs when one catches one's reflection in a shop window and mistakenly takes it to be someone on the other side of the glass. Again, it is at least natural to suppose that when it comes to judgements based on bodily-awareness, action-awareness, memory and intellectual experience, such errors are not possible. If, for example, intellectual experience grounds for judging that someone is thinking, then I will judge that *I myself* am the thinker.

With a third sort of case, not strictly an error, call it *no-identification*, I judge that there is *Fness*, making no judgement about who is *F*, although it is in fact myself that it *F*. An example of no-identification might be when one 'senses' a tense atmosphere in a room when, in fact, it is simply oneself that is tense. Once more, it is at least natural to suppose that when it comes to judgements based on bodily-awareness, action-awareness, memory and intellectual experience, such errors are not possible. If intellectual experience grounds for judging that there is thinking going on, then I will judge that *I myself* am the thinker.

When Shoemaker and others have claimed that a certain class of judgements is immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun, it is typically errors of self-misidentification that they have had in mind. In the first systematic discussion of IEM, for example, Shoemaker introduced the phenomenon as follows,

> If I say "I am bleeding," it can happen that what I say is false even though I am giving expression to the knowledge that a certain person is bleeding; it may be that I do see a bleeding arm or leg, but that because my body is tangled up with that of someone else (e.g., we are wrestling) or because I am seeing my identical twin or double in a mirror, I am mistaken in thinking the person who is bleeding to be myself. (Shoemaker 1968, 556)

It should be reasonably clear that alienation cases are not errors of self-misidentification. They are, rather, errors of other-misidentification. What they show is not that it is possible to mistake somebody else's states for one's own, but that it is possible to mistake one's own states for somebody else's. This is compatible with the relevant forms of experience being such as to ground judgements that are immune to error through *self*-misidentification (De Vignemont 2012, 228–30).

The point can be obscured by the fact that IEM is often described in a number of non-equivalent ways. The standard thought is that 'I feel pain' is IEM

if and only if, "it cannot happen that I am mistaken in saying "I feel pain" because, although I do know of someone that feels pain, I am mistaken in thinking that person to be myself." (Shoemaker 1968, 557). Here IEM is characterised as immunity to self-misidentification and it seems clear that alienation cases pose no threat to the claim that various judgements are IEM. Thus, in this respect at least, the certainty of the self is preserved.

But compare Wittgenstein's original formulation, "To ask 'are you sure it is *you* who have pains?' would be nonsensical" (Wittgenstein 1958, 67).[7] Now consider a case of thought insertion. In such a situation, it may make perfect sense *to the subject* to wonder whether any given thought was theirs or was an alien thought 'flashed' onto their minds. Alienation cases, therefore, *would* pose a threat.

If alienation cases do not pose a threat to IEM, at least as standardly construed, the same is not so for the self-presentation thesis. Defenders of self-presentation claim that some experiences have first-personal content in virtue of which they count as presentations of the self *qua* self. First-personal states, in turn, are those for which it makes no sense, from the subject's perspective, to wonder who they are about. When I utter "I", or think an I-thought, it is manifest to me that it is me, the subject of the thought, that is picked out. What alienation cases show, when taken at face value, is that it can make sense, from the subject's perspective, to wonder whether or not their subject is me. That is, it is possible for such experiences to ground other-misidentifications. This would not be possible were those forms of experience first-personal, i.e. self-presentational. For self-presentation would seem to entail a sense of ownership lacking in these cases. I conclude that alienation cases show that, in the case of bodily-awareness, action-awareness, memory and intellectual experience, self-presentation is false.

This conclusion is disputed by both Zahavi (2005, Ch.5) and Gallagher (2012, Ch.7). Both claim that, whilst the subjects in these cases are alienated from their own states, "[they] nevertheless have the sense that [they] are

[7] This formulation, in terms of what does or does not make sense to the subject, is used liberally by Evans in his influential discussion (Evans 1982, Chs.6&7).

experiencing these things" (Gallagher 2012, 149; Cf. Zahavi 2005, 144).[8] That is, they are aware that it is they, not someone else, that is suffering, say an anonymous memory. Indeed, RB, the person suffering from anonymous memory, is quite clear with regard to his memories that, 'I can 'relive' it in the sense of re-running the experience of being there'. If it thus true that none of the people concerned are confused in just this way, it might be thought to give some reason to think that self-presentation is consistent with the alienation cases.

An initial response to this might be to point out that the proponent of subjectlessness does not deny that the alienated states in question lack phenomenal consciousness. There is, in the well-known phrase, something it is like to have an anonymous memory, or an inserted thought, etc. The most natural explanation of the fact that the anonymous memory is recognisable as taking place within one's own stream of consciousness is simply that it is one's own conscious state. That the people are in conscious states puts them in a position to self-ascribe those states, to judge that they are in them. As Kant memorably put it, "the 'I think' must be able to accompany all my representations" (Kant 1781, B132). So, for example, someone suffering from an inserted thought will be in a position to judge that they are suffering from an inserted thought. What makes the phenomenon so puzzling, so different from our ordinary experience, is that the thought does not seem to be one's own.

If self-presentation were true, not only would subjects always be in a position to self-ascribe their states, it would also be manifest to them that those states were their own. Since self-presentation is the view that the experiences themselves have first-person content, the state that one would be in a position to self-ascribe would manifestly have oneself as its subject. Yet the cases of alienation outlined above do not.

[8] This is closely related to Strawson's (1959, Ch.3) objection to the 'no-ownership' theory. Also, cf. Chisholm, "What Hume found, then, was not merely the particular impressions, but also the fact that *he* found those impressions as well as the fact that *he* failed to find certain things. And these are findings with respect to himself." (Chisholm 1976, 41).

4. Subjectlessness and self-articulation

Consider the judgement, based on action-awareness, that one is typing. The self-presentation thesis, as applied to this form of experience, claims that, in action-awareness, actions are presented as *one's own*. In other words, that action-awareness has first-person content. Cases of anarchic hand, discussed above, provide evidence against this view. If action awareness were self-presenting, it would be manifest that an experienced action was one's own. But it is not.

An alternative picture of the grounds of such a judgement would be that in action-awareness, one is aware of some entity, *a*, as performing some action and, in addition, identifies *a* as oneself. If this picture were accurate, judgements based on action awareness would be subject not only to errors of other-misidentification, but also to errors of self-misidentification. This view has struck many as implausible. That these two pictures, the self-presentation view, or this identification-dependent view, are the only two options seems to implicit in the following remark of Peacocke's,

> The content of the action-awareness is both first-personal and present-tensed. The content is of the form *I am doing such and such now*. When you take such an awareness at face value, and judge *I am doing such-and-such now*, your judgement is identification-free in a familiar sense. It is not the case that you are making this judgement only because, for some mode of presentation *m* other than the first person, you judge that *m* is doing such-and-such now, and you also accept that you are *m*. (Peacocke 2010, 248)

If Peacocke were indeed making an inference from identification-freedom to self-presentation, for action-awareness or any other form of experience, this move would be unwarranted. This point is, I believe, related to that made by Strawson in his discussion of the Paralogisms,

> And now we come to the fact that lies at the root of the Cartesian illusion. It may be put as follows. When a man (a subject of experience) ascribes a current or directly remembered state of consciousness to himself, no use whatever of any criteria of personal identity is required to justify the use of the pronoun "I" to refer to the subject of that experience. It would make no sense to think or say: *This* inner experience is occurring, but is it occurring to *me*? (This feeling is anger; but is it I who am feeling it?)[…] It is easy to become intensely aware of the immediate character, of the purely inner basis, of such self-ascription […] Thus there arises a certain illusion: the illusion of a purely inner and yet subject-referring use for "I". (P. F. Strawson 1966, 164–6)[9]

On a liberal reading, Strawson can be understood as insisting that it is a mistake to move from the fact that certain judgements about the self are identification-free (are based on no 'criteria of personal identity') to the claim that there is an introspective awareness of the self. In the terminology that I have been employing, the fact that some judgements are IEM relative to the first-person pronoun does not show that they are based on self-presenting experience.

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[9] This passage, of course, directly echoes Wittgenstein, "the idea that the real I lives in my body is connected with the peculiar grammar of the word "I", and the misunderstandings this grammar is liable to give rise to. There are two different cases in the use of the word "I" (or "my") which I might call "the use as object" and "the use as subject". [...] One can point to the difference between these two categories by saying: The cases of the first category involve the recognition of a particular person, and there is in these cases the possibility of error, or as I should rather put it: The possibility of an error has been provided for […] It is possible that, say in an accident, I should feel a pain in my arm, see a broken arm at my side, and think it is mine, when really it is my neighbours. And I could, looking into a mirror, mistake a bump on his forehead for one on mine. On the other hand, there is no question of recognising a person when I say I have toothache. To ask "are you sure that it is *you* who have pains?" would be nonsensical." (Wittgenstein 1958, 66–7)

But how, if not via self-presentation, are we to explain IEM? I will not go into a great deal of detail here, as I have outlined my view elsewhere (Smith 2006). Briefly, suppose that form of experience *F* is a way of coming to know of the instantiation of mental properties of type *T* that has the following property: necessarily, a subject can come to know, via *F*, of the instantiation of her own *T* states only. Call such forms of experience *self-tracking*. Note that it is not necessary to suppose that the object of a self-tracking form of experience is *oneself*, only that the properties known through such a faculty are *one's own*.

An example of a self-tracking form of experience might be episodic memory: a subject can only remember conscious episodes from *her own* past. If *F* is self-tracking, then it will not be possible for me to know, via *F*, that someone is *t* but mistakenly think that it is me that is *t*. If I know, via *F*, that someone is *t*, then I am that person. It does not follow, however, that I realise this. It may be that I mistakenly suppose the person I know to be *t* to be someone else. That is, errors of self-misidentification will not be possible, whilst errors of other-misidentification will. This is exactly the sort of pattern that I have been suggestion we should want to see.

This explanation is closely related to that given by Perry's idea of a "necessarily self-informative method" (2012, 94–5). Given this necessity, there is no need, according to Perry, for the self to be explicitly represented in the relevant form experience, rather it is an 'unarticulated constituent'.(cf. Récanati 2007) As Perry puts it, "it may be that architecture of the representational system insures that this object belongs to the content, without an explicit part of the representation having this job" (2012, 89). On this view, making a first-person judgement grounded in subjectless experience is a matter of articulating the unarticulated self. The experience itself does not present the self *qua* self as an object, it is not first-personal. Nevertheless, it 'concerns' the subject, in that it is necessarily tied to the self. In the terminology I introduced above, it is self-tracking.

The Humean insight is, I propose, really an insight. For a number of forms of experience, there is evidence that the self-presentation thesis is false. Given the availability of an alternative explanation of IEM, it is plausible to draw the inductive inference that all experience is subjectless. As Shoemaker points out, Hume gives no impression that his own case against self-presentation is *apriori*, but claims that, "First appearances nothwithstanding, the basis of the Humean denial can hardly be empirical" (Shoemaker 1986, 102). Here, once again, I part with Shoemaker's company.

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