Jacob Berger –Associate Professor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy at Lycoming College
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Where the big topics come up
- 1:41 Higher-Order Theories: “…science of consciousness and also has a kind of um an interest as well in higher order theories. But I don't really think of myself as someone who really believes that higher order…”
- 2:38:57 Emotion, Fear & Pain: “…whether that the behavior indicates that they are perceiving or feeling uh pain consciously or if there is any unconscious perception. uh one uh and I totally agree that…”
- 26:42 Global Workspace Theory: “…of when you hire order represent? And if you're a global, you could say global workspace, what you're aware of is the stuff that's global to be broadcast and therefore the first order…”
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Brown, R. (Host). (2026, May 15). Consciousness Live! 100th Episode Spectacular Extravaganza -Session II [Video podcast episode]. In Consciousness Live! https://onemorebrown.com/consciousness-live/100th-episode-session-2/
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Brown, Richard, host. “Consciousness Live! 100th Episode Spectacular Extravaganza -Session II.” Consciousness Live!, May 15, 2026. Video podcast, 2:57:55. https://onemorebrown.com/consciousness-live/100th-episode-session-2/.
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Jacob Berger –Associate Professor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy at Lycoming College
Claudia Passos-Ferreira –Assistant Professor of Bioethics at New York University
Transcript
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0:01 Okay. Oops. Hold on. Let me see if this is working. All right. So, I believe we are live. Um, one can never be too certain about these things until one gets confirmation from from someone in the Ethernets out there, but I believe that this is live. Um and welcome to the second session of Brown of Palooa the 100th episode consciousness live spectacular extravagance. I forgot my own thing that I wrote but anyway welcome to it and here we [laughter] are
0:35 joining me extra special guest Jake and Claudia. Thank you very much for joining me today guys.
1:11 this is uh I just want to say a little bit about the book before we get into discussing it. Um so I want to thank you guys for for joining me and um I am very uh interested in hearing what you guys have to say. So I I I wrote the book to as for you know to try to get some of these ideas out for more general discussion. So I'm very happy that you know we have this uh opportunity to have this discussion. I want to thank you in advance for that. I'm at a little bit of a disadvantage because I'm not exactly sure what you guys are going to say. So, I'm going to guess a little bit um and talk a little bit about some of the
1:44 themes that may come up. So um now uh the first thing that I kind of want to say is that I wrote the book from the perspective of someone who's very interested in the science of consciousness and also has a kind of um an interest as well in higher order theories. But I don't really think of myself as someone who really believes that higher order theories are true. I I think that they are an interesting empirical conjecture about the nature of of consciousness and that they should be taken as seriously as other empirical
2:18 conjectures like global workspace theory um IIT if that's a respectable one I I tend to think that it is uh etc. So, so I want to put it on the table not as something that I want to say I think this is true and you should believe me but rather as an interesting idea that can also help us to try to figure out whether the science of consciousness uh at its current stage can make serious progress on some of these issues. So the the Ohio theories seem to me to be a good test a test case for the
2:53 science of of consciousness. Now thinking of these things in this way has led me to believe that the traditional way of setting up this uh landscape of higher order theories involving uh what's known as a transitivity principle an awareness that conscious state is one that I am conscious of myself as being in. Um I've come to view that as a kind of uh not not wrong but delineating only one subset of the possible space of higher order theories. And that doesn't mean that it's uninteresting or that I don't like it. It's just that I don't
3:26 think it's the only way to approach these issues. So I've tried to explore an alternative way of thinking about these things that rejects the idea that there are unconscious states which then become conscious as a result of my being aware of those states. And this is what I call the non-traditional non- relational higher order approach that says that a conscious phenomenally conscious state just is a certain kind of higher order representation to the effect that one is having a mental life. So it is a kind of higher order theory
4:00 in that it involves inner awareness as an important part of the account of phenomenal consciousness. But it's a non-traditional way of thinking about this given that it does not start from the idea of the transitivity principle. So that nonetheless it shares many similarities and also some differences with these other sorts of views. So that's where I start off by by saying that this if you were looking for this kind of thing in the brain, you would want to find a neural coralate for this kind of higher order representation, not
4:32 for the states which it represents you as being in. Um so that that's one set of issues that I think are going to come up in this discussion are issues about the transitivity principle and the kind of traditional what I call the traditional higher order approach and can you make sense of inner awareness and why accept the theory of consciousness independently of these considerations. So I think that's going to be one central concern. On the other hand, I think that a central concern is going to be my reliance on the notion of concepts and intentional content and whether the kind of higher
5:05 representations are are sophisticated in the sense that they kind of go beyond the abilities of simple animals, infants and other uh less cognitively adept uh organisms than full grown humans. um whether such creatures could have the kind of states that the horror theory postulates as in this explanation. And so I want to say at least that there's the empirical possibility that the answer is yes and that infants can have these kind of states and same with uh animals and maybe even you know I I
5:39 would go so far as to say we're not really sure um what the right uh biological neurochemical conditions would result in the kind of higher order states that we're interested in. So, we're in the process of trying to figure out where in the brain to look and what kind of activity would count, but I don't think that we can say with any great certainty. Um, instead, what we have are a bunch of different candidates uh for implementing these ideas in the neural in the neural um setting and then we want to kind of go through and test
6:11 each one. Uh, and so therefore, I don't think that the prefrontal cortex is necessarily associated with higher order theories. It's an interesting u place to look and it is a possibility but I don't think that if we didn't find something there that would somehow falsify higher order theories. So I think there's a lot of stuff regarding infants and their development of their brain and whether they can have these kinds of states that are going to come up and which part of the brains may be relevant. So those are the kind of general general themes general issues. Um I'm sure many other things will come up but uh having said
6:45 that I'll turn it over to Claudia uh for some comments.
7:18 developmental consequences of the of the approach uh but also other I have one uh maybe one uh question that was not in the introduction you give. Okay. So I just want to start with like kind of a general remarkers of what I like it in the book uh given the fact that I oppressed you in many points. So I start with some uh some more complimentary remarks because I really enjoy uh reading the book. Uh I think it's a rich very carefully argued book uh and I
7:53 think you actually the book asks all the the right questions. Maybe I disagree with the answers. So I'll press you more in the answers than the question. But I think the the really the the book is uh the the landscape of of questions that the book uh uh has has I think is really relevant for uh uh for the science of consciousness and and I think whatever someone thinks about the oral theories I think one very nice contribution of the book it's kind
8:27 of reframing the entire landscape of consciousness science less about specific theories and more about first order and high order approaches. So I think this is a nice uh uh a feature of the of the book. Okay. So it's a very I think it's kind of like for me one very big contribution for the science of conscious as it so seeing the those uh so we haven't been discussed how many theories uh uh the science of consciousness have soil saf and chim
9:01 bane has that nice paper with all the 20 plus uh theories of consciousness and I think given the variety of the theories sometimes it's hard to assess the field you don't have a more um uh framework that might help select the theories in a different way. So I think it's a nice feature of the book uh the contrast between first order theories and high order theories. Okay. Although I'll press you later in in uh a consequence of this uh of this frame.
10:07 don't know maybe some meta theoretical claim uh that uh that is uh uh this distinctions between harder order and first order uh theory and more than work with the classic five options that everyone usually starts with the science of consciousness uh global work uh their own work uh workspace IIT recurrence process uh um on psychism and and other versions. You start with uh framing high
10:41 order and first order views as a kind of cross uh uh uh cut a crosscutting future of every theory. Okay, this is a I I thought was also an interesting project of the book. So how we can read those theories as either high order the uh theories or first order theories and how we can see those theories being developed as a version of a first order theory or a version of a higher order theory. Okay. Uh so that said I will uh just uh um jump into my um my remarks.
11:19 Bo most of my my questions will be addressed to the empirical chapter of the book. I think it's a a very relevant chapter where you try to uh what has been a challenge for higher order uh uh views to actually being in dialogue with the empirical uh um uh data. Okay. So um so I think you uh you you do a very nice job. Um so you have a interesting remark saying that uh the
11:55 grounds for accept accepting a theory of consciousness are empirical and I kind of agree with this idea. Uh but I think also uh most of your defense of the high order uh theory uh is more defensive than actually trying to accommodate a different type of of u empirical data. Uh so one worry for uh for uh your view is how you could how the view view could
12:30 be refuted if the view could accommodate all type of empirical data. But I will make a disclaime focus more in the empirical uh uh chapter. So I have three but kind of a general point that I want to make. One is uh the first one one claim you have uh right in the introduction every theory is implicitly
13:03 high order or first order theories. Okay. So you can uh accommodate each theory can have a version if I well understood the claim each theories of consciousness can be framed in a high order view or a first order view. Um and I want to uh to discuss this claim whether um if any theory can actually accommodate high order versions. um maybe uh this uh how how actually what would be
13:41 uh the way to falsify the view if all all the views can accommodate this. The other claims a more specific claim about uh unfalsability. So you also try your own version of high order view the horror um you try to accommodate with different types of empirical finding. So we try to accommodate different neurolocations richness relational structure. So um I was wondering if uh what would be the way to falsify the
14:15 view if the view could accommodate different types of empirical data. But I I will reframe this in um with more details. And my final point will be will be a three three points three challenges for the view related to uh infant consciousness that could apply to animal consciousness. But I will uh ask more more uh uh I will frame the questions more uh regarding developmental issues of infant consciousness in humans. You
14:49 know maybe Jake might have more questions related to animal consciousness. Yeah. So I'll start with the the first point uh and and Jake feel free to to add if you also have some uh uh some points on on this. Uh okay. So in the page six of introduction you say um uh that every theory of consciousness is either a higher order theory or not. Okay. I think it uh there is uh I think the big idea here is that uh global
15:26 neuro workspace I local recurrence and attention theories could each come in high order versions. Okay. So you you can see different features of the of the each of those uh those theories although you you you you I'm I'm focus on those on on this those views here but you also think psychism can could come in a high order version. what I thought was really challenging to think about a particle
15:59 that would have a high order representation of their own states but it's uh uh putting aside whether this claim actually capture the entire landscape of theories even if it capture the those uh views I'm thinking here like the global workspace I lo local recurrence and attention theor a very interesting claim regarding ing whether those views could come each of them in a high order version. Um so in this sense the high order uh uh theories would not
16:35 be uh a fifth contender in the in the debate of theories of consciousness but much more a dimension of every theory if I well understood this claim. Okay. Uh I don't I think the claim is interesting and um maybe there is something here to explore but maybe I was wondering if the the the claim is kind of proved too much. Okay. So I want to hear more what you have to to say about this. I think the fact so one thing I had in mind is the fact that you
17:08 can actually find a feature f for instance uh whatever feature in any theory then this does not make that feature actually something that is what is playing the role of uh a marker for consciousness in that theory. Okay. So uh it doesn't make the future like what organize a organizing feature in the landscape of the theory. Okay. So to actually say that the high order aspect
17:43 is can be implicitly present in all theory, you have to tell us how this high order awareness um actually explain uh relevant role in the explanation of consciousness in that view and I don't know if actually uh you you you could uh you you would have like a a reply for is actually to to place the high order component that might be present in every view as the key feature of that view. Okay. Yeah. So
18:19 this would be uh and I think was without this this meta claim um this would be uh much more a weak claim. Okay. If you cannot show that in each ver in each high order version of a global workspace in each high order version of the local local recurrence process or the attentional process uh view if you cannot say that this feature is the key feature that actually explain consciousness in the view um
18:54 uh your claim that every theory of consciousness is either high broader theory or not, it would be like a weak claim. So I want to say if you want accurate to bite the bullet and um endorse the stronger claim that you can show that all those views, all those theories could be um uh designed in a way that has a high order uh in a high order version and prove that that high order feature is the key feature of the view or whether
19:29 you want to embrace a more weak claim. Yeah. Okay. This would be my my first point.
20:03 that a higher order view is one that somehow involves higher order awareness because you could construct all kinds of theories where the higher order awareness is maybe necessary but isn't playing like a determinative or core role. Like here's like a really silly theory, a theory where you've got a conscious state but in order for that state to have phenomenal consciousness, you have to have a higher order state about some other state. and like just contingently because of the way the brain is organized. You've got to have this higher order state about some other state. Neither of those states are conscious. You know what I mean? Um but that makes this state phenomenally
20:36 conscious. Is that view a higher order view? Um anyway, so I've just feel like that's kind of maybe a I don't know if that's echoing some things that Claudia is saying, but I've just I've often been unsure about exactly how to characterize what what is you know what makes a state a higher state. So anyway, does that make sense?
21:11 property of mind and that's going to involve psychological concepts uh as to from our pallet from which we want to theorize. Uh, so I don't really think that you can have a truly neuroscientific theory of consciousness in in the sense that I want to use the word theory of consciousness because I don't think it's going to really explain the thing that you're trying to account for. So I want to draw the distinction between an implementation and a theory. So I would say that you have a theory at
21:45 the psychological level and then you look in the brain for how that gets implemented. like what is the brain doing such that it doing that is the implementation of those psychological concepts. So so that's the way I would think about this um uh relation between well first of all where I would start like what are we even looking for? So then when like I look at a theory like RPT recurrent processing theory and it says aha well consciousness involves recurrent processing at the 350 millisecond range or 250 mill before whatever certain time
22:19 frame um and you say okay but that's not a psychological level concept uh that's a neur that's a neural concept. So like what is it that they are actually talking about when they are talking about recurrent processing? Well, I think that when you actually dig down into it, what they're talking about is is an awareness of things in the external environment and that in the overarching psychological theorizing side of things, people like Victor Llama are thinking, well, it's just you being aware of the thing in the environment.
22:51 That's what consciousness is. And awareness is of the thing in the world. So, it's a first order thing. And that turns out that awareness of that kind just is this recurrent processing. So that really he's guided I would argue he's guided by this implicit psychological theorizing that guides him to look for this relevant neurological implementation. So that the theory really is is not RPT. Um RPT is an in my way of thinking is an implementation of a first order idea namely that uh consciousness is a kind of awareness of
23:24 the ex what's out there. Um and then there are other implementations of that very same idea. So for instance, global workspace theory as is typically presented is another a competing um model of what it is to be aware of things in the external environment as I think of things. And when you look at the theory, the reason why you can come to that conclusion is because all they ever talk about are things in the world. They don't talk about things um you being aware of things in the mind or anything like that playing a role in in phenomenal consciousness. the
23:58 explanation of it. So, so I would say what makes them first order theories is that they are ultimately implementations of this psychological concept awareness and specifically awareness of things out there and what they differ on um is like in cases where you can't report and say are you really aware of the thing um so for example glob space takes one answer recurrent process takes no that's it so so I would so an answer to cla's question, I would say I would take the
24:31 stronger claim and say that each one of those theories could be modified into a higher order view. Um because you would just add to it the claim that in the state of which you are aware is the RPT state or the globally broadcast state and then you need a theory of inner awareness that somehow playing the right role. Um, now how would you know what that right role is? That's the kind of what I thought uh the thrust of the question was in terms of falsifiability
25:04 and how would you know which thing is doing that? So I want to address that in a second. But to Jake's question, what I would say is that what makes it in in my so sometimes I waffle on this a little bit because when I use the word theory of consciousness, what I'm really thinking of is something that in terms of an explanation. So I I don't really think that like pansychism is a theory of consciousness in some sense in that sense maybe. So I don't know although I do I do think by the way that Dave's sometimes toyed with a version of pansagism which is a kind of higher orderesque pansist type view. Um it is
25:38 very strange but I do think that's kind of this it's you know the self-representational electron uh is a kind of commitment of some of these views. So I I do think that and then there are people who would deny that. So so I do think of each view that is a theory of consciousness that you could have a higher order version of it. I I I would say that um but I don't know if that means it's implicitly so so maybe in Victor's sense the recurrent processing itself is a kind of implementation of inner awareness. I mean I don't think we have any reason to think that is or isn't the case as of
26:11 right now. Um, so now yeah. So I do think I would, as far as I'm understanding your first question, I think I would take the stronger route and say that each every theory could be turned into a higher order theory. Um, and the way that I view like RPT and Goldwork space theory as in my own thinking is as accounts of the first order state. So they are going to be answers to the
26:45 question what are you aware of when you hire order represent? And if you're a global, you could say global workspace, what you're aware of is the stuff that's global to be broadcast and therefore the first order states may be in the prefrontal cortex and floating around in in working memory. That's kind of Leoo's view in some sense, I take it. Um or you might say, "No, they're the states that are in V4. They're the recurrent processing states. Um those are the states of which you become aware." So I I I would view that as like those are just first order because they're just theories of awareness. So, so that's how
27:19 I would differentiate between these views is higher order views are ones that invoke inner awareness. First order views are ones that deny that inner awareness is is important and the kind of invoking of inner awareness that I have in mind is that it plays the right explanatory role because there are people who say I'm thinking of Nikico Selen's who has his ascending roadview which is kind of your view that you it's the silly view that you mentioned Jake. He does think that there is this kind of necessary connection between first order states and and inner awareness of some kind, but that that's not at all
27:52 relevant to why the first order state is conscious. So higher order theories simply are the ones that say there's something about inner awareness that's relevant to the nature of experience to the explanation for why it is the way it is. So, so I don't think that that is um you know a really hard distinction to make. So the kind of view you were saying where you represent that there's a dog next door, you know, I I'm not sure that's a higher review the way I just put it, but anyway. So if you turn it into some kind of weird
28:24 higher review where you're representing a mental state, uh, but in a weird way, then yeah, I don't know. Is that I would say maybe it depends on the specifics of it. So, so now as to Claudia's other question about how could you falsify any of this stuff, I would say, well, you can't falsify an approach, but unless you go through all the candidates and falsify them or show that there's something wrong with the whole approach. So that the empirical way to falsify these theories is looking at specific
28:57 implementations of them. So there's a specific version of the theory, first order theory, which is global workspace theory. There's a specific version of first order theory which is recurrent processing theory. There's a specific version of high order theory which is prefrontal horror theory etc. So I see them as kind of on a par where prefrontal horror theory is kind of analogous to like global workspace theory and then these other versions are more analogous to those and yeah so you just kind of go through and look at them individually um and compare their predictions but I don't see why that would make them unfalsifiable. They they all kind of vary on what they're going
29:29 to say about key cases. But but so yeah, I'm not sure. Claudia, did I
30:36 global broad broadcast I see I see better version I see like that the the view itself the theory itself can accommodate high order uh processing more easily and I think is is I think this is one of the reasons there are many uh versions of the higher order views I try to connect with a global workspace field, but the recurrent process it seems would require at least to change the the way the view was formulated. But
31:11 yeah,
31:44 workspace is you know higher order awareness is like a necessary condition. It's like a you know gatekeeper for letting things into the global workspace. You could just make the same kind of move with recurrent processing that like the high order awareness is like a necessary gatekeeper for there to become recurrent processing recurrent processing. I mean I'm with you that I think that these are sort of cludge add-ons that are sort of distinct from the original first order views. And so I guess yes you could create this kind of hybrid thing that accommodates some insights from both. It seems to me a little unmotivated but it doesn't seem to me like you couldn't do it. Well, I was making a different point though
32:17 which I mean I agree with what you're saying Jake but what I was saying was that since RPT is not defined psychologically you can interpret the in any way you want basically. So what it's defined in terms of neural activity and then there's an assumption about what that neural activity indicates psychologically. So what what what we know is that there's neurons which activate in a certain feed forward way in a certain time window and then at a certain point they activate in a recurrent way. Um, and then how do you interpret that psychologically? Well, why couldn't the recurrency be an inner
32:52 awareness of the kind that why isn't it a horror? Like I say, a higher order representation. Um, and that's what consciousness is. And it doesn't make any state back there conscious. It's just that's I mean, so my my point was that unless you interpret the neural stuff psychologically, uh, it you can't get anywhere. And in fact what what the what those guys are doing is implicitly interpreting it psychologically but just as first order awareness as this is just awareness of stuff out there. And I I and what I was
33:25 saying is I don't really see that we have good reason. Um I mean we don't really it's a mess right now how you map the psychological concepts onto the neural stuff. And so that's one postulate. And I'm not saying it's silly or wrong. I'm just saying it's not known to be true. um that that recurrent processing is a first order thing simply because it happens in V4. Um and
33:56 like implausible or something. So um
34:31 theory or this is a new theory uh because maybe some commitments of the theory would be really changed a lot. Yeah, just one one question if if it would still be the same view or
35:06 that uh views that do not require cortex. I don't know the midbrain view by by Mercur.
35:39 views that would be hard time to accommodate. Yeah, I see what I see what you're saying and it's a good point. I I think that uh what what I'm actually committed to now that I'm thinking through this here is well maybe and this isn't what I said because you know um who's got time to actually say what they mean. [laughter] It's I'm just kidding. But anyway, a sloppy writer is what what the actual answer is. Uh but um I think that what I I'm trying to say is that when you're when you're when you come to this landscape of of theories,
36:13 people often present this like recurrent processing and global workspace theory are two different theories of consciousness. And then there's higher order theories. And then they're like, wait, but why is like there all these varieties of them? Higher thought, higher this, higher that. And so it looks like it's kind of strange. like there's all these weird varieties and then these these different kinds of theories on the other side. But it seems to me that really these other theories just are offered as first order theories because the people who are the theorists are implicitly
36:48 first order theorists. And so what they've offered is a first order theory. But if they were higher order theorists, if they in other words, if they had the intuition that some kind of inner awareness was important, then they would be describing what they're saying in a different way. they might be pointing at the same stuff and describing it differently because we don't know and so for example another example of this is Steve Fleming I think his work where he has the hos model and he has this generative higher order state space model where if you if you activate the uh higher order state space it sort of
37:22 um is generative in a sense activity in the higher order module will percolate down and activate the states at the first order level um And so he thinks well okay so there's this thing that people like global ignition this this nonlinear transformation at a certain time people associate with global broadcasting that's an interpretation of what's happening there. Another interpretation is that there's some kind of process by which the first order state is being updated um which results in that kind of activity that we notice there. Uh and so it's it's not clear how to interpret at the psychological level
37:58 what these things are doing. Um, but yet there's often it's often assumed by these guys, especially in cognitive neuroscience. I think they're very sloppy about this a lot of times, uh, where they just assume that there's, well, since it's in V4, it's first order and visual, and since it's in prefrontal cortex, it's not visual. But it's but if you're thinking that the visual part of the brain is the part where consciousness of visual stuff is, then I just think we don't know where to look yet. we don't know where they'll look in the parietal cortex, the frontal cortex. It's it's a big mystery. Um, so th
38:32 though these questions often get run together and that's what I'm trying to sort out in in this part is by saying look so I agree with you and then what you're making me think right now by what you're saying is that yes, if you start off at the psychological level and say I'm giving a theory defined in terms of first order awareness, then probably you can't turn that theory into a higher order theory. So that my more limited claim would be that every theory is either one or the other. Um and then maybe you were saying the stronger claim is that you could take any theory and turn it as it is into the other. And and I think I would kind of soften that to
39:06 say no, you could take any neurological theory and turn it but not psychological. So I would then distinguish the psychological from the neurological and say that that stronger claim applies to the neural level um and this weaker claim applies to the um psychological level. So I don't know if that would help at all, but that's what I'm thinking now.
39:42 second question will be uh about uh you just start to reply but about uh falsifiability I don't know if uh Jake has another point more close to the discussion that we having okay so just making this point and then maybe yeah so um so I one thing I was uh um uh interesting chapter 4 that you is a chapter that you um you you you try to say what would be the impirical
40:17 grounds to accept to accept your view.
40:51 Okay. So the neurolocation, the richness, the rich versus sparse.
41:56 kind of a way to shuffle around stuff so that you can have a consistent interpretation of the data. I I believe that's always going to be true. It's just that it's going to be less interesting and less fruitful to to occupy that corner of space. There will be someone over there though. Um, you know, but it won't be
42:30 highers view can all be accommodated. uh and and if the the view that is not prefrontal cortex not rich and not compositional is so close to the first order view. So why this is not first order theory. So if you remove all the apparatus the pre prefer prefrontal cortex location the richness and the compositional aspect what rest like what is the what remains actually distinctive from high order
43:06 views from first order views. It seems like really the view collapse in a version of first order view. And yeah, so one one worry is the unfalsability worry that maybe um if the view can if if different versions of high order view can accommodate different data, different findings, it seems that um the view can never be falsified because it just say okay this is a a different version of our other
43:40 view that the finding uh that can accommodate this type of finding. So one question is this. The other question is uh if the version that that is the opposite of your own version is so removed of all the characteristic of our other view that seems collapsing of virtual other view. So it's a kind of two two words in this.
44:15 general frame.
44:48 pooing in the first session of quin but that's like a kind of classic
45:22 progressive um research programs aren't falsifiable in this sort of like narrow way. Um but I mean this is like now moving into more conversations about you know like philosophy of science and methodology. Um, but just like my general take is yeah, like the demand to be able to specify what's the one experiment that will falsify this theory. Just it's like I don't think any scientist has ever really thought that that's how science works. Um, anyway, so I'm just echoing points that you were making. I think
45:55 being her. [laughter]
46:28 refuted by an evidence the other version is still survives.
47:00 implementation would survive.
47:34 a different first order theory you can fall back on if you think this version this implementation of it has been falsified. You could become a global workspace theory if you think there's evidence against RPT and that would just be switching to a different kind of first order theory. And I think something like that is mirrored on the higher order. I mean all these sides actually, but that there's always another version of the theory that you could fall back on and be like, "Oh, well, if you just reorganize things like this, then I could get away with it." Um, and so that's why I think Jake was saying that what the kind of, you know,
48:06 progressive versus degenerative distinction um is really is really helpful here. But but I do think that there would be a kind of like general falsifier for for these kinds of views which is extreme and not havable but in principle could be had which is this brain clamp stuff that I always talk about of keeping the first order activity the same and then varying the higher order states and seeing what happens or vice versa keeping the higher order states the same and varying the first order states. And
48:38 a lot of part of my research empirically has been looking for cases that are this um and that's why you know when I first uh started studying this with and I was in classes with David Roosevelt he would talk about wine tasting you have the same first order state but different experience and people say well it's maybe it's not the same first order state and you talk about you know so there was always this sense that what we were looking for was some sense in which the psychological states at the first order were the same and then you could see a difference in what it was like for you and then when you know I know I met Hawwan and heard about subjective
49:11 inflation I thought a ha so here's some empirical stuff that looks like that turns out it's really hard to nail down in the empirical details to get any kind of confidence that you really do have the states matched in the way that the the prediction requires but still the general idea that first order theories would be triumphant as a class if you could show that you could vary the higher order state and not change the experience at all that you know you're looking at a red thing and
49:43 you're messing around with every higher thought and you suddenly believe it's green see it but it just still looks red um that would really wipe away those theories or vice versa if you could hold the first order states constant whatever they are you'd have to find out what they are and then hold them constant and then vary the higher order content along any dimension in all you would better have some change in the experience of the subject So, it seems to me that that would be a way of like falsifying the classes of theories, but but we don't have that because we can't achieve this ideal
50:17 condition of keeping these because we don't know what they are. We can psychologically define them, but looking in the brain, it's like, oh my, it's a mess in there. So, we're at the early stages, I would say. And the worst limit condition is is the Dennit style version where there's no systematic correlation between what's going on inside the head and the psychological level theorizing. All there is is like person level stuff that it tracks and then you can't make any kind of guesses about what states are inside. Um that would be horrible. But you could have a kind of higher
50:50 order denet um interpreter, you know. Uh so I do think that that's a poss. a very keep it away from me type of view, but it's it's not impossible. So anyway, I would say that all of these views are on the table. And that doesn't mean that it's like unfalsifiable or any way different than the first order. I would just say we're just becoming more sensitive to the landscape and the distinction between the psychological level and the neural implementation of it. the way you could have different versions of first order theory, the way you could have different versions of
51:21 higher order theory, what in principle would count as like decisive evidence, but given that we're not in ideal conditions, like how do we approximate something that is close to the ideal condition is the actual empirical challenge that we face ourselves in. And so it's going to be a lot messy like the way you describe it's going to be we don't but but in the ideal case it wouldn't be messy. We we could just hold some stuff constant and twiddle the right dial and be like look nothing changed therefore end of story. But we we don't have the control um or the
51:56 understanding of the relationship of these levels that would allow us to do that. But that's my view is that ultimately that is how we would decisively settle this. But given that probably that's too hard for us, all we can do is kind of try to find these approximations and there's always going to be a Nurath corner where someone can hide and rearrange everything else out there and hide in their little corner. Um, and it just will become increasingly clear that it's not interesting to do so. Uh, in the sense that it's just not at we're not getting interesting
52:27 questions. We're not being led to new ideas. It doesn't apply to another area. We're like, whoa, look at that. Um whereas I think that you know one of the arguments we try to make this argument in the trends and cognitive science paper that I wrote with Joe and Hawwan where we're like part of the reason why higher theories are interesting is because of the translational benefits of thinking about some psychological dist distress some psychological disorders thinking about why uh treatments for depression change the behavior but don't make the person feel better right the these ideas have the power to maybe help
53:01 us understand some of those things which is if we're going to break out of this kind of uh puzzle of how we decide it's going to be those kinds of things I think um that it leads us in interesting unexpected directions kind of the same idea that you get from people that talk about string theory a lot like why do we take it so seriously because it has so many surprising unexpected applications it leads us in so many interesting new directions that we wouldn't ever thought of doesn't mean that it's true but it but it means that you know we should still be taking it seriously So anyway, that's that's a lot that I
53:34 said, but I don't know if you have anything you want to come back on that.
54:07 like it's it's not that interesting. Um, and yeah, I I agree with you that there's like a million ways that high order theory can be sort of unpacked and and worked out and there's, you know, not just at the implementation level, but I think even thinking through at the psychological level, like what how to make sense of the theory and so that way it's like very fruitful and um uh has a lot of room to be worked out, but also that gives it the room to be flexible and dodge objections and so forth, which makes it look like it's unfalsifiable, but really what it is is progressive in this kind of I think good way that good science is
55:49 it's obviously it's really great.
56:23 one place in a really thoughtfully argued way. Um, I mean, and and I found it like both I don't know like I agree with just so much of what you're doing in it, but also have what I think are like some very serious disagreements about like very basic things in the book, you know? And I'm just I don't know. I'm I'm still even after years of thinking about your stuff like kind of on the fence about whether or not like my crit my my concerns are like really just purely terminological and like not super substantive and interesting.
56:55 exactly. I want to use you against you in some of my questions. Okay.
57:28 you're calling the traditional high order view.
57:59 traditional view. So I'm defending my version of the traditional view. Um uh okay. So those are kind of like Richard qualifications to like the kind of uh thing I want to say. But okay, but B, you know, get all that kind of ground clearing out of the way. Yeah. My main concern has to do with your like I don't know reject rejection or neutrality with regard to the transitivity principle. And I guess my main worry about the horror way of describing the higher order approach which again in many ways like I think we think like the same molecules are there and the same molecules are moving in their same way. So we're just the implementation stuff we're probably all going to agree about
58:32 or at least I'm I'm happy to go along with a lot of the stuff you say about implementation. It's describing the psychological level and what we want to I mean it's fundamentally what state do we want to call as the conscious state I think is like where where I seriously disagree. um or at least I'm concerned. Um and so like a big move that you make in the book and that I think is central to distinguishing horror from like the traditional view is distinguishing what like what people in the traditional side call state consciousness from what most folks in consciousness studies call
59:04 phenomenal consciousness. Um and I think horror wants them to coincide in a certain way but not in the way that I want them to coincide. I want them to be if there's phenomenal consciousness, it just is state consciousness. Um, and that's motivated, I think, by thinking about a traditional way of construing the transitivity principle. So the traditional way of construing the transitivity principle is if you're in a state and you're not anywhere anyway aware that you're in that state, then that state's not conscious. So what is it for the state to be conscious? It's for you to be somehow aware that you're
59:37 in that state. And horror has to reject that because you want to say that the the state that's conscious is the state in virtue of which you're aware of yourself as being in the state, not the state that you're aware of yourself as being in. Um, and I guess I a way to put you the the the comment just like as a question is just I'm not sure I totally understand the motivation for thinking higher order awareness figures at all in the explanation of phenomenal consciousness if you reject the transitivity principle as I've stated it. Um, and so I I have lots of like
1:00:12 follow-up questions and stuff like that to talk about because I think I have a broad idea about what you want to do, which is that you think it falls out of experimental results and I'm skeptical that that can do it for kind of reasons that you've already alluded to. Um, but anyway, so I don't I don't know if I should stop there and like let you say some stuff. Um, I have like more like kind of direct objection type ways of putting my point. So maybe I'll just give you one which is um so I think you do a really cool thing in the book where you try to say that there's like a way of rejiggering the transitivity
1:00:45 principle that fits with horror. um
1:01:54 horror because now it's open that the state that's conscious isn't the state you're aware of being in, but the state in virtue of what you're aware of being in the state. Um, I think that's a cool move and it's a lot like the move that you and I make in our paper in Phil Sych where we say, well, actually you can connect phenomenal consciousness and state consciousness by putting the TP in terms of what it's like.
1:02:58 aware of being in a different state um uh and so in a conscious state um and in the in uh and in a state that you're not aware of being in. You see I mean
1:04:03 version of it is before. So because I don't think anybody would agree to the claim if you're in a state but you're not in any way appropriately aware of being in a state and you're not in a conscious state that does not sound like if you want to call it intuitive or common sense or like something I would agree to. Uhhuh.
1:04:35 that's supposed to be like I don't like saying intuitive because I have issues with thinking about intuitions, but you know, it's supposed to be like it's supposed to be a thing that ordinary people would agree to.
1:05:08 equivalent but not um typically stated as the transitivity principle but it is just the statement that's supposed to be like no one can disagree with that and and actually I I I wonder like do you disagree with that that if you're in a state you have no idea you're not in any way aware of that state you think that that state still could be conscious ious. I mean, you you
1:06:15 folk psychology um because I think that folk psychology bad uh cognitive science good so I think that when you want to say what a mental state is and you want to start talking about these kinds of things you should not talk to the folk um you should talk to the cognitive scientist And so that's my what I what how I think of what a mental like what is a mental state I say it's whatever the cognitive scientists say what just like whatever a physical thing is what the physicist say you look to the science um and so you know that there's a debate about that
1:06:49 for right now like take the activity in the amydala um led Joe Leoo is going to say that's not a mental state that's occurring in the amydala because it mental states are the ones that uh involve modeling and there's no modeling in the amydala whereas someone like yaks pens is going to say no that is a mental state there that that low-level activity in the amydala. So, so there's a debate about that and we have to make a decision about it but I don't know empirically that we have good we we're not sure what to think about this yet. So, do you want to count the activity in the amydala as like unconscious fear?
1:07:23 Leoo says no. Uh Panske says yes maybe. So I I think that these questions are still very much um very much open and that we don't really uh what we're still in the early days of trying to map all of this dial. So that's so I want to proceed with a little bit of a little bit of caution here. But um when when you're saying like well in the more objectiony way of of putting things um what I would say is that there's still even so there still
1:07:57 is a common sense sort of way I can put what I say um which is the following thing which is that if you aren't in any way aware of something happening in your mind then you're you don't have a conscious experience. If if I mean I think that's as common sense as the way you put things which is the contraositive to my version of the the transitivity principle is just like if you don't have any awareness of of something happening in your mind how what what kind what experience are you having like so I I don't see like does anyone deny
1:08:30 that I don't know yeah lots of people maybe but it's at least a way of saying something that's similar to the common sense thing which I at least find some intuitive grip on myself like if I'm not aware if I don't have any awareness of myself as be you know seeing red or hearing a sound or feeling a pain like what's what's you're still saying I'm conscious like that sounds weird to me so that's at least as common sense as like you know that you when you're not aware of it you because um anyway at least by which I mean if you took a poll of all the people you probably find
1:09:03 percentages of people saying yes and percentages of people saying no and it's all a mess so I just think that we don't want to lean too much on this folk stuff. We want to say what are the various candidates and when we start theorizing we take the thing we're theorizing about and we ask what the appropriate level of theor uh theorizing is. In this case I argue it's the psychological level. So we want to use those that toolkit. Um and the primary thing that we're all talking about right now
1:09:36 is awareness and representation. And so the question is whether the kind of awareness that's importantly involved is awareness of stuff out there or awareness of something in my mind. And why would you focus on those two kinds of awareness? Because historically lots of people have said one or the other of those seem important. They just are the things that people have talked about. So like you know Aristotle said, we survey the masses because they've done a lot of induction for us. This is just what people think that some people say it's
1:10:09 just awareness out there. Some people say it's inner awareness. You have long traditions on both sides going back to to Aristotle to Khan to I mean to Brentano to everyone. So it's just a lot lots of stuff have been talked about in this area. Seems like an important question that we would like to have an empirical answer to. So we don't need transitivity principles. We don't need any of this stuff. We just need to know there are these two candidates that people have proposed as being importantly involved in the explanation of this thing that we find very important. I want to explain and those two candidates are inner awareness and
1:10:43 outer awareness and maybe there's some other candidates too but I don't really see any other candidates to be honest with you. Um so you know uh there was a paper that came out recently that said like beyond going beyond higher order first order and I was like you can't do that. I almost wrote a response to it but uh then I had to go teach my 70 classes. So anyway the I do think this is an important this line is very very important and it is a kind of hard and fast economy in the way that Claudia was bringing up. I do think of things this way. Um so anyway uh why would you be looking in this area?
1:11:16 Because other people have this intuition that transitivity is important and other people don't though. So, I just think that once you get to that point, you don't need to be motivated. You just need to be empirically minded. And these are proposed candidates. So, let's test them. And I don't need to like tell you why you should care about it. Well, I do. I think actually, that's the first part of my book. I do kind of say everyone should care about this for the reason you said, namely, every theory is harboring commitments one way or the other. But beyond that then why I personally should believe one theory or
1:11:50 the other has to be because of these empirical considerations not because of the transitivity principle. So that would be the first thing I would say. So that the reason I'm skeptical of it is because I don't think you need to motivate me. Um well to motivate me you need to have me choose between these options that are already established in in the history of humans I would say so that I don't need to come up with it all on my own. I just need to recognize that people have proposed these two candidates and we still don't know which is right and then we would like to know. So I would say
1:12:23 that's good enough motivation already for investigating whether or not inner awareness is is a relevant thing and it doesn't rely on the transitivity principle. just relies on this sociological fact that people have proposed this idea and we don't know if it's true.
1:12:57 why are people talking about it in these two ways? because they have a conception of what it is that they're talking about, an ordinary conception. And I think that that's all that I mean when I talk about trying to start with our folk psychological conception of things. You're just trying to get at
1:13:31 the contemporary consciousness literature like for the last 50 or so years have described consciousness in allegedly a common sense way that there are these two ways. I'm not sure that in ordinary people actually think about them in these two ways. I think that philosophers do. Um, so here are the two ways. There's the transitivity principle way and then there's the way that I think you're actually more drawn to which is what I think a lot of people are drawn to which are really which which I would regard as more common among the first order theorist which is the what it's like way of describing
1:14:04 things
1:15:11 whether the folk have any opinions about consciousness and if so whether they think in terms of transitivity principles or not. Um I can tell you myself that I caught myself thinking in both ways at different times when I was an undergraduate. So it seemed to me as though you could elicit both of those. Like when people talked about transparency I was like yeah duh. And then when people talked about transitivity, I was like, "Yeah, duh." And then I was like, "Wait, what?" So, um, but and I found many people you can pull them towards transparency, push
1:15:46 them towards transitivity, pull them away from transity, push them toward it just seems like these transparency is the counterpoint. Namely, that all we are conscious of is stuff out there. Um, and that we're never aware of any mental thing at all. I think you can find that as strong as widespread in the folk as you can this intuition about a state of which I'm not aware. So that's an empirical conjecture and you know that luckily we have X5 people to go look at that. I'm not one of those guys but luckily I think they can do it. Anyway, so that's one claim. Okay, that's the folk. But the the sneak move that I want
1:16:23 to guard against is that now we move to what does the science of consciousness have to explain.
1:17:32 theory. It's capturing what ordinary people think consciousness well something a fact about consciousness that they think in ordinary thinking. Um, and from that claim, you can then spin out to get both a richer understanding of what the folk conception is by doing the the contraositive and then go on your way to get a theory like high order thought theory.
1:18:07 contra contraositive is. I don't think they think they're equivalent. In other words, I don't think that ordinary people understand conditionals very well.
1:18:40 it's H2O even though everybody knows that now right the what H2O is a is uh some scientific stuff that chemists tell us to explain this common sense thing that we can describe in common sense terms that the clear drinkable whatever you know the primary intention in Dave's language versus the secondary intention or whatever um so you want to first get that description of if you want to do science on water or consciousness you want to get a description of this of the in the common sense terminology first before you go on to trying to give any
1:19:12 sophisticated account of how it's implemented chemically or neurally or whatever.
1:20:17 is why does Seth and Bane you know catalog 22 theories and there was a new one then 200 theories because if you start with this thing what it's like it could be correlated with anything I mean it could be correlated with high order awareness it could be correlated with recurrent processing it could be correlated with a you know global workspace it could be correlated with it's in shoes and galaxies I mean we don't know what we're talking about because the because the definition that you've given or the characterization that's in common sense
1:20:51 what we're talking about because I don't know what we're talking about. Right. I think implicitly the thing that everyone actually thinks, you know, you you made an interesting point. You were saying I think a lot of people, you know, cast their neurological theories in first order terms because they're first order theorists, but they could have cast it in high order terms. I think people talk in this what it's like way, but they're actually implicitly higher order theorists because the only way that we have any grip on what consciousness is at the common sense level is through this common this high order way of thinking about it that a conscious state is just one that you're aware of. Um,
1:21:24 they don't think of it in those terms and you have to get them to do some work to think through to do to do a conditional from the intuitive one to the less intuitive one. Um, but I think that that's what implicitly everyone's got to be thinking about when they think about consciousness because I otherwise don't know what we're talking about, right? Or why people would be talking about it throughout history. Like you're like I mean I'm sorry I'm blathering. So I'll definitely let you jump in.
1:21:56 out and see that people have been talking in a high order way. I think that that's like saying I just want to look out and see that it just as it so happens people talk about water as it's this clear drinkable thing. I mean I don't know if it is or not. Um but I'll treat it as a good going hypothesis. That's a weird way to talk. No clear drinkable thing just is water, right? And so it's not surprising people talk about that. Then we need a theory to figure out what it is and I might turn out to be H2O. I think similarly
1:22:29 That's where you start.
1:23:02 mean.
1:23:34 mean? Or it could be the fish. Um, you know.
1:24:06 but it has to be descriptive otherwise it's not clear how we're supposed to I mean
1:24:39 forward making sense of some phenomena. If you say well I've demon I've demonstrated it you know now do the science on it. They're going to say, "Okay, you know, I got to get my lab going. Can you tell me what it is I'm supposed to be explaining?" And so, for example, of all the other psychological phenomena that you think we have good going sciences about, like attention or memory, um there's they have to operationalize what they're talking about. They have to say, you know, here's how we understand, you know, what it is attention is in terms that give it something we can explore. Um, and I
1:25:14 think that one of the big problems with consciousness research is what we do is we operationalize around verbal report. Now, that's not unsurprising, of course, if you like the PP. Um, but it seems unmotivated.
1:25:46 contrastive methodology to figure out uh what's going on in the conscious case and what's going on in the unconscious case, whether or not whatever you whatever thing you've seen only occurs in the conscious case is actually just correlated with verbal report and not with
1:26:20 made like Jonathan Burch in the um, infant and non-human animal consciousness literature is is that if you have theories of consciousness that are motivated experimentally where you're just doing this contrasted methodology and you find some difference in ordinary normal human human adults that like whenever they're able to verbally report on this you know uh state um it's got this function and whenever they can't verbally report on it it doesn't have this function. Um, you can always wonder whether that's just some quirk of something that's
1:26:52 necessary for uh human consciousness and not for infant or non-human animal consciousness.
1:27:26 Anyway, so that's like that's one of my biggest questions for you. Yeah.
1:27:59 others make, Josh and David included. So they they want to talk about what it's like and I don't see you denying that kind of talk and I know David Rosenol doesn't deny that kind of talk. when we want to explain what it's like for the subject, we appeal to the higher order representations. Um, and that's what consciousness is. A matter of what it's like for you is a is a way that often you find higher order theorists of the traditional variety speaking. And phenomenal consciousness
1:28:33 just is what it is like. So, as I use the term I and I said I I understand that everyone uses these terms every which way and I explicitly say you could you can this territory is so well tread that it's a a pulp that you can reconstitute in any which way you want and I'm stipulating how I'm going to use these terms. And so for phenomenal consciousness I mean what it's like for you. I mean this the uh what I call phenomenal character or all these you know phenomenal properties whatever fancy words you want to use I just mean
1:29:06 what it is like and when you say a state of which you are not in any way aware is one that's not conscious what you really mean is there's nothing it's like for you. So that's just phenomenal. So you're just saying phenomenal consciousness then you're just saying you're giving a theory of phenomenal consciousness and saying basically if you're not aware of the state there is no phenomenal consciousness and I say that's a great that's a that's a that's a proposal for the nature of consciousness. Uh but it
1:29:39 is not the defining characteristic of the science of consciousness because it is already put in terms of phenomenal consciousness. It's already saying what we want to explain is what it's like for you. We want to explain sub this uh phenomenal subjective well as I would put it. So I I wanted to say I want to say that um phenomenal consciousness has subjective and phenomenal character where subjective character is the thing that distinguishes conscious states from unconscious states and the phenomenal character is the specific phenomenologically manifest aspects
1:30:14 um in the stream of consciousness. And that's what you want to explain too. you just don't want to use those words and you say, "I don't know what you're talking about when you say those things." But then you go on to say the terminologically equivalent things and give an explanation that I recognize in as an explanation of the thing that I'm talking about. So I just don't understand how you could say that you don't know what it is we're theorizing about when you are sitting there giving a theory of that very thing using the same language and just saying, "Oh yeah, but uh it's not the thing we're talking
1:30:47 about." So that's how it sounds to me a bit like what you're trying to do. Um and so I think that what you're trying the argument you're trying to make is say state consciousness is phenomenal consciousness. Um and what I want to argue is that state consciousness is distinct from phenomenal consciousness but that we're both trying to give an account of phenomenal consciousness. Um, even if you don't want to use that term, I think that's merely a terminological point that is like, you know, uh, stemming from not wanting to use proprietary language that was invented at a
1:31:20 different university given that we come from a separate university, if you know what I'm saying. Um, so we don't want to use the NYU lingo maybe, but I I don't think you're describing a different phenomenon. Um, and in fact, it sounds to me like you're just talking about the same stuff. So, so I that's how I would hear what you're saying. I don't see like what you
1:31:53 and defining it in this what it's like way, the high order view can accommodate that notion if you like. Um and you know for publication purposes and so forth since the terminology of the day broadly speaking is this what it's like terminology and phenomenal consciousness terminology you know you you can't just write a paper without mentioning it or starting put casting things in those terms.
1:32:26 would talk about conscious states. Um, and it for one thing they weren't distinguished from access conscious and phenomenal conscious. That was what that distinction was initially introduced to distinguish. Um, but characterizing conscious states as states for which there's something that it's like
1:33:00 in ancient Greek. This is not a new thing. We're talking about the properties of our experiences. This this is just a word to name that thing which has always been there. And what you can find people talking about in every tradition. I I don't I don't think you can really make this claim that you're trying to make which is that this is something invented by Ned in 1996 or whenever he wrote that paper and no one else has ever believed in it until then. It just doesn't seem right to me. That seems completely
1:33:35 terms we can use for that. We could call it if you like phenomenal consciousness. We could call it if you like state consciousness. Um that's all terminology. There's a question of how do we get a grip on that? What's the common sense description? Because there's the thing water and I guess we could call it I don't know what's another name for water like awa, you know, other languages. Um, so we could call it lots of different things. Then there's a qu So there's the term that picks out the thing. Then there's the description of it in common sense terms that lets us have a grip on what word it is that we're talking about.
1:34:09 state consciousness, I don't know, consciousness, the experience, whatever you want to call it. And then there's the grip. And your grip, and the grip that's been the grip for since Nagel is what it's like. Um, my my claim is that okay, fine, but it's not very informative. Um, it kind of feels close to just like AWA. It's like almost like another name rather than an actual description. Um, it gives the vibe unlike AWA that you're saying more, but I don't know that you're saying much more and you're certainly not saying
1:34:41 enough to ground a theory. It doesn't point to any theory, which is why it's compatible with infinitudes of theories.
1:35:14 elements it doesn't freeze at a certain temperature.
1:35:46 description, but not like any. Whereas what it's like gives us no constraints on what a theory could look like. Um, which is why it can be realized by literally it could be in your shoes, which is what lots of famous people think. Um,
1:36:19 from this description of the phenomena and so the phenomena is completely untethered from you know we don't know what a good explanation would look like. This is why there's a hard problem. However, if there's another description which coincides with what it's like or is really primary in in our driving our thinking about consciousness is that that's really what we really think it is. um that could put some constraints on it. And the only other description I've ever heard anybody ever give, as you pointed out, there's two strains, I guess, in in history, but I think this strain, and I don't know, I I haven't
1:36:52 talked to enough scholars because I'm um I don't go to conferences as much as I as I'd like these days, but I haven't talked to any lock scholars, but my sense is like that more common way to talk about it in the history of people who have talked about consciousness is this kind of higher order way, which is that if that that the states that are conscious are the ones that you are suitably aware that you're in. Um, and that seems to be the only other way that we have into it. Um, so it's at least in my view on par with what it's like, if not primary. Like what it's like is like kind of a secondary way of describing
1:37:24 it. Seems like a theoretical add-on. Um, which describes the states of which we're aware of ourselves as being in.
1:37:57 the hell are you doing? And then someone's like what's wrong? I'm not doing anything wrong. Well, what's your problem? I think the the natural response is you're causing pain. The baby feels pain. It's suffering. And that's wrong to do so. No one says anything about you're causing it to have conscious states. No one says anything like that. They say it feels
1:38:28 that from your point of view it's painful um and that that picks out the thing that is morally relevant and gives me reason not to care about the infant. Um I think there's other things too by the way. I'm not just a consciousness uh I I think there's reasons beyond consciousness to care morally about things but I think consciousness is an important reason to care about things. So, um, but no one is doing what you said. Oh, that they're in a state and the state is conscious and they're just saying they have a feeling and they feel pain. There's a there's a experience that they
1:39:03 have. And those ways of talking seem to me to more coincide with the what it's like business than with the conscious state business. Because no one mentioned states or whether they're conscious. They said there's an experience, there's a feeling. And then it's theorizing that add states and you're aware of it. That's all theorizing. So it just seems to me like you're kind of trying to put it in the reverse order. The theorizing is the stuff that mentions states. The the stuff that mentions what it's like is is not theorizing. It is simply
1:39:38 pointing to something and saying what is that?
1:40:14 explanation of the of the view or actually change the consequences of the view
1:40:50 you become transitively aware of them. So those are two things I think that like very controversial empirical claims that follow immediately just definitionally from the theory. So
1:41:22 from each other. And yeah, like I'm okay with that. Like, you know, the sometimes theories do have empirical consequences and
1:41:55 you're defining it into existence and then ruling out all possible counter examples
1:43:00 different under different conditions, it's a big deal
1:44:35 water acts weird in those conditions.
1:45:08 like string theory and how it gave us a theory of gravity when it was really applied for strong nuclear interactions or something.
1:45:42 that, but you haven't really successfully avoided talking about the thing under consideration, which is
1:47:19 the things that I Richard Brown say. In which case I'd say yeah fine but don't do it. But but are you saying something more than that?
1:47:52 said which is that there is consciousness. It's just not what you think it is. And then what Keith has added to that is yeah, it's not what you think it is. And what you think it is is phenomenal consciousness.
1:48:25 is in the minority. I agree.
1:48:59 say, which is the thing that we said a couple years ago, is that these notions coincide, right? That when people are talking about phenomenal consciousness, they're talking about the same thing that the TP is on to. I think that that's the kind of more ecumenical way to bring things together. I'm saying that I could do all the moves that you're making in the more extreme version where all there is is state consciousness. You're the illusionist. Um, the definition of consciousness, which is state consciousness, is a state you're aware of. Phenomenal consciousness, I don't know what that is. Like, you know, like that could be true, maybe not true or whatever. I don't want to do that. I'd like I'd
1:49:30 rather have the state and phenomenal coincide claim. That's all that I'm saying.
1:50:38 that's it doesn't entail that those states do or ever have to exist. Now they do I think typically and I think that they are mental and I do think they exist but I don't think that that I don't think that the TP version of the higher order view automatically commits you to the existence of non-concious mental states. It could be that as you claim whenever there's consciousness there's awareness of states um [snorts] awareness of oneself being as being in states. It could be that none of the states are that you're aware of yourself as being in are actually mental states. I mean that's compatible with the
1:51:11 traditional TP. I don't think it's right. Um
1:51:44 state into a conscious state by becoming aware of it. So I think that's a kind of a [snorts] that is a way that people describe it, but I think it's a little misleading because I don't think there's any turning. I mean I'm a non-reationalist like like you are. Um so I don't think that the first order state gets modulated in any way. um or even
1:52:17 that term functions like more like apparent or appears it's the apparent state um and so
1:52:50 I'm trying to say that it does commit you to denying overflow. Um but I don't think
1:53:23 clear that he has an argument for the transitivity principle based on this idea I would say that the um the mental state of which you are aware is the same one which shows up unconsciously during priming. Um
1:53:55 that you I don't think anything has so the science of consciousness had better explain what it's like to be me um or to be an infant or to be a dog. And if it can't do that then I don't want to play anymore. I'd rather I have other things I'd rather be doing. Um, and if you think that you can say you can have a theory of consciousness without doing that, then I don't respectfully believe that you're being sincere or taking seriously the first person date. So, I
1:54:31 don't I can never honestly sincerely believe a person who says, "I don't know what you mean when you say what it's like." Because they're having an experience at that moment. So, how could they not know? They they all they need to do is be themselves. That that's it. It's just that. So I I always find it disingenuous like literally honestly a kind of weasel move to suddenly start saying we don't know what you're talking about and oh it could be it's like this is in some sense the most important most apparent most directly right in front of your face thing that we could ever
1:55:05 encounter the nature of our own conscious experience. And I don't know if you need to take some DMT or go on a vision quest or what, but man, it's like very obvious that it that we are having these what seemingly are direct immediate encounters with these things. Anyway, so I just I find it very I I honestly can't really take seriously this as more than a rhetorical move whereby the
1:55:38 person is trying to say I don't want to be trapped in this first person methodology because I want to say physicalism and I like physicalism but I can't deny the existence of consciousness. I just don't I can't take that seriously. So
1:56:10 than the states that I'm aware of? And so there are these conscious states and they're the states I'm aware of. Um, and I can tell you about
1:56:45 disagreement in the very end. Okay.
1:57:54 try to press you in two uh requirements and one point of the view maybe three points that maybe be problematic for infant consciousness and see what you have to to say about this and Jake feel free to just uh jump into the the three points if you have something more to say. Uh so I think maybe the the three points is the concepts there the the the conceptual content requirements um the self components
1:58:27 and the fact that the view does not allow any gra uh gradation okay so either you are you have the high order state or don't have. So I think those three points uh might might create some some problems for accommodate any developmental uh view of consciousness. And and what is interesting is that in the high order uh theories as a whole there are uh other versions of the high order
1:59:01 views that you could accept that uh you would not have the same problem but you want to have one version of the view that might raises more strong problem for the kids of infant consciousness but I know that you actually want to accommodate them. So I just I'll just bring those points to see how you would accommodate uh them in those cases. Okay. Um yeah. So the first uh uh so okay so those three points together
1:59:34 is related to how the view may be committed with some kind of adult linguistic condition. Okay. And if you are committed with this you might uh uh this might be a problem from for infant consciousness. So first one the conceptual content requirement and maybe this allows you also to see a little bit more about your exchange with an ad block and the color concept. You have this in a in a footnote. So so so you you insist to say that horo uh
2:00:11 deploy concepts. Okay. So the concept of seeing perceptual red or being a state uh and you know we know from developmental psychology uh that some of those con concepts we arrive very late in development at least the first year the second year. uh so maybe some of the concepts that it seems that the view imply might not be available for infants.
2:00:47 So one idea if I well understood in the discussion of the color discrimination that maybe it's uh uh one place where you discuss this what would be available for infants would be a kind of a general concept. Okay. So even if the the infants didn't have could not have the discriminative concept of color of that shade of red uh they would have like color concept of color or concept concept of seeing
2:01:23 um and I think this and as an add point this is very uh this is contested by uh the mental psychology seems that they are not implying any color concept cept before 6 months and this will rule out uh consciousness in early stages and even if you appeal okay they don't have the concept of color they have the concept of seeing it seems to me harder to claim this maybe infants has I don't know if they have some very basic
2:01:56 primitive concept I don't know this object this would be hard for me to think that they have like seeing as a concept or a general concept of color. Actually I think this comes really later probably they have more concepts related to objects they are seeing and then just later more general concepts emerge but because the general concept would require more more abstraction like the concept that I'm seeing seeing things
2:02:30 seems require much more abstraction than just the concept of this um and among The high order theories are one view Janaro Roco Janaro's uh view that uh have this primitive concept. Maybe the first concept is this this pain a kind of a demonstrative concept that seems to me more plausible than the view you're holding. Yeah. So, so the question is uh what do you think about this or how you could
2:03:03 accommodate infant uh consciousness with this more abstract concepts the the the the interaction with the specific discussion of color concept and why not adopt a more uh that would be available for high order views some more simpler view as the the you start with a very basic de demonstrative concept of things that rocker generos view endorses. I'm saying that because in in in my my my infant uh our infant consciousness
2:03:38 paper, I want to accommodate her how other views as one view that could allow for infant consciousness in the uh in early stages, but the the horror view make things harder [laughter] so to speak.
2:04:12 it. But anyway, it's got to be in here somewhere. Anyway,
2:05:15 about this two weeks ago. He's very skeptical about infant consciousness, and he's neuroscientist. So I I think there is room for skepticism. Um and there are people who [snorts] still are skeptics but I don't really think of myself as someone who shares that skepticism. Um okay so that's the first thing to say is yes I I do want to accommodate the intuition and I don't want to be someone like Peter Kathers um who just says yeah so what that's the view. Um, okay. So, there are versions of high order theory, I think, where it's going to come out as an implication
2:05:48 of the theory that infants of a certain range don't have um conscious experience. I think possibly the traditional higher thought theory is one of them. So, I'd be curious to hear what Jake has to say about this. Uh, but um I think there are innate concepts. Uh so that there could be a core set of innate concepts and the self is a good candidate for one of those concepts which is innate a primitive version of the self maybe a stripped down version of just this
2:06:20 clump of cells this body this this thing. So I I think something like that is innate probably. Um there's some it's very sketchy because it's hard to test but I think there's some reason to think that this could be the case. In which case then you know um it wouldn't be so hard to think that there's some very lowlevel higher representation as of you know there's a me there's something but also I think that there is a possibility of a what I call a selfless horror which is just a kind of um instead of I am seeing
2:06:56 red is a kind of there's red but not attributing to any self. Um, so I do think that that's a possibility for infant consciousness that maybe they just have that the concept if the concept of the self is not there then possibly they're just kind of having experiences that are free floating in a sense a redness here bless there sound over there and then it kind of coaleses maybe around the center once they start representing themselves as distinct thing I don't know there's speculations but I do think that there's a possibility for a selfless horror and I think that Rosenthal has argued against
2:07:29 the idea and saying you need to have the high concept in the higher thought. I think the argument fails um uh for reasons that I say in the book, but basically because I have pointer contents that allow some connection. So you could say who states they are even if there's no eye content in there. Um anyway, so I I do think that's a possibility. I think maybe there's a primitive self, maybe there's no self, but instead some kind of selfless representation of of something going on. um it is going to involve demonstratives and I think just that one I mean yeah there's got to be some sense in which
2:08:04 these concepts are easy to acquire because like the concept of scene for example in the in the kind of concept that's going to show up in a higher order state that I'm talking about is not going to be the same concept that you get when you're walking around saying like oh I see that thing over there it's going to be a special concept showing up only in these specialized states in which case I think just visual activity enough alone is going to be wired up in the brain probably in the way to just lead to having these concepts be acquired. So I don't I I would I would speculate that it's not difficult to acquire these concepts like
2:08:37 seeing um or perceptible red at a primitive very vague level. So I do think that development consciousness develops in terms of specificity in terms of generality etc. So you start off with a kind of vague blooming buzzing confusion which maybe is a way to make sense of what Alan Sobnik talked about right just like you know a bunch of stuff hopping around everywhere and then it kind of trims into this point of view. That's one possibility. Uh but none of these are like out of line with the horror theory. It just says that they would I mean empirically it could
2:09:11 be disconfirmed if you could show that infants have no way of having these kinds of higher order states. But we don't know what in the brain would count as having these higher order states. They have underdeveloped prefrontal cortexes. Sure, that's true. They don't have a zero prefrontal cortex. Um, at least to a certain extent. Um, they have an analog of it, a developmental uh precursor of it. Um, there's other cortical areas that may be important. Alo cortex is around um the hippocampus and these other areas, the entrinal cortex. So there there various and maybe so this is an idea that comes from Joe
2:09:45 Leoo. Maybe you have higher representations that are very vague in general at these lower cortical levels and then once the cortex develops it takes over supersedes with all the detail that it can provide but maybe at the lower level it's these subcortical cortex I mean these in you know these not subcortical but um aloccortical um areas that are are relevant these are all open I would say uh and should be explored so you know maybe you're going to say this leads back to the unfalsifiability claims and maybe but but uh I would want to explore those as
2:10:20 as issues. Um so and then about concepts I would say if you want to define concepts in such a way that it's impossible for infants to have it then I think that's kind of cheating. Um and that there are you know there there there are reasons for thinking that you could have concepts like this. So my response to the block article is that they may have visual concepts but not concepts of color. So they may be saying, you know, I'm simply seeing a dark square. I I'm having a visual experience. So they would have to have
2:10:54 some kind of concept of the visual thing. I agree that some vague concept of that, but I I just don't see how that would be difficult to acquire given that they are using their eyes so much. Um, and so one possible hypothesis is the one that David has, which is that they've got to figure out like where these sensory qualities are coming from. So in the early stages of their development, they're kind of going, is this quality coming from my eyes or from my ear? So that they're trying to figure to calibrate the senses in a way might be a way that they just pick up these concepts um by by trying to sort the
2:11:28 sensory qualities. So something's going on at these early stages of development and I don't see why that couldn't be part of the story. Uh so partially I'd say part some some innate concepts some early acquired vague concepts that get that become more precise and filled in as time goes by but start off kind of vague in general. So while the higher order state being there or not is yes or no the content that it has can be very vague sparse very abstract very general and can become specified or vice versa depending on like the details. So, uh, I
2:12:02 I just think that you can't prejudge the issue, that you got to figure out some way of empirically looking to see whether or not these things are the case, and you can't simply say, "Oh, it's it's doesn't seem like it has concepts." Um, anyway, so yeah, I I think that the issue is complicated, but I guess if I found out that they that if you could conclusively prove that infants lacked all of these things of which I was saying, um, then I would say, "Oh, yeah.
2:12:35 therefore infants are not conscious. Um so so the only reason the only way I would get to that point is if you confirm the high order theory beyond a doubt in typical cases then I would say if it's well confirmed you could trust it in these hard cases. Otherwise common sense should supersede it. So I think it's a complicated issue here and that's why starting with infants is a little bit the wrong way to start. I would say you want to start with regular humans, try to find a well-confirmed theory, then see what those theories say about the other cases. Um, yeah. Anyway, so I
2:13:11 don't know if that's something you guys want to talk about yet.
2:13:45 I don't know what is I think maybe you remove what is a specific of horror. So it seems horror collapse in other views. So I don't know how you can have horror a selfless uh uh component horror a horror that there is no self-content without without self-content. It seems very very close to other views. So
2:14:19 you allow for non nonconceptal concept uh nonconceptal content then the view really become a self uh first order view.
2:14:53 speak. Um and
2:15:25 the objection is but the selfless horror is supposed to just be there's a higher order representation which is a representation of another mental state um but you're not attributing it to yourself so that it doesn't appear as though it belongs to you. It just appears and and I try to tell you know I try to tell the story about like cases of semata paraphernia where the you know the w the this famous case of a woman who claims that her arm is not her own and that when you touch her arm you're really touching her niece's
2:15:58 arm. Um, and when she closes her eyes and you touch her arm, you say, "I'm touching your arm." She says, "I don't feel anything." But when you say, "I'm going to touch your niece's arm." Then she says, "Oh, I feel it." And she says, "I feel you the touch on my niece's arm." Um, so now in that case, is she is that like a is she representing like so Rosenthal has an interpretation of that is she's representing I myself had an experience of someone else's the arm over there. Um, but I think it's also possible that she's having the experience of not being mean, not being
2:16:31 the niece, that her niece is having the experience. And so what it's like for her is that it's on the niece's side. Um, and that the eye content is not in the higher order state, but rather that the niece is there playing that role in some sense. So yeah, I don't I don't really think that you need to have the eye component that is strictly required necessary in order to have a higher order representation. Um it just seems to be
2:17:03 together so you remove this uh self-content component you make the concept very thing very very basic uh is a spar the sparse description of the baby so then if you put all this together it's almost a first order view so just like everything together make the horror less compelling in the infant case. Just like more maybe the objection is more does how how the horror with all the horribly
2:17:36 horribly argument can actually accommodate infant. Maybe to accommodate infant you kind of remove everything that in your
2:18:10 compelling uh become less compelling
2:18:45 thoughts or there is no gradual emergence of those abilities either the abilities there or not or not. Mhm.
2:19:21 of phenomenal consciousness or kind of something that it's like to be me or only indeterminately be the case that there's something that it's like I find it very mysterious and puzzling for those kinds of views. Uh instead, what I think that I can make sense of is that there either is or isn't something that it's like to be me, but what it's like can be sometimes very vague and degenerative and sparse and spread out and not um nailed down. So that that's almost like the kind of sort
2:19:56 of being conscious stuff that they were talking about except now you're definitely conscious except in this what's definitely conscious is is vague. So um that seems to me to be something I can make sense of but the kind of true gradualist thing I don't know how to make sense of. So I I guess I would say I do want it to be the case that the infant's either phenomenally conscious or not. And there it does seem to me the kind of the follow from h how we set things up that it's got to be that way. Um as a matter of metaphysics of reality that the infant either has an experience or doesn't. There either is something
2:20:28 it's like or there isn't. Um so yeah I don't I I don't think that as a I don't think of that as a flaw in the view. I think of that as like that's how I think of phenomenal consciousness. So it's got to be that way. Um so I see it as a plus that the view accommodates that. On the other hand, I see it also that the infants is probably going to have some very far removed sense of consciousness from what I have um in which case I want to accommodate this kind of generic sparse spread out vague thing and I would do it in the way we
2:21:02 have been talking about by you know um and then you say well gee haven't you given up everything that the horror um thinks is important and I would say no not not necessarily because what the what the view says is simply that there's a higher higher order representation and that's what phenomenal consciousness is and whatever the content of that representation is what you are experiencing. So in this case that's still going to be the case. It's just that the content of the higher representation is going to be just you know there's some vague stuff happening down there
2:21:35 something sort of seeing like is happening. Um, so that will develop over time and become more precified as the infant. So I I see the story as being just the what what you would predict. It's just and I haven't given up anything that makes horror distinctive because what makes it distinctive is just the claim that it's the higher order representation which is phenomenally conscious. that that's really the only thing that I think of as
2:22:08 like the important part of my view. Um that it's the higher order representation which is phenomenally conscious. And then what is that higher representation? Well, we have to figure that out. Um, so the atomistic version of it I is a is a version where maybe there's just like it's just a global state in some sense that you can't break apart that doesn't have components and maybe it's different for each individual conscious experience in which case you know it it might be in the infant's case some just
2:22:43 determinate but having vague content determinate state in which case yeah I I saw I don't really see the force of the objection, I guess, in in the case of me giving up anything. Um, I'm giving up things that make my experience the way it is now, but I wouldn't expect them to be present in the infant case. So, it doesn't seem like I'm giving anything up.
2:23:17 very simple for infants I think in the end in the in the infant in the infant version of horror you end up with no phenomenal active self-content a kind of a minimal descriptive content uh I don't know pointing to a first order state and I think this is very close to maybe what the first order theory would say about infants. So this it's more like the force of objection more all this together. But I could put
2:23:50 this maybe I could put a different challenge for the view. Okay. Uh maybe one challenge is can you identify uh a kind of empirical functional criteria that could tell us okay this is uh infants are conscious of this. their consciousness is here. Now as for instance the recurrent process view has some criteria or a global workspace view as a criteria. uh so what would be if I want to so if I
2:24:25 want to use higher order theories for generate predictions of when consciousness emerge in development what would be the marker
2:24:57 start with the with the infants. I think that that's where we want to end up, but I don't think we can say anything right now about what would count in the infant case.
2:25:32 but they generate predictions for when consciousness might emerge during development and I think the higher view um I don't know I agree with you that maybe this is a future development of the view.
2:26:07 based in the cognitive architecture that emerge at certain point in development uh but apart from those views Um,
2:26:41 these other guys have a head start in the sense that the theories were developed by scientists. The markers were built in at the beginning so to speak whereas the higher order view was developed by philosophers and it's we've have real trouble trying to translate it into empirical testable ideas and we're only just now beginning to figure out what would be or wouldn't be the markers of higher order states. For example, we still have this compound about behavior, about performance of the task, and whether or not you can say because a person can press a button or
2:27:15 not that that indicates that they did or didn't see the thing or or or consciously or not. So, we we have a lot of these issues still to work out and higher order theories are the most complicated of all these theories and the most psychological of all of them. So, it's very hard to develop these markers. But that's just because we haven't done it yet. We've only been in my mind it's really started like in in 2010. So it's been 15 years or so since people have really trying. I mean I'm talking about when Hawwan and David Roosevelt.
2:27:50 does the pointer emerge in development. So even if the the more uh the theories that are that are grounded in neuroscience, I think the this is a challenge even from the more neuroscientific views of high order theories.
2:28:22 theory to say you can't do it yet, but these guys can because they started from a different position. So that that I would just say we haven't caught up to them yet, but we're that's where we're working towards. Um Jake, did you want to add anything to that?
2:30:04 infants are going to exhibit those markers until pretty late in development which would obviously you know and Richard if you're if you're starting with the assumption that or like it's like a bedrock thing that infants better have consciousness like from birth then I'd be you know it looks like hot theory's fault you know higher theory traditional higher theory is false um
2:30:38 would look like um for these kinds of pointer awareness that isn't necessarily self-representation of the sort of full-fledged type that the traditional view holds. Um or even I mean you you still think that mental state attribution is necessary. So whatever the evidence is that non-verbal organisms are making mental state attributions to other organisms
2:31:12 tests. Um but I guess I'm inclined to not think it's such a big deal that maybe infants aren't conscious for at least a little while. Um, I don't I don't want to prejudge the issue. Like, you know, you've been saying throughout this, you know, Richard, that you're like, a lot of these things are empirical issues. Like, I kind of feel like it's an empirical issue and I don't want to prejudge. Like, maybe I'm more with Tony that, you know, I just I don't know. Um,
2:31:45 question I have for you actually, but you don't deny that there are functionally equivalent states that an organism can be in that are like we just don't want to call them perceiving or feeling pain or um I don't know thinking on your view if they're if you're not having the the horror about them. Um, but see, I guess I just, you know, we could argue about whether that's a good idea or not, but if you think that that's okay. Um, I think it's quite plausible that I mean, I think it's undeniable. What's undeniable is that infants are in those states. Um, and I think that those states can ground welfare. I actually
2:32:17 have a paper coming out with um Joe Gotautle and um uh Bob Fischer. It's going to be in Utilitas where we basically make this argument that we think that like you know if if you think pain can be unconscious which I know that makes a lot of people their heads explode but I do think it's pretty reasonable or at least there's functionally equivalent states of pain. Yeah.
2:32:51 part I kind of feel like one of the good things about the traditional higher order theory is it makes this question of when does consciousness arise like a lot less important. Um because what's more important I guess is when does mentality arise and that I think is obviously in utero you know what I mean um and we have good reason to think that infants you know are thinking and in pain whether those pains and thinkings are conscious is I think an additional question which is very challenging and I think you know probably comes online pretty quickly but um I don't know my my inclination is to think that may not be
2:33:25 right at birth although you
2:33:58 non-conciously.
2:35:06 things whereby um, one is assuming that uh, there are these unconscious mental states. Um, so anyway, yeah, I do I just want to point that out that that does seem to me to be an important issue about how you define and what you are committed to in in in respect of these questions about higher order theories. So, um,
2:35:39 flagship argument of his that only higher order theories can explain the difference between a conscious and unconscious state. That's always been an argument of his and it's a it's a correlary of this
2:36:10 global workspace. So, it's not conscious perceiving. Or if you uh are a recurrent processing person, maybe you could say, you know, you've got the non-recurrent processing and that's subliminal perception and then when it gets recurrently processed, then it's conscious perception. Yeah.
2:36:45 the theories lend themselves nicely or at least you know have resources to accommodate the existence of agree.
2:37:22 oftentimes you will find people in the literature saying higher order theories are late theories. They have to they are committed to consciousness showing up late in development.
2:37:54 difficult. But I just don't think that you can say, "Oh, infants are conscious, therefore higher order theories are false." It can't be that simple. There has to be some more. And I think the types of thing that Claudia has been bringing out are the things you would want to point out. Namely, like do they have concepts? How are they representing their mental states? So, so those are good empirical questions. Um, but I but I don't think that we have decisively shown that um this can't be the case.
2:38:27 don't know if there's a lot of evidence for it but I don't think there's any strict evidence against it.
2:39:00 is interesting in the case of infants just the behavior expression. You might not know whether that the behavior indicates that they are perceiving or feeling uh pain consciously or if there is any unconscious perception. uh one uh and I totally agree that uh welfare subjects are not just grounded on consciousness. So you can have welfare uh subjects uh that are related to other criteria that might be relevant to make decisions. So even if I might
2:39:34 not feeling consciously pain, I might still might still be required to avoid me to feel pain because this might affect me physically and my future interest. But that said, I think it's very relevant for ethical purpose to know whether neonates are feeling conscious pain or not because it matters whether we are reliefing uh relieving pain from them or not. the way you treat them.
2:40:38 hierarchy that the golden standard for protection would be like phenomenal consciousness the other things are relevant with phenomenal consciousness would be like golden star for protection uh for in the case yeah in in that case. So it matters whether they're feeling uh whether the cons uh the pain is feeling conscious pain or not. And in the horal uh view the first order state does not fix the phenomenology. So I need the higher order structure to fix the
2:41:12 phenomenology and if they don't have the high order structure the consequence of the view is that there is no phenomenal conscious pain in that case. So it matters to know whether when for the that the view actually generates some predictions of when uh the high water structure
2:41:44 this paper like this is like one of like the big thing. So we controversially say no.
2:42:17 But I think it's broadly speaking going to be unpacked functionally. Um, and then it can consciously hurt. And what does that mean? It means it hurts and you're aware of yourself as it as being in the hurting. Um, but what's bad for you is the hurting, not the being aware of yourself as being in the hurting. And so the pain, what's bad about the pain and what gives you the impetus to take it away is it's being a pain, not that it's being that you're being aware of yourself as being in it. Um, and I agree that I recognize that this is very controversial, which is why we have to spend 20 pages, you know, arguing for
2:42:50 it, and we I'm sure we'll convince no one. Um, but yeah, we make two the the paper's kind of broken into two parts. One is arguing that um, pains being conscious isn't necessary or or planer pleasure being conscious isn't necessary for a subject to be a welfare subject. And then the second part of the paper is arguing that it's the consciousness doesn't even in uh, modulate the subject's um, welfare status. Um, yeah. So, I do I I bite that bullet. I know that's not going to sound good to you. I mean, I got out some arguments for it. Um, I could send you the paper if you
2:43:21 like.
2:43:54 consciousness but leaving the states nature intact. And so you could be anesthetized and have a conscious pain or you could be anesthetized and have an unconscious pain at least on my taxonomy of how things work. Um or the anesthesia could be removing the pain itself. Like it could be an analesic but if that's the case then what's bad what's good about the analesic is that it takes away the pain but not that it takes away the consciousness. Um so I think that if a person had uh reasons to um if they could take a pill that would just remove the consciousness or take away the pill that would remove the pain it's better
2:44:27 to take away the pain. the consciousness is kind of beside the point and it's hard to see why
2:45:34 theories could respect the existence of non-concious pain. And then we argue that on different theories of welfare it's hard to make sense of if you grant that a full-fledged pain can occur unconsciously which again that's a hard tough pill for a lot of people to swallow. I think a lot of people are like oh well there's functionally equivalent states but they're not really pains. A pain is by definition something that's conscious. Um, but if you take seriously the idea that a genuine person level pain can occur non-conciously, then all of our theories of welfare seem to suggest that they're bad whether or not they're conscious.
2:46:37 actually the consciousness, but it's about it's the functional broader implication, you know, that it's making [clears throat] you worse off at doing a whole bunch of other tasks or something.
2:47:40 it's being it is worse in virtue of being conscious. Yeah. I guess um I can't remember what we say in the paper. It was a couple years ago.
2:48:13 unconscious pains or
2:48:46 and then, you know, we could debate about whether or not those functional things ground um intrinsic like welfare, you know, or whether that's just instrumentally bad for you as opposed to um not instrumentally bad. But I think that that's what it the non-instrumental badness consists in is it's having this. So this is all a response to Block's claim about awfulness, isn't it? And that uh
2:49:18 consciousness.
2:50:26 they're inconceivable and so I think arguing about them is kind of a waste of time but um
2:50:58 people, too.
2:51:30 feelings and desires and hopes and fears and wonderings and so forth and and basically all fears and
2:52:03 knockdown objection to your view that you have to say this stuff, but I think it is a cost to the theory to have to say stuff like that.
2:52:35 about this is that, you know, I think that you're often in a wonderful way driven by moral considerations and I think that these kinds of considerations naturally expand the moral circle in a way that other views will struggle. So, I feel like it's easy for me to accommodate non-human animals and infants mattering in a way that other views, you know, potentially struggle. Um,
2:53:08 why doesn't it matter? It does have some low-level intentional states. I don't think it has consciousness, but doesn't it in some low-level sense matter whether it's intentional states are fulfilled or not? So, I do kind of accept the idea that that maybe non-concious mentality is important and it can can ground uh welfare. I I think that's an important point. Um and I would go beyond that even because I think the environment is important as an environment. Um you know, I'm all for
2:53:41 like there's lots of stuff that go beyond consciousness, but I think that I got to agree with Claudia on this that that consciousness at the top and trumps all of those things in the good sense of Trump. It overrides Yeah, exactly. If we can still use that word in this way. Um, it overrides those those other considerations whereby the the the awfulness or the suffering of a conscious agent seems to me to outweigh the suffer the the non-concious suffering of an unconscious agent. And and I find that to be very
2:54:14 counterintuitive to think um but but again I I don't know when I so you know Jeff Lee has this interesting idea. I think it's kind of similar that maybe there are states that matter just as much as phenomenal consciousness that aren't that. And maybe this is sort of in that ballpark.
2:54:49 You know what I mean? Um it's just hard to see. because it makes it feel like something.
2:55:22 state. That's the thing we want to avoid or give you. You want the person to have achievements and uh you feelings of love and friendships and so forth. Whether they're aware of themselves as having the pleasure, aware of themselves as having the achievement, it's hard to see what that's adding. Um
2:56:29 I have to bite, but I'm not sure that I b, you know, mind it so much. Um,
2:57:04 new orientation for high order views and I think frame the discussion uh all the the the back and forth between you and and Jake was really interesting because you're trying to come with a new proposal like that push the view different from the traditional view and more friendly with uh imper empirical findings like uh I think one one challenge for the traditional views would be how to accommodate empirical findings and how to accommodate those cases like the infant case and maybe the noonhuman animal case. So yeah, so my
2:57:41 final words is just like read the book.