Consciousness Live! with Torin Alter

0:00 All right, we are live. Uh, at least one believes one is live. One can never be too sure with these YouTube settings. So, and and skepticism generally uh you know uh joining me today on the uh off chance that we are live is a very special guest

0:34 Alabama. You know, football and um and uh what else am I I I've been here sort of since the Jurassic [laughter] since my my first job. I'm still here. Um and I'm still enjoying it. Uh the apartment department apartment is a nice place to be, I think. Uh and you know, I'm slowly getting used to the South. I'm from New York originally. Okay. Uh, I can now I've I've worked you all into my, you know, natural vocabulary and I've even sometimes can can can sort of pull off might could, which is my favorite

1:08 southernism. You know, Burge might could make this move. You know, when I first time I heard a student say that, I sort of did a double dip. Excuse me, might could. But now I actually say say that. Um, so I've been here for a while and, you know, getting getting the southern into me a bit. Um and I I work on philosophy of mind in particular really the same thing uh that that I know you Richard have written on um on consciousness and physicalism that kind of that kind of stuff conscious and the mind body problem. Uh I've written a bunch on that. I've written up on a few

1:41 other things but that's my main focus. Um and uh I guess uh what else about me? Um, well, you can see I'm look I I usually turn the self view off because I'm sort of self-conscious, but I decided to try I want to get over this so I actually can see myself. And I noticed that my some of my trophies are on my bookshelf back back there. I'm a table tennis player, so I've got a few a few trophies. Uh um that's that's my main hobby. Uh and

4:57 much everything he wrote on the topic I He's he's quite prolific. So there's probably some things I've missed but since then but I I try to keep up. Uh but yeah I was work I was working on that and um actually was this is you might enjoy this. So so I'm I'm on the market right in 1995 and the reaction that I tended to get to um to the knowledge argument and just remember this 1995 was it's overworked. this this this area there's already been there there can't be any more papers on Mary

5:30 in the black and white room because there's just been too many already and there's no more moves left. I was told this honestly by by uh by one of my own adviserss and I was you this was the days where where you would interview the APA and then at the at the smoker and sort of through the grapevine uh the your your interviewers would uh confer with your advisors and so you would sort of hear in that in that weird indirect way like how you did and that was the the that was the message. The message was this topic has been has been uh

6:06 worked over so much there's nothing else else to say on it. That was and that was 1995 before the conscious mind came out in 1996.

6:41 the time there was no one at UCLA where I was a graduate student who was working on it

7:14 like really intense like one- on-one training of each other and each other's discipline basically where we and putting it in that way of someone who doesn't get where you're coming from at all is actually very useful as a as a dis as a

7:47 already thinking in kind of similaresque terms when um that stuff was coming around. Is that kind of the lay of the land?

8:20 David and everything, but but I didn't really see that uh uh to be honest. So I was I was you know a follower there, not a leader.

8:54 not that I don't find it interesting but I've always find found it to sort of bring in distracting shiny not relevant objects like epistemology generally. Um and it invites all of these uh well nonproductive discussions about that that really are kind of common to everyone about how we encounter consciousness and how like you know these concepts are special that we acquire. And so to me it always struck me as bringing in a lot of baggage so to speak which is why I kind of thought the

9:26 zombie arguments and cry's modal arguments kind of got away from that a little bit. But so I am curious what what you feel about that kind of pessimism or if you think maybe that's not because because I know you think it's an important argument and and Tomer's argues as an aside here that actually you can kind of reduce all these arguments to something that's basically a similar structure. Um so so in a way it doesn't matter which one you start with. So I am wondering like what you what you think about this as a starting way into this argument.

9:59 that it it emphasizes some epistemological issues that at least at first don't seem directly relevant to the metaphysical issue that which you know the conclusion of knowledge argument as it was originally stated was that physicalism is false and physicalism I take it whatever is meant by it is is supposed to be at least primarily a metaphysical doctrine not an epistemological one. So the segue through epistemology might see might seem um uh a bit of a distraction. Um, I guess I guess I I agree with Chalmer's on this that that that there, you know,

10:34 you can sort of you can sort of um make the force the the different arguments, the zombie argument, the you know uh the the the other conceivability arguments, inverted spectrum arguments, that kind of thing into the same mold and you can see them as as being more or less equivalent. Um, and and they're not exactly equivalent, but you know, pretty close. uh the way I guess the way I think of the the relationship between the the zombie or conceivability argument or the cryp k circumodal argument on the one hand and the knowledge argument on the other is

11:06 really a point of emphasis. Um so the epistemology does come in to the say so so say the zombie argument the zombie argument the first premise is something like it's conceivable that there be zombies or there's a zombie world or something like that where where zombies um are defined as creatures who are phys physically and functionally identical to to ordinary conscious human beings but they don't have any consciousness there's no one home right so the first premise of that argument is typically it's conceivable able or or coherently

11:40 conceivable or ideally conceivable something like that that there be these creatures there's no there's nothing incoherent in the thought experiment

12:14 that's a little little more dubious than the corresponding premise in the knowledge argument which which uh which which is about Mary learning something when she leaves the black and white room. So um so so Mary's you know this this super scientist in the future. She she's she's a brilliant reasoner. no no flaws in her reason or limitations in her reasoning ability, but she's never seen color. She's in a black and white room. Um, and yet she's uh she's learned the complete physical truth by reading books printed in black and white, watching videos and in black and white

12:48 on black white monitor, that kind of thing. And she knows she knows everything you can know in that way. Uh not just what's known today, but what what can be known through physical science. Mhm.

13:21 room, sees a red tomato or something like that, she learns what it's like to see red. She learns what other people have known all along. Other color side of people outside of her black and white room has known all along what it's like to see red. That premise so many people including physicalists uh uh find find intuitively quite compelling.

13:54 this sort of big segue, you know, big roundabout route to a metaphysical conclusion going through the epistemology. But the epistemological starting point is I I think a little bit stronger um intuitively than the than the zombie argument. The zombie argument is once once you've got got that epistemological premise, it's that zombie that zombies are conceivable in the relevant sense. the move to the inferences to to metaphysical conclusions is a little bit more straightforward. The segue isn't isn't as as indirect,

14:58 defeat it.

15:32 goes back to Hume and Lach and and Britishism pericism which is uh a kind of different issue actually um about whether you could know something about what blue was like on but in a way that you know the blind person couldn't or whether you know Molly New's question is true and these kind of questions about perception are are kind of old and interesting. They're not bad or anything. It's just that they're not the same question as physicalism. And I think that when people have this intuitive reaction to the knowledge argument, it's partially because that

16:05 issue is being invoked. Yeah, of course. You have to you have to see it to know it because just like I don't know what Vegemite tastes like or I don't know what pineapple pizza tastes like until I've had the experience. And that's just a kind of common sense thing. Not and then maybe you're going to say, "Yeah, but that's what leads you to physicalism." And then we say, "No, that's just empiricism." like that's, you know, um, so yeah, I do think that's maybe why I I I I think that my way of thinking I'm suspicious about the knowledge argument because that seems like a common sense thing and and you you're going to get all these issues

16:38 mixed up and and I mean your book does a careful I'm not saying you do your book is very careful you sort everything out. I'm just saying in the common presentation of this argument this issue is invoked in a way that's not helpful.

17:12 the empiricist view you're referring to is actually true. I was early, you know, before I got into this con convinced of that by um I don't know, Peter wrote a paper about this, you know, the 60s. It's like just we can just imagine a molecule for molecule duplicate of someone who's seen color before and they're not in a cult, you know, they're in a black and white room or or something like that, but that but their their memory and everything is working fine. I don't see why they don't right now, you right at that at that moment, even though they've never seen color because they've just been created by hypothesis. Um why don't they know what it's like to see red? There there

17:45 different way there are different ways you you you can you know you can have that knowledge. Um one the typical way is to actually have experiences that that that cause that knowledge. Uh but uh that's not the only way and the and the argument does not depend on the the empirist's assumption that it is the only way. Instead the claim the relevant claim is that uh it's that you can't in this one particular way by doing uh deductions a prior deduction from in

18:18 information presented uh in black and white so physical information that's I I think is properly understood as structural information you can't uh you you can't based on that deduce um uh what it's like to see red from that the truths about what it's like to see red um from just that structural in information. That's a very different claim from the claim that the only way to acquire that knowledge is by by having those experiences. Very different

18:53 claim and I think false that the empirical claim is just false. Whereas the uh the claim that you can't get knowledge of what it's like to see red based on just structural information is at least um you know worth considering. It's not it's it's not easily refuted by the sort of anger type of examples that I mentioned.

19:28 one way that I want to ask you about this is what do you mean by knowing what it's like? And so by way of prefacing this, what I would say is that one way of hearing the complaint about Mary, one way, and I'm not saying this is the way I endorse, I'm just exploring these issues with you. Yeah.

20:02 of hearing what you just said

20:34 and she acquires that concept and then she goes, "Aha." But so why isn't kind of what you're doing illegitimately asking her to deduce this concept? um or else how could she know what it's like in in your terms?

21:10 to see how to answer that objection. the objection about she look you could just say she could do deduction if only she had the concepts but she doesn't have the concepts what's the problem yeah so I I think I think to so what I say in my book is yeah okay well let's go to the experienced Mary case that's what Dan soldier Daniel Souljar calls it or or um you know it's a variant on Martina um uh Nita Relan's um Mariana case um where imagine you know Mary goes goes is out in the world. She she sees red and then

21:43 she uh then she sort of returns um to to the black and white room. So she's actually she knows what it's like like to see red. There'll still be there'll still be questions about for example uh other you know other species and so forth. Are they experiencing red? And she won't be able to deduce from what she knows that that that that they're experiencing red or not. Um

22:16 thought thought experiment. It seems consistent with the information she has say information about their about their if they have brains you know their the aliens brains or something like that that that um they might feel they might feel uh itch where we feel tickle or they might experience red where we uh experience uh green or something something like that. and and um you know um there's the the the usual kinds of arguments apply but but uh

22:48 arguments as a response because

23:24 from of the the concept of phenomenal readiness from structural concepts. Uh and and nothing interesting follows from from that other than something about concept derivation. Certainly nothing nothing like the conclusion of the of the knowledge argument. The physical is false. We're not going to be able to get that from that. So So then I say, okay, let's take the the case of experience Mary where she clearly has the concept. She she and she's got it in a sort of normal way. Um and now now ask her to um to do a a relevant deduction and she still can't do it. She still can't I

23:57 even though she has the information, she still can't derive it from from the structural information. It's still there's still going to seem to be a a gap there. How do we show this? Well, think about other cases. Think about how how she would apply the concept to other cases. And once again, uh I I think you know the intuition is that she's not going to be able to to d to to to deduce the relevant information. Relevant information being for example that the Martians see red when they when they see, you know, roses of a certain hue and so and so forth, they have the same

24:29 kinds of experiences that we do. just from the structural information she has uh about about their brains, even though she now has the concept. So,

25:02 that.

25:36 case is to say suppose she has the concepts. There's still deductions you should be able to do and can't should be able to because if you have the concept, again, I'm conceding this point that that that to acquire certain concepts, it's not sufficient to have the have structural information to have these phenomenal concepts. You've got you've got to have other kinds of information concede that. So give her the concepts and get have required in the normal way and there's still things she she can't figure out about she's still things about about experiences uh of other creatures that

26:09 she can't figure out. That's that's the claim

26:44 she has a concept she wouldn't be able to make the deductions. I think at that point it would be a priority that uh the states that she was in. I mean you could just imagine her learning ah so this is what red is more similar to orange. Um these relevant brain states occur. Uh this activity in some manner is more similar to that activity in the relevant dimensions. So of course that's what red is and that's what orange is. I know I I still think it's I don't want to build you don't want to build it into the sort of definition of deducibility that

27:17 having con the relevant concepts is sufficient that that would be to beg the question right that that that's that's it still it should be an open question suppose you have the concepts can you do the deduction

27:50 intuitively can't uh can't deduce. And seems to me that it's the intuition is just as strong as before. Um that there's going to be there's going to be um things left open. You can't conclusively tell whether no matter what you say about uh about similarity of brain processes and so forth uh of these other creatures whether um whether they're experiencing red or or they're experiencing green or something something like that. She can't rule that out but mere merely by deduction from structural information. Even if she has

28:24 the concepts of red of red and green that seems that seems to me still a very strong intuition. You may not have that intuition. I have that intuition. I I think that's a very strong intuition. I think it's strong.

28:58 argument ends up be ends up being probably sound.

29:34 reasonable option. There's room for reasonable disagreement here. There's no question about that. just just the the sort of balance of considerations in my mind weighs it balances out such such that the knowledge argument come comes out to be pretty strong in the end.

30:08 sound uh at least it's it's a good enough argument that exploring its consequences is worthwhile and and my reason for one of the reasons I have uh one of the considerations that goes into that in that equation that that you know balancing out or argument to the best explanation is um is how uh well it fares to some very impressive objections. I mean, there's just been so many objections and a lot of them are very clever. Um, but I feel like it it uh the argument does quite well in, you

30:42 know, it's possible to defend against all the all those quite quite reasonably. And that that makes me think, well, maybe it's right. Uh, and uh, so, you know,

31:49 about. Maria, my super phenomenologist, knows these things and and yet has no knowledge of and you even may imagine that she's like in this falling man state. Um, so she may not even be fully aware that she has a body if you really want to

32:21 know.

33:31 philosophical question not something you just sort of see.

34:06 first of all, the first point I wanted to make about that kind of case is that I I I see I see a disanalogy. I think there is reason whether or not you agree. I think there is a reason for the physicalist to subscribe to the to the view that uh that if physicalism is true then uh uh an ideal reasoner who knows all the structural truths all the truths in about you know um about spacetime um uh should be able to deduce uh the truths about what it's like to see see

34:40 red. I think there's at least an argument for that. Uh the the the reverse argument in the in the case you're describing that uh that if idealism is true or phenomenalism is true or something like that then the the physical facts should be deducible from the phenomenal facts. I I don't you know I don't really see

35:12 experience.

35:47 versions of physicalism where it doesn't follow but I I nevertheless that's a separate argument.

36:21 you my my opinion about a very about sort of the the the opposite view. I' I've noticed more re recently there's been more of this uh idea that that um instead of the the knowledge argument and the conceivability argument, those kinds of things, we should we should really if if we're if we're against we're going to give an argument against physicalism, we against physicalism, we should rely on an intuition of distinctness. That's the phrase that keeps on being bandied about. I've seen that in a lot of prominent philosophers work and I feel like that is a step backwards. I have no such in you know

36:54 I'm I'm here I've written you know a book and many articles defending these anti-physicalist arguments. I have no sympathy with this with this kind of intuition of distinctness thing at all.

37:27 it seems to me plausible that Mary uh Mary learns something when she leaves the room. My do I have an intuition that brain processes and you know experiences of pain are just different things? maybe at the but in so far as I do I don't think anything interesting follows from it. I feel like we're back in, you know, back back in uh, you know, in 1959, Smart's uh, famous article, Sensation of Brain Pro, he's he's sort of kicking away the these sort of silly objections. Uh, and there were sort of objections like that. It just they just seem different. So, it's not because of my of my sort of anti-physicalist inclination,

38:03 not because, you know, I'm disagreeing because our our final positions, your mine, are are somewhat opposed. It's not it's it's not because of that that I I'm not that I'm I'm I'm not buying the stuff about she just you know in your case she just sees them the same. I just don't I don't have that intuition and and also I even if I did I just I don't I don't think it has any any re real proive force whereas I do think that the the conceivability of zombies uh or the plausibility of the the claim that that zombies are conceivable and the plausibility of the claim that Mary gains knowledge when she leaves the

38:36 room. I think that does have some force that the consequences of those are really interesting. Uh this intuition of distinctness stuff or intuition of identity of non-distinctness. Either way, I just don't think it's a matter of intuition. Take the take the water of H2O case. I think that the claim that waters H2O is identical H2O is a reasonable hypothesis uh uh based on reflection on you, you know, we learned it from Putinham and Crippy. Krypky basic basically it's like well look is isn't this how we're using the term for the for like water for the the watery

39:09 stuff around here whatever that happens to be if there is happens to be one dominant uh natural kind that that you know has has uh that's unified in the right in the right ways um then uh then it's reasonable to assume that that that just is what water is same thing with heat and lightning and so forth and it turned out in those cases that there really is one thing heat is molecular motion uh um lightning is electrical discharge between clouds or between clouds and the ground. Turned out there was in other cases like you know Putnham schools us in this and jade it turns out there

39:42 there isn't there's there's more than one and it could be that that you know the what we we think is a new kind isn't some just a variation of an old one. There are all these empirical possibilities and I think in the water H2O case it just happened to turn out the way we kind of expected it to. So it's reasonable to say um you know the semantics of the the the externalist semantics is quite reasonable about that and so forth. But none of this is a matter of oh I just see it. I just see that water is H2O. It's it's a matter of philosophical reasoning.

40:15 it in that way. But yes I I'm on board with the rant in and all aspects. Yes. 100%.

40:50 the knowledge argument defending the zombie argument but I don't get that kind of stuff. I you know I I don't see how it's just sort of it's all everything about consciousness is just all there

41:25 know I I just don't

41:58 that the that that the entire world including consciousness is is fully structural in a specific sense of that and and so if that's the right con conclusion that that that's not true the knowledge show that not true. That leaves open several possibilities. One is that there's primitive mentality which is nonstructural. And another is that there's something other than structure, but it needn't be intrinsically mental. It's just it could be just some new kind of call it physical if you want you know. So so in a broad sense physicalism the knowledge does not refute physicalism. It only

42:31 refuts it in in the in the narrow sense in which it's very clear that um every every physical fact is is um something Mary can fully understand before she leaves the room. And I don't think that's true uh of non-structural facts. I think it's only true of of basically facts that that can be expressed in mathematical logical nomic language there. There's no reason why she can't understand all that fully. And so and and so that's what I take to be the strongest version of the knowledge argument, the one that's limited to the

43:04 idea that the physical is is is uh structural in that sense that it could be fully expressed in that limit of vocabulary. If so, then then it's pretty clear that she can learn all the physical facts before she leaves the room. And it's also I think if it if you add the intuition which I know you reject but I accept that that she gains information when she leaves the room. It it uh it's there's a plausible argument that can be made that um she there's some new information there which was not contained in the structural information. But that conclusion is is totally compatible with the idea that there's

43:38 you um there's there's nothing uh primitively mental in in in the world.

44:10 this is a very significant thing that happened and this is why it matters. So what and and I do want to come to all that giving um in in in due course hopefully. But uh

44:46 almost everybody who ever wrote on the knowledge argument with the exception of one person who wrote on it possibly and that was me

45:20 That's the way you were trying to say uh the true reverse. And I I deny that. Um I just think that this shows that the conditional that if you have all the physical facts and you have consciousness is a priori is that this person would know that and they would know it a priori. Um, and you in the book specifically, you want to deny that that this can be done. So, I want to ask you about this because this is something that I think is

45:54 Um, and then that person could know the identity. Let's suppose um just for sake of argument then this person could frontload all the evidence that convinced them of the of the identity into a conditional statement and then without the phenomenal concept would be able to deduce the relationship between them. Uh but and they wouldn't rely on the concept they wouldn't rely on introspection. That's kind of what I saw as your counterargument to this move was that they would crucially invoke introspection somewhere and it wouldn't be a priori. But the front-loading idea just says you just got to put the

46:28 evidence that would convince someone with the phenomenal concepts of the identity into the antecedent of the conditional statement. So, so I wonder if if what you think about that kind of move, which is, you know, very closely related to a bunch of other stuff you talked about. So,

48:41 thing that I was suggesting that the super phenomenologists would be able to do when they learned all of the physical facts. Um, that you were suggesting that they would be able to do deduce the physical facts from their phenomenology whereas I was just saying that they would be able to see that this a this condition was was true

49:15 uh I don't see how they could um understand the Q part if they're not using the relevant phenomenal concept. Uh how could they that you know if Q is going to be you said something like I have a migraine. I mean, isn't there a phenomenal concept of pain or of, you know, migraine-like experience there that that that if if you understand the queue, you're going to you're going to have to and apply, you know, uh what does it say? Deploy deploy that concept. That's one one issue,

49:48 the deduction or the I don't like the word deduction. So, I just say they can come to know it on the basis of these facts. Um so then we don't have to worry about if they deduce it or what your like a theory of deduction or inference is but that they can come to know it. So uh and then you can supply your own theory of what that means. But the question is do they have to rely on the phenomenal concept in the knowing? And the whole idea is that Mary is not supposed to be able to do that. So she she if if you in are having the experience currently

50:21 then you know what it's like to have the experience. I I hope you agree with that. Um, right now, like I'm looking at the green of this, uh, this is a liquid death can, by the way, not beer or anything, but not that it matters, but people wonder sometimes. Um, Liquid Death is a great company. I'm not sponsored by them, but I am against plastic, and they so are they.

51:27 invoke the the the direct pure phenomenal concept in that moment but still invokes her you know other concepts that are related to it in the right way and then we can say she knows it in that way. So, I think it really this is going to be the crux of the matter because you're going to have to say what you mean by her successfully performing this. Um, and you can't just say, "Oh, it's impossible." So, I don't have to tell you because in this situation, I'm saying I think it is the case. So, at least for the sake of argument, I I you would going to have to say what a successful uh what it would look like to be

51:59 successful in this case, in which case it's either impossible by definition or there's some other flaw in what I'm saying. I mean it sounds a bit like you're going back to the issue we discussed earlier about you which I responded to by invoking experienced Mary where I was conceding again that that uh uh it's a reasonable hypothesis that the reason Mary can't do the deduction in the original Mary case is because she lacks the relevant concepts and that's why I went to experience Mary. If you ask me uh I I still want to make a point about the your your

52:31 interesting sort of reverse case of the ph this ideal phenomenologist uh who knows all about I mean you know it's it's a very interesting case um but uh I don't see I I guess I I guess don't see why we should you know expect her um her you know vast phenomenological knowledge to help her uh do do this deduction of Q from P. I I don't I don't see why why that would why that would help. It still seems no matter how much you know about

53:05 phenomenology, if you're actually deducing Q from P and I do think deduction is crucial here. um then uh uh knowing knowing the stuff in Q might you know it might be necessary but it's not necessarily going to be sufficient and this is a matter of of

53:37 talking about knowing what it's like

54:10 phenomenology there. I think there are pretty clear cases where where you can deduce uh you know, some phenomenal truth from other ones. I you know there's this sort of mission state of blue cases and and uh you know you you can you you can deduce

54:43 both A and B are phenomenal uh truths um not B therefore A I mean you know They're they're all phenomen make make you know a A is you know I'm I'm feeling hungry. B is I'm seeing red uh uh and not B is I'm not seeing red. So you can deduce I'm feeling hungry from those two propositions. They're about phenomenology but you can do the deduction. I you know I don't think there's anything special here. Um

55:18 the proposition that I am in pain or I see red

55:52 there's some abstract form like disjunctive syllogism that this inference can be deduced from, but to know that this is true, by which I mean that someone's having a headache. And there it looks like you have to invoke either the they're having the experience. So, what you're then would get is the Patricia Church kind of response. Well, knowing about pregnancy doesn't make you pregnant. And that does sound like the right kind of response to someone who says you have to deduce the experience into existence. That sounds that sounds like absurd to say but then if it's not but hold on but hold on. But if it's not that then what is it? You're

56:24 asking her to deduce the phenomenal concept that shows up in the proposition that you have when you the person are in the experience and directly go that's what it's like. Well that's the same thing just over again. So like where what is it that a successful Mary is supposed to do? Um is is like I don't see like an answer on your side of the fence

56:58 bit. Why is the the whole question Jackson raised in the you know original version of the of the knowledge argument was can she deduce the truth about about seeing color that people on the outside of the room the color side of people on the outside of room know and his answer was intuitively no she can't figure that out if you if you want to know like what is it to know those things well um it's it's I I think it's to know that you know to put it in sort of uh the normal way it's it's put

57:33 like it's to know that seeing red is like this where this refers to a certain kind of kind of uh phenomenal experience.

58:07 true. I I but

58:43 successfully making this deduction because my intuition is that she'll be able to do it. You say you don't think it's possible, but what is it that you're saying is not possible that she can't look at the physical information and then infer from that

59:15 grasped the concepts that that's the whole point of going to experienced marriage. But that's what my point of asking about experienced marriage is because she will be able to do it. So what are you saying she won't be able to do?

1:00:25 It's not as though he had to be feeling pain at that very moment. uh he as long as he unders understands you know what it's like to to to feel pain he doesn't have to be deploying that concept in that way you know

1:00:57 writing about And I it's not as though when I was writing this book I had to I you know I didn't know what I was talking about unless I I like you know was in a room with colored stuff or something or you know probably

1:01:30 precluding her from? It doesn't make sense to me anymore. Like I lost the grip of the entire what we're talking about.

1:02:39 brain counterpart they have whatever water pump system or whatever they have um it's still going to be an open question for me if I'm Mary you know whether Even if I have the concept uh of of of red and the concept of green, the phenomenal concept in in the full any sense you want you like um it's still going to be open question whether um whether when they're their water pump system is in state, you know, one whether that's green or red. That's still going to be an open question for me. I can't do I may be able to make

1:03:13 you're saying. You you can state that but what's the actual evidence for what you're saying except look so it depends on what in us

1:03:47 for consciousness.

1:04:20 all right, do we live in a jade world that's like jadeite and nephright or do we live in an H2O world? Um and so you know that that's an interesting question, but that's a different kind of question than this this more dramatic question of like is it a physical thing or not? So now the if you're going to stipulate no they're like commander data or they're like you know chatbt then I just think that there's no evidence for that. We we don't have really much reason yet for thinking that. And by the way I have a separate kind of argument that I make which I think is that if there were kind of AI systems that were reasonably humanlike then illusionism

1:04:53 would be true of them but not us. That's my kind of official AI illusionism view is that illusionism a great theory for AI. Yes, that's wonderful but it's false for me 100%. It can't be true. Um, but anyway, so that's that that's kind of a different topic, but I I do think that bringing in these aliens and all these kind of weird thought that that's that's a separate whole bunch of separate issues. The question here is just whether she could deduce this, namely what that what it's like to see red from the physical facts. That was the original question. Now she has to deduce these weird alien things that aren't like her or she debats concepts which

1:05:27 she doesn't have. So there's just a question is just the Martina needle roomm I think is more you know forgiving in this sense because you kaleidoscope Mary and all that I like yeah of course she would know which one is which in the kaleidoscope room it's not even a question for someone who fully knows the phenomenology and fully knows the physiology there just no question zero absolutely none which one is red and which one is green when the physical states show up and if you think that there is then I just don't know anymore like what you mean? Then you're basically saying to me like, imagine a

1:06:00 world where there's H2O and it's exactly like ours and all the laws are exactly the same, but there's no liquid there. And you're like, uh, no, you can't do that because when there's H2O and when the laws are like this, there has to be a liquid in a situation like has to be necessarily. So it cannot be the case at all that there is H2O and also the laws like this. What could be the case is a situation that's kind of similar in superficial aspects. That's a different case. But so to me, that's what it

1:06:34 sounds like you are trying to say is these with the aliens. You're saying, well, imagine that there's like this non-lquid H2O that shows up on Earth, but it's not ice. It's not like vapor. It's like at room temperature, but it's not a liquid. Then I go, okay, but the laws of physics say no. So it it just depends on what you're holding fixed in this sense. Um,

1:07:07 know you've thought about all this stuff more carefully than I could ever possibly have. But I just This is the one kind of part where I didn't in your book I thought, well, I don't really see this specific way of doing things addressed.

1:07:42 the idea that uh look at just like the water case and so forth, I think there's I'm I'm disincclined to to think that uh uh terms like seeing you know feeling pain, seeing red and that kind of thing are sort of um you know Putnham Crypky natural kind terms that they lend themselves to this kind of semantic analysis. Um I've actually uh you know, you know, Putnham says that many many words are, you know, are like are like water and so forth. And I'm I'm you

1:08:16 know, I'm sympathetic to that, but he doesn't say every word is like that. And he he even says there they're exceptions and and I'm inclined to think that uh that these sort of mentalistic terms uh are exceptions. So when you go back to your your case where um you know do do these alien creatures have that physical feature of uh what was it um uh

1:08:51 is is is the or at least that that that the approach um might trade on the assumption that I'm questioning here that that the term say you know feeling red or feeling pain or something is is a is a natural kind term in the crypto sense. So I'm I'm

1:09:24 similarities and I want to argue from empirical cases. So I think pain as symbolia is a good case where where people say pain's not painful um but they can tell you if it's burning or sharp. I think that people in morphine states say yes is very painful but I don't care. So that's weird. And then there's also dental fear is another case like I learned from Rosenthal but then I've subsequently investigated um and it's a real phenomenon I think where people mistake a case of vibration and fear as a instance of pain. So, so I do think that there are kind of at least a

1:09:57 a kind of coherent interpretation of the way we use these words that in weird cases where you could kind of say, okay, so yeah, there is this um kind of natural kindish thing not to direct or pure phenomenal concepts, but to our ordinary language uh public concepts which is enough to give you a grip on this other thing and weasle your way in there so to speak. Um, so but I but I agree that these issues are not obvious and I and I agree that this is really an important aspect of the argument is that this is

1:10:31 symbolia is not really pain because they don't they say it's not painful [laughter]

1:11:04 experience having but not necessarily activating introspectively at that moment if that counts as succeeding and I think you kind of get forced to having to say it does otherwise you're forced into the Patricia Churchland Oh, you're you're telling her she's gonna get pregnant by reading the science book, which is, you know, so that's kind of the caricature of and and lots of people have that reaction. Like, you know, the church lens, Sean Carroll, another famous guy has that very exact same reaction.

1:11:36 to do a lot of work being like, "Oh, yeah, that's not really a good point." The point is, could you know it? But then what is knowing it if it's not going into the state? because empiricists like tend to think that is what knowing it is like knowing it is being in the state. That's the first instance of knowing it and then all the other stuff is derivative of that. So, uh the question is like how like what is it that we're trying to get to um from the physical facts and and it's not it's not obvious to me once you go into the details that uh that that that is not going to be successful or something

1:12:09 that's completely ruled out. Um although it's not obvious the other way either. So anyway, that that's kind of I guess where I would stick and and but but having said that, I I mean I didn't mean to jump right to my pet peeve in instead of glossing over all the tremendous like work that went into this book that you have done which have come up here and there but I just want to say before like I'm noticing the time now and how long we've been dwelling this but uh but the book is you cover almost every possible way every premise and then every counter

1:12:42 response to it and and then I think that that is a tremendous valuable thing that you've done with that book. Uh

1:13:15 though, though I did kind of, you know, more recently, uh, the other book, uh, uh, Modernism Matters, uh, which is just sort of just out, you know. Here it is.

1:13:48 the you know the knowledge arguments over is any good or

1:14:24 why anyone would care about this um is I can give a little background of the genesis. So I was I was um I was at an APA at conference giving a paper defending the uh the sort of very standard view uh that if physicalism is true then um the mental supervenes on the the fundamental physical phenomena right some something like that sort of this almost you know very very uh very standard kind of view until Barbara Monto's Barbara's 2013 paper challenging

1:14:57 it and then since then there've been a bunch of papers challenging different different ways saying you can have physicalism without supervenience. And one of the arguments I used in that APA um presentation was was that well um if you give up if you give up a supervenience then you'll um physicalism no longer looks like a version of monism and surely it's a version of monism and then people in the audience including Amy Kind and someone else I didn't know were challenging that. So I was so that's where it sort of came from. Um, and I I initially I was going to write the book

1:15:29 with my my my friend Robert Howell because you know he and I disagree on he's a physicist I'm I'm not. And um and and but we sort of agreed on this that that that physical physicalism is a is a version of monism. Idealism is a version of monism. Neutral monism is a version of monism. Physicalism is a version of monism. And and um you know to some philosophers it became pretty clear that this is kind of a quaint old oldfashioned way of looking at physicalism. Why why should we care about these old old crusty metaphysical issues about you counting things? I mean I mean you know it's it's isn't this

1:16:02 just like bad you know don't don't think about physicalism as a kind of met in this sort of very you know very metaphysical ontological kind of way think of scientific hypothesis something like that where we don't really care and and so I I got interested in that that question which you know there there hasn't been a lot written on it uh you know is sure I mean we can define the physicalism any way we want including ways that don't in make it a monous theory but I think you lose a lot Um if if you if you don't think of it as just an instance of moanism.

1:16:36 the book when I first uh just anecdotally I'll say that when I first started reading this book I was like this is going to be a short book. Like what could you say about it? Uh it seems obvious to me and you were like well some people find this obvious and other people don't. And then it turns out no there's actually a lot you could say about it. So I felt like probably that person in 1995 [laughter] say you can't say anything about this and then there's a whole bunch of stuff to say and at the end you bring in the moral ethical dimension as a possible

1:17:11 Barbara used to be at the Graduate Center. We lost her sadly, but I used to hang around with her a bit more and had her on um this podcast. She's also been involved with the online consciousness conference that I used to organize way back when I was a graduate student back in the good old days. So Barbara's been doing important work in in this area for a long time and she's allegedly writing a book on this um very topic of this kind of

1:17:45 people u wondering about this and it's interesting too because the whole supervenience stuff comes not you know from comes from Davidson he's wasn't even originally talking about physicalism but about ethics generally I think in first context and then I guess one way to voice the dissatisfaction that people like Barbara have not I'm all put exactly this way of putting it but my way of reading what she's saying is like why are we letting our enemies define what we think like we're physicalists we think the world is a purely physical place so why are we letting the like not you're like an

1:18:17 enemy but you know the opponent

1:18:50 structured differently. Um so h that would be like a not to say that it's wrong the supervenous thesis but that it's foisted on the uh physicist by the opponent so to speak and if we just start off with this neutral conception and go what would the world look like for physical then you might be led to a very different place and then you know so Monta invokes things like disordered chemistical worlds and fail so all sorts of interesting thought experiments and then you go oh okay so yeah why were we so interested in this so I see you as trying to address that challenge

1:19:22 directly.

1:19:55 many physicalists are that that are absolutely fine with with a physical degree, including Robert Howell and

1:20:27 really interesting question about uh do you have to be um a superven do you have to buy the supervenience the theory? I mean I think in in some some supervenience the it's the real question comes out to whether whether um everything including the mental has to superven on the fundamentally physical stuff but uh there's a way in which you can get superven sort of trivially if you if you don't make that distinction between physical and fundamentally physical but but put putting that aside um uh yeah I I don't know I don't want to I don't want to have that uh you know

1:21:00 what I don't want to sort of sort of say there's there's no there's no interesting questions about physicalism. If it's not monism, it still would be interested in some way. Also, I think that in in some of the debates, like a lot of the stuff we were talking about earlier is completely independent of of this issue about about monism. You can you can take Barbara's position and say physicalism doesn't have to be a monist theory. Um uh and and we can still have a lot of the same B. I'm not I'm not saying that that monism is ma matters for every move in you know in this area

1:21:32 or things like that or uh but what what I'm saying is here's the way I I I look at it um I think of there's the sort of this basic question you ask in the first first day of uh philosophy class look what uh what are what are the fundamental ingredients of the world what is you know using Krypky's metaphor what does God have to have to have you know if God's this kind of chef like what ingredients does God have to have in order to bake the world? Right? Do you know do you need start out you start out with the concepts of the mental and the physical? Do you need both? Do you

1:22:04 need just or is the physical enough and can you make the mental out of the physical? Or if you're an idealist, can you can you start with the with the mental and make the physical out of that? Or do you know, if you're a dualist, do you start with both? If you're neutral modest, is there some X thing that we don't know what it is, but it somehow underlies both the physical and the mental? Uh, or are you a pluralist? is there lots of lots of ingredients nothing reduces you know there this is an interesting question it's it seems to me and and I I subscribe to that way of of looking at the general issue in which the mindbody problem figures and and to that issue

1:22:38 this question of monism seems to be quite quite important some evidence I give but that's that's my sort of general approach

1:23:13 you know fungus and so is the same but there's just no supervenience relations you know that there's no necessitation relation everything sort of can can flo float free the the the the micological can float free of the physic physical the chemical right and and uh you know I I think it's a perfectly co coherent thought experiment uh and you can call you know if if you want to define physicalism as say you know as in some moods she she tends to as the you know the the not fundamentally mental well that world might be physical in that s

1:23:47 physical in that sense it's purely physical in that sense but there's an important sense in which I I think that that world gives up um a lot of what what in sort sort of the inspiration of physicalism is physicalism I take it as partly inspired not wholly but partly inspired not just by this negative idea that mentality isn't a fundamental part of the universe but also by the idea that the only ingredients you really need are the physical ingredients that's all you need to make every everything else and and and if that physical just means you know x y and z with no no

1:24:20 connection between them or nothing in common nothing nothing underlying that I don't think it's I mean it may be interesting for c for certain purposes but not from from many of the purposes that physicalism is thought has historically thought to be interesting. So I I think two of the arguments that I that I sort of think are are most central to to my sort of pro-monism um idea that that monism is is important to the mind body debate. And so like for example to physicalism um are are the idea that um uh the

1:24:53 supervenience thesis like the physicalist supervenience thesis or the counterpart for the idealist they're also going to subscribe to supervenience thesis can be that's one thing that I think monism can help explain why it is that that supervenience the theorist might want to subscribe to the sup to to superven that sorry that physicists might want to to to to subscribe to super obedience thesis. Likewise, what I call repudiation thesis. Um I I think I coined that term. They're discussed, but I don't think there's a general term for

1:25:26 it. The idea is

1:26:31 different versions of physicalism, but but minimally you've got to be a nothing but theorist. So why is that? And I think the answer to that or is part of the answer to that is because you're fundamentally a monist. You're saying that there's really one type of thing in the world and that kind type of thing is physical.

1:27:05 commitment to of physicalism to supervenience and likewise of all these monasteries to supervenience um to their own supervenience claims and likewise to their commitments to repudiation thesis that there are some other subsidiary arguments as well I give but but that's that's the idea that that that it's it's I think I think if we I don't think it's incoherent or anything like that but I think we lose a lot if we detach these traditional theories from the from the um sort of these big onlogical positions like monism, pluralism, nihilism and so

1:27:39 and so forth. So if you put the two like kind of in your mind the two arguments together from the two books.

1:28:11 structure?

1:29:19 strive to strive towards but you know I I I can't really I can't really

1:29:54 in a way?

1:31:02 guess cuz the only version of the what am I trying to say the only version of the monist that survives all of these arriori arguments is Recelian monism. Yeah.

1:31:36 not agree with that? I wonder uh be because I sort of feel like only generic like Russellian monism something or other that's the quintessential nonstructural thingabber is got to be important but I don't think you get much more than that from all of but I wonder if you do think you get more than that

1:32:08 of the book is from the knowledge argument to Roselian monism and the ar and I give a kind of causal argument and the basic basic argument is that is um is that well if if you accept the knowledge argument then uh probably there are going to be um both structural and nonstructural properties. the structural physical properties which we're just sort of assuming here are exist and then and then the non-structural ones that are that are going to be needed to account for consciousness and the and you know there's a kind of causal argument it's

1:32:41 sort of defeasible it's you know it's a lot of qualifications but basically um the a theory is going to be more likely to be true if it integrates all the kind of properties into into into causation resilient any any view that does that is going to look a lot like resilient monism it's going to probably be a version of resilian modism so that so I think you know there's a lot of qualifications like well you know these are there keter's parabus clauses that kind of thing but nevertheless uh nevertheless I do think that there's a pretty good argument a causal argument that if the knowledge argument is sound

1:33:15 then probably roilian monism is true is does it follow that that monism is true I don't think it does follow because there are different ways to understand rosilian monism There's a in one of the early chapters of of the more recent book I say look there there are some cases where it's kind of like there there's theories where it's kind of they're hard cases where monism uh could be understood as a version of monism because because of the integration between the structural and the non-structural. But on the other hand there's the structural and the non-structural and that you know there's

1:33:47 a way in which if if they're not they're really different they sort of sound that's not the mental and the physical but it's looking kind of dualistic. So there are sort of different ways to go to go over those those theories. Um uh as far as the the the uh the question,

1:34:21 causal space-time structure. Uh

1:34:55 she's got to be able to deduce uh all the facts about consciousness. I mean, I think Brazilian monism is if nothing else, it's a reductionist view. It it says that that consciousness reduces to sort of sort of phys physical or physical structural properties and the non-structural properties that underly them. Um and if if they thought that somehow you couldn't even given that information you can't deduce the sort of macrofil phenomenal properties you know you can't deduce facts about those. sort of sounding it's sounding just just

1:35:28 like uh I don't know sound like dualism like a like a kind of in a sense that no resellian monism should mon should accept okay I thought that they often do accept that um

1:36:01 against um uh sort of Relian monism and certain certain versions of of it.

1:36:36 or you know nonphenominal protophenomenal properties that kind of thing. I I I actually don't think that those arguments are nearly as strong. I I feel like in a way the combination problem um you know how the pallet version of it uh you know how do you get ordinary consciousness facts about ordinary consciousness how do you get that from facts about protoenomenal properties or microphenomenal properties if there's such a thing um I think of that as kind of an interesting problem for the view like a it's in a way it's it's not bad that the view gives rise to

1:37:10 questions which are hard to answer um uh and I just I don't I don't think the reason I don't think though the argument you can't give the same kinds of arguments is because I don't think we under it's sort of by hypothesis we don't understand these properties these microphenominal properties or or protoenominal properties the the whole point is that they're very different from the properties that we do understand either either from introspection is the case of phenomenal properties or in the in the case of physical properties from you know from doing science we we we understand the the the knowledge argument is not I

1:37:44 think a not it's not a good argument if if we if we don't or or it wouldn't be a good argument if we didn't go with the assumption that we we kind of understand the sorts of things that physical facts are the physical properties are if we if we didn't understand that then we can't re really include anything from the from what we can and cannot deduce from them if we don't understand them and and you know the case of protophenomenal properties for example I you know it's just they're defined as nonstructural properties which somehow in combination with structural properties give somehow

1:38:17 somehow give rise to or or underly ground um experience experiential properties phenomenal properties okay I don't have the foggiest idea of what these things are really like you know what what what what their nature is so I don't think I can draw any conclusions about um any interesting conclusions

1:38:51 arguments where the properties in questions we don't understand. So I don't think

1:39:22 "You're wrong." Um, and so it sounds to me like but but what I know is not some non-physical stuff that they don't know. What I know is called the theory of chemistry backed up by a theory of physics which relates the two in a specific way which allows me to understand something which to them looks unstunderable. How water a clear thing has parts. So, so your way of putting it there will be some new stuff that we can't understand that's not structural or functional. Um, sounds to me like you're just you're just going too well

1:39:55 that we don't right now that we can't for right now from what we know.

1:40:28 theory and

1:41:03 said you know a few moments ago was prefaced with a you know suppose the knowledge argument is sound you know what are the consequences of of this if it's not sound you know if structural physicalism is true then nothing of that applies at all I was I was saying suppose suppose that there there are these you know extra nonstructural properties then can you can you give can you run arguments um like the knowledge argument or the the conceivability argument on those and say and I was saying no but my question I agree but my

1:41:37 question is everything you said everything you said was was well but you know it's not based on that same assumption that there are these extra non-structural properties of course if everything is everything is structure and function then yeah then then

1:42:10 these further nonstructural features then I myself don't see so wor be see why I should be so worried that we right now can't from what we know deduce these things but in the future probably we should be able to. And I say, "Aha, see, but how come that's not the same thing that I was saying before?" Um, except that I say, "Suppose that the knowledge argument fails." And physicalism of the supervenience kind is true, but it doesn't involve some new nonstructural fact, but a new theory which would allow us to understand how those structural

1:42:43 facts relate to consciousness in the same way that our chemical theory allows us to understand things that Socrates and Aristotle don't. So that why isn't the move exactly the same at that point. It's just that we don't understand something and we're both betting on something in the future helping us understand it. I think it's going to be more of the same. You don't. But that's really all that it boils down to is like how willing you are to make that bet about the success of science as it has like the way it is currently. And and so it seems like there's no argument against my view then anymore. there is

1:43:16 just like your very strong intuition and bet that it's not going to go the way that I think it's going to go and it's not going to end up being like water and energy and us explaining to Aristotle but instead is going to be like well something that's never happened before. Um and that that seems like very counterintuitive. So and also a mark against that way of doing it. I'm I'm I'm still not quite getting what you're asking because it sounds like what you're saying right now. I must be misunderstanding. You're saying is, hey, uh it could be that, you know, you

1:43:51 really can deduce all the facts about consciousness from the physical facts. Maybe we just don't know, don't don't yet have enough sophisticated theories to enable us to do the deduction, but that doesn't mean it can't be done.

1:44:25 that that uh you know, somehow we know with certainty or anything like that that the premises of the knowledge argument are are are true. And if they're false then then then um you know what you said is just sounds quite plausible. I mean Nagel said similar things in you know 1974 and it still sounds sounds you sounds quite quite plausible. Um but ruling that

1:44:59 to this exact same move.

1:45:34 accounts for the truth of the premises uh of of the knowledge argument, which is, you know, I lo the way I set it out is logically valid. So, it's consistent with a with a sound argument. Your yours isn't. Uh I think I think it m my side wins on that though it's you know it it might be a pirate victory. I mean it could could be could be that uh could be I made a mistake you know as you said there there are moves I didn't consider in in the book and maybe those work. I'm always open to that possibility.

1:46:08 much to do about something

1:46:43 like what has been gained. You're still making this. You can't do the thing you say you you are required that you need to do.

1:47:17 do that are not necessitated by the structural truths and that's very nicely articulated by uh by I think you know versions of the sophisticated versions of the knowledge argument and by and by the the the conceivability argument some other arguments. So uh you know I it's in in the end in the end if those arguments are are sound then then you know my my my position is uh is consistent with that. So that I think is an advantage. Now, now it I for other

1:47:51 for for independent reasons, I'm inclined to sort of be somewhat I guess conservative and think well all that shows all those arguments shows is that there's something more than the structural that's completely left open that physicalism in a broader sense is true. Um if you if you sort of liberalize the notion of a physical property to include the nonstructural then uh then uh uh there's nothing has been there's been no threat to that view. It also hasn't been vindicated. I haven't pro proven that that that it's

1:48:24 that it's true or anything like that. So

1:48:58 to me you know there are other virtues but that's that's that's you know number one and and I I

1:49:30 think that you know I think that the the evidence points towards I don't think it's decisive, but I think the evidence points towards um the soundness of of these arguments I've defended. So that you know so I want to I want to go with that. Now it may be that that I this that accepting the arguments I think it not just maybe it is true that that uh accepting the arguments leaves further problems. Uh

1:50:03 think that's true.

1:50:35 is always the mark of a great book when you're like still thinking about it after you're done. So anyway, um

1:51:07 there's nothing mental in it.

1:51:41 Uh there are other explanations as well. I just think it's a natural plausible explanation. I also think that that there are independent problems with say um I mean you're referring here to to sort of the vine negativa the idea

1:52:14 purposes in particular of physicalism or or in backnet of distinguishing between physicalism and and its competitors because neutral monism seems to me a a perfectly coherent possibility a theory it's an alternative and the version of neutral modernism I'm talking about is not the one where you know the the things called that uh mock theory on which which the physical and the mental are are you know it just depends on how you look at it or something there's there's still basic cate I'm talking about the sort of nagel kind of view on which um on which there or or or Grover Maxwell kind of view on which there are

1:52:49 these uh properties which are not neither um physical nor mental they're they're some other thing some x thing uh And they underly both physical and the mental in the sense that the physical and mental are just manifestations of this one unified kind of deeper property about which we know very little uh that that we call them neutral because they're they're not physical and not mental. They're some unneutral. Okay, that's the view. Now that view is also uh also repudiates um fundamental mentality, right? on neutral monism

1:53:24 there's just the neutral properties and there and there there are mental properties there are physical properties but neither of them are fundamental.

1:53:58 they're importantly different theories are competitive theories uh just like idealism is another version and dualism would be a different theory. um pluralism you know more than two kinds of things would be another theory and uh divine negativa just doesn't distinguish between neutral monism and physicalism I think you should

1:55:03 physical which is positive um that as opposed to the negative definition that is what it's not notable but it's also not non-ifferential. I I follow Robert Howell in this uh uh uh because I the the dominant you know

1:55:38 like Hebel's dilemma you know well what physics are you talking about and so forth and and um you you you may be able to resolve that that problem, but but an alternative is is to is to basically follow follow a more old school kind of traditional path um cartisian path which is what Robert Howell does

1:56:14 by its implications for the distribution of um of things in space over time. So instead of saying as Deart did that um to to be physical is to be extended in three dimensions, it's basically well it's either that or it's um what determines what things that are extended in three dimensions, where they are and how they move and that that kind of stuff. So it's in the spirit of decart. So it's neoartisian and it's neocart. And I quibble with that. I I I I think I don't think that quite works, but um but it's something along those lines. I I I

1:56:48 I add a little Carnapian twist to it.

1:57:22 of this I think um

1:57:55 function argument. It's just and that's just it. It's that science explains structure and function. Consciousness isn't a matter of structure and function. Yep. Science doesn't explain it.

1:58:30 notion of uh a physical, so you're neo carnapian is neo uh carn. How do you which one?

1:59:03 I had a question I was going to ask, but I must be getting on in hours here because I forgot what I was going to say.

1:59:37 what's next? Like what are you going to write on next? Uh, and and I was going to say a very predictable thing that that what I'd like to I mean I'm working on other projects right now, but what I I'd like to do is is is um try to do something to address the sort of uh the black box in the middle of the Brazilian monist theory. I'm inclined towards Brailian monism, but I don't like theories with big mysteries in it, you know, and this theory has a big mystery at the at the center of it.

2:00:10 Uh, so so I I just want to I want to I'm sort of interested in in in

2:00:43 this would be an answer? like because Tomer's work kind of ends up in a pan qualityish way, you know.

2:01:17 a way you could one way I can I could pursue this project is is to try to understand that idea because something like that is in it's in the ballpark and the same thing with neutral monism what are these neutral properties I want I just want to know more more about this and maybe I mean that you know Durk Paraboom has this this sort of minimal idea here that sort of sounds in that in that kind of vein roughly that there these sort of um they're the categorical properties that that un underly basic physical dis dispositions and th that is

2:01:51 all they are you know it's it's sort of mass itself uh you know charm it itself and you ask what is that like well it's the property which underlies the disposition to be massy and to be charm and and it's like well but but what what do you mean by that and and his view is sort of like that there's it's a mistake to think that there's a real question there and you know I find I find that sort of mysterious and baffling But it I don't know. It's may I I I I I I

2:02:23 that that kind of direction I want to go.

2:02:56 science is interested in with respect to the brain and how it's related to consciousness. So part of me feels like yeah there's got to be a theory in the midsection somewhere that's going to connect these levels. And so until we until a lot of the empirical work comes in um there's always going to be this question this open box that would just we don't know what to put there. So I think so and having said that my own attitude is we should explore all avenues of like what could be in the box so to speak and I'm not against any of them. Um so so I appreciate your careful really careful uh attention to these matters. I I I recommend your work to

2:03:29 anyone who's serious about this stuff. you know, 100% it's it's worth it repays a study and very careful. So, in my estimation, it's you know, um what what philosophy best looks like and whether I agree with it or not, I I you know, that's a different question, but

2:04:02 time. Hang out for one second. I'll say bye off air, but other than that, thanks for joining me.