Consciousness Live! with Katalin Balog (S8 E7)

0:00 How often do you do this?

0:32 Joining me today is a very special guest. Um, so, uh, well, actually, I'm wondering, are we? Oh, no, we are. Okay. So, it's hard to tell on YouTube sometimes. Um, so Kati, uh, I sorry about the miscommunication at the beginning, but can you tell us a little bit about who you are and what you do for those who might not know, uh, about you?

1:09 the the philosophy community and analytic philosophy here in the US. So I I've come to the US from Hungary and I grew up there. So, I grew up in communist Hungary and uh and maybe I say something about what made me interested in philosophy in the first place.

1:46 as I said, the public discourse and generally just the discourse that we were expected to engage in in any sort of official capacity was just so maddeningly rapid and confusing and very hard to understand. I felt like a lot of what was said and and what I was expected to say just had no discernable connection to reality and and uh and I have this

2:20 um bug in me that I guess a lot of philosophers especially analytic philosophers have that I would like to get clear about things. M

2:56 satisfy my desire to become clear clearer about things. Ironically, the very first philosophy book I read was Gilbert Riyle's concept of mind which which I came to detest later on.

3:34 just to say that's that's what turned me to towards analytic philosophy. However my background otherwise was much more congruent with continent of philosophy concerns. So I was I was I grew up um studying and and being in involved interested in literature and art uh and psych psychoanalysis you know humanistic type psychology and and so nevertheless

4:06 the continental authors I read you were just very unsatisfactory to me like what is what what are they saying you know it's just like I don't No. So, so I that's how I became an analytic I came to the US. I became a grad student at Rodgers and um um and I became an analytic philosopher

4:38 analytic philosophy and and um this is just for background that you know there are reasons why why that is happening that maybe maybe somehow in my background but anyway so so I'm a philosopher of mine that's what uh my work mostly is concerned with and um and especially uh I've been working on the mind body problem which which was the time when I was coming up as a graduate student it was um you know there was renewed interest

5:11 in that now I'm interested in the mind body problem especially from the point of view of consciousness

5:44 So, so that's um you know that that's the problem that I've thought about most and and written about most you know the the the the status of consciousness and its relation to the physical world and um and and I approached it um from uh a particular point of view from the point of view of our awareness of consciousness. and our introspective awareness of

6:16 consciousness, the way that we think about it, the way we we conceptualize our conscious states. And I came to believe not all by myself, you know, I was I was um Brian Lur's student, you know, he was my dissertation advisor. And Brian Lure came up, I think, first with this idea that later, you know, later [clears throat] was became the known as the phenomenal concept strategy where where he was focusing uh on the mind body problem not from the

6:53 point of view of what sort of metaphysical uh specialness consciousness has, but from the point of view of the cognitive status. is of our um knowledge and awareness of consciousness. So he you know he started talking about recognitional concepts and that recognitional concepts um um that the recognitional concepts we have of consciousness give rise to all the well-known puzzles about consciousness. the conceivability of zombies, the

7:26 explanatory gap, um um you know, the the the um incorability of certain phenomenal judgments and so on. Um and so so that's how I got into the philosophy of mind of you know being interested in in that you know whole um concept of you know how how we can tackle you know this this metaphysical issue from the point of view of um of

8:01 our cognitive architecture and from from the point of view of how we form concepts and and especially um I got especially interested in introspection of consciousness because I also believe that um that the first person perspective that it involves um is you know has an interesting status not only in philosophy but generally in in contemporary culture uh as opposed to the third person ways of understanding

8:38 things and and uh understanding the world.

9:14 interest in uh the relationship between value and consciousness and my interest in how various metaphysical views about consciousness um actually uh are tied up with practical concerns through this connection between introspection and value. I guess I want to kind of start about uh a consciousness and the phenomenal concept strategy and then ask you about this contemplation stuff and uh illusionism. Um I might find myself in

9:47 the unusual situation of trying to be friendly towards illusionism uh which is not a position I find myself in often. But just so we don't gang up on them, I I might I might take that uh that view because I I generally agree with you that um well I Well, anyway, we'll get to what I generally think, but I'm curious about your views. So when you're talking about consciousness, you agree with me, I think that we're talking about phenomenal consciousness. That's the nagal sense of it. Um and yet there's this deep sense and according to many people that this thing can't be a

10:20 part of the physical world. um and that is somehow like a category mistake or simple-minded or like I don't know I've heard some people say some use very strong language that's inconceivable or impossible uh that that this thing that we're talking about could be be physical and indeed some people even associate the very term phenomenal consciousness with just like whatever is non-physical about consciousness and so I I think that we both agree and have talked about this many times that we disagree with this way of characterizing things even though we

10:53 agree about what phenomenal consciousness is, we want to insist that there's a way to understand its phys from a physical standpoint. Um,

11:27 sure anymore that it's worth defending, you know, either side, you know, in exclusion to the other. [laughter] I'll get to that. You know my view now is that there is really the the two views that are uh the most plausible is physicalism and um and property dualism of the kind that accepts the causal closure principle that is the principle that every physical event can be explained by a prior physical event. Um and um so so I think that these are the

12:03 two most plausible people will disagree with me that you know there are pansists and neutral monists and idealists and and um but but I came to the conclusion after you know surveying this field for a while that that these are the two more most plausible candidates for um having the true view on on the mind body problem

13:09 Is this cuz I saw a talk of yours and I think it was in a paper at one point where you called it non-interactive um non-interactive dualism or uh non-in is that that's different than what you're talking about right now, right?

13:44 doesn't mean that the best version of that view would be epifenomenalist

14:16 like I'm thinking of maybe like quantum dualism of the kind that you know, David Chmer's and and Kelvin McClean have uh, uh, have it. Is it McClean or McQueen? I I don't know. I'm not where the L goes. I'm sorry. But, um, yeah. So, how what do you think about those kind of interactive dualistic views? You just find them implausible? um that that that consciousness collapses the wave function that kind of thing

14:49 resists um in in such a way so as to cause something that looks like a collapse or there's different ways of spelling that idea out but yeah do you do you don't think those are

15:21 phenomenal facts from like physical fundamental microfysical facts or or is that something that you think is optional like you could go for that because I was talking with Barbara Montero recently and and she's you know arguing and gets that as a definition of physicalism. Um, and I and so I'm just curious like uh ho how much you think a physicalist truly is committed to these kinds of like definitional claims that people which when you think about it are usually offered to us by by by the non-physicalists. Uh so I don't know if that's a reason to

15:54 reject them but it's a reason to go hm is that really the most friendly way to set up the debate. So, so I wondered if or or do you think that that is what physicalism is committed to this kind of uh modal claim about um possible worlds and such?

16:29 my physicalist hat I definitely deny the Opriian entailment thesis which would say that which which would claim more strongly than what I said is that the full physical description of the world a prior entails you know every every truth about the world and I don't think that that's true um as as I say in my physicalist incarnation especially because of truth involving consciousness. You know, they, you know, they're definitely not up oriented by the physical as as evidenced by the

17:03 conceivability of zombies. Um, the explanatory gap and so on. All all of those arguments against physicalism appeal to the the idea that that that the oporentilment fails between the physical and the

17:37 know we could we could debate

18:11 and in my own work I call these creatures shambis and um I sort of found out about these things after uh I was already writing this paper and presenting it at a conference and I was like oh there's all these and it goes you know there's these ideas out there but the basic idea that I and So, my I think the way I was using this idea is slightly different, although maybe we can find out um is that I was thinking that when I hear someone say that zombies are conceivable, it sounds like they're begging the question to me because um I feel like if we truly knew all the physical facts about these the

18:47 way the brain works or something or had a good theory about it even then we would start to know what is or isn't conceivable like for example water being H2O think it's fine that Aristotle found it conceivable that water was an H2O, but now I can't find that conceivable because I know enough chemistry. So, I sort of think that what it what changed is that there was a theory um that was well confirmed and that now what's conceivable changes and what seems common sensical is different and it would have been different uh for Aristotle than for me given our knowledge of chemistry and so forth. So,

19:21 I feel like maybe that could happen with consciousness. Um, and to kind of illustrate that, I say, well, think of the Shambi, a creature that's physical but with consciousness. And there's no non-physical things at this world, just the physically conscious being. Um, so I think that's a conceivable thing. Um,

19:54 question against the uh the opponent. Uh but

20:27 conceivable one short of arm wrestling or like some other like I don't know. It just seems inconceivable to me to have a physical thing like me but no consciousness. You say that isn't. So I I just don't So to me it seems like I it was a more dialectically uh engaging way of present the argument. give them the op prioriness and then say but still your view you can't just assume that these things are conceivable because my thing is conceivable or your thing the Illuminati or Keith's thing the anti-z zombie so I am curious what you think about that as like the

20:59 rhetorical uh the dialectical strategy

21:33 why they have to be conceivable because our concepts of or phenomenal states are not in any way similar to pretty much any other concepts, you know, functional, structural, you know, physical whatever. um like water for example that that we conceive of as you know according to crypto you know the the the portable you know transparent liquid whatever uh that's not how we conceive of our conscious states we conceive of them directly by attending to them and by turning those very states

22:09 into a representation of themselves

22:42 would you agree that that uh well assumes that that phenomenal concept strategy is true which I know you want to defend and you agree but it could be wrong I think and if it were wrong I don't think that means physicalism would be wrong so that if there were so that there's there's another way to defend physicalism is kind of I guess what I'm saying so I'm not trying to disagree with with the way you're setting things up but I think that even if you turned out to be wrong about all that stuff you said it wouldn't refute physicalism on my view I because um of the things that

23:16 I was saying So, so yeah, I I wasn't trying to object or to or provide a counter to the phenomenal concepts uh way of dealing with this because I like that as well. um with regard to so charm's argument is you know just put it in a very s very simple terms is um that um the physical being how it is and there being no no phenomenal properties is conceivable if that is conceivable that

23:49 is possible if um if it's possible then physicalism is false you That's you know in in a in a nutshell

24:25 originally when when Dave Chalmer's um suggested that argument in the 1996 book you know the conscious mind he uh um he used the concept of negative con conceivability to um to flesh out the argument and and uh that way of putting the argument I think has a pretty much a knockdown reputation. That's my zombie reputation that there are zombies who could give the same argument. Um, but their conclusion would be false by

25:00 assumption and therefore there must be a premise that is wrong in the original argument. That's you know to to think about it in terms of negative conceivability. But later on Dave um Charmer's put this in terms of put the the zombie argument in terms of positive conceivability which is a um more um demanding notion although not 100% clear what it is but it's something like [laughter] something like if you conceive of a scenario in a positive manner then um

25:35 then uh you're able to construct you know in your mind a scenario IO that would satisfy um satisfy that you know you're able to construct um some state of affairs that would make you know that scenario true

26:10 that.

26:43 would be special pleading to say well but shambis are impossible because of the conceivability argument because then you know then you could say well the conceivability you know um you you can turn the the argument went against the dualist in the same way saying that the CP principle together with the positive conceivability of Shambis um um implies that um physicalism is true.

27:15 But yes, exactly the dualism

27:48 physicalism wouldn't be false as a result, but everybody was walking around saying like that was the real nexus of the debate and that if if they turned out to be right about the CP principle, then oh no. And I was like what? Uhuh. They're begging the question by assuming that we're wrong at the big so and we're letting them get away with it. So that was

28:21 ideal conditions only one of those would be conceivable but that under current conditions we don't know which one it is. [laughter]

29:30 also um uh it explains why you know the puzzles about consciousness arise. You know it gives a a a very nifty explanation of exactly that

30:02 the ground even because the CP principle shows that blah blah blah and so so you can dig in your heels if you're a dualist you can say well I have a perfect you know full metaphysical picture of the world I can explain mental causation if I squint a little bit and I have a beautiful account of modality and I can totally explain you know why the why the physicalist is wrong and and so on. So so they can both dig in their heels and and if you have been around for a while like I I have been you know you become like exa you

30:36 [laughter] know exasperated by that you know where where is this going it's not going anywhere because you know it seems to be like a a a gridlock you know like a an um you know um a situation where there is no resolution in sight. You know we have two views that each you know can defend themselves against the other and um um and explain why they are right and the other is wrong each of them. And so I

31:11 came to a a view now which is a different view um and which I call dialectical monism. You know that's a new it's [clears throat] a new kid on the block. Although I don't think that that many pe it's like roles of many people's lips yet because it's it's not been around. It's a in a paper that's coming out now in in the kryk volume. Um

31:45 once we accept the causal closure principle which which I think that the reasonable versions of dualism and of course physicalism as well does

32:18 positing that there is such a thing as a soul that's an independent actor in the world you know that you know causes things in the physical uh realm and um and then there was a real um a real stakes between physicalism ism, a real empirical disagreement and you know all of you know the work of uh but but the minute you give that up you that that mind has this uh independent role to you know cause a role to play the

32:53 disagreement I believe now fizzles and and by the way I I just um I just was talking with somebody and and gave this you know this analogy that imagine someone says says there is a god you know the god is god is immaterial but but it or he or she is unable to do anything in the world it's not [laughter] it's not doing anything and you say what hello what's that so so once you say that the mind you know that that the mind is something

33:27 that you know it's immaterial and you know it's nothing physical but but it's not able to influence the physical, you know, that's there's something weird there.

34:01 everything with the physical. Right.

34:36 use different notions of property that you know um they have different concepts of property. Um the dualist notion of property has a require has you know makes us a a close connection between properties and concepts that are embodied in you know like principles like the the CP principle or you know cryky's princ you know transparency principle that if you have two rigid designators that each um you know denote the reference each each

35:12 uh pad reference by essential property ities, you know, there only could be an identity if that identity is a priori. So, so that you can sort of put the the same idea, similar idea in different ways, different transparency thesis. But so, so that transparency thesis is is merely a way in which you think about what fundamental what properties fundamentally are. They are kind of things that are related with concepts in

35:46 this way.

36:20 you know the god sees what the property really is and then we just have to compare our notions to that you know I think that we can't really even think about the world at that fundamental level without already conceptualizing it one way or or the other.

36:57 dualism comes out true. If you take the other notion, physicalism comes out true, but not because they say different things about the world. It's because they have, you know, they they use a different conceptual scheme

37:30 almost I want to get back to how it might relate to the shambis versus zombies dispute because you could almost see like from your point of view how I think you would think about that situation but I want to ask you about that but anyway so um I wanted to ask if if like is this related to the Carnapian distinction between internal and external questions um what you get from like the history of philosophy or Was that is that not related to what you're trying to get at here? Um,

38:04 really relate my view to. So, I think that that idea is actually quite simple. And I mean, you you might think this way that yes, you know, like

39:46 I guess how do I put this? If you're a dualist, then you think that the world could have been such that there wasn't consciousness. Not not simply from an epistemic point of view, but like from a metaphysical point of view that it could have turned out that way.

40:19 motivated to do that. So, um, but but don't you exactly precisely need to invoke some sort of explanation for why the world didn't turn out that way, which does seem to suggest that maybe, you know, something something um is resolvable.

41:25 world could have been different and you're saying that's a terminological issue whether the world could well

42:31 uh on on you know you you will say that different things are possible you know depending on whether you use the dualist scheme or the physicalist scheme but again that's not because there is some you know something about the world that is um you know makes one uniquely true and the false. You know, the world as it is makes both of them true in their own conceptual scheme. So, so that's sort of

43:05 the, you know, the the outlines of the answer, but of course, you know, more needs to be said about it. And

43:39 consciousness with respect to AI and and biological entities. Um and because you know this is a slightly different issue than than fun than than physicalism uh and dualism but it is kind of in a way sort of related uh so that so that someone like me who's like friendly to biological naturalism because I like the identity theory is going to tend to say well you know these AI things they're they no matter how much they duplicate us they can't be conscious unless something unless that view is wrong

44:11 which maybe it is. Um, but that seems to me like a real important issue because a lot of stuff about morality, how we ought to treat these things really hangs now all of a sudden on whether something like the identity theory is true or something like computational functionalism is true. Um, and so that that seemed to me like a real important issue. That's that doesn't look terminological, right? So would you agree that in that case that's different? That's definitely doesn't look terminological and and I think we we would have to be very careful to to think about that because I I

44:46 you know just off the top of my head I I think that u the the question of whether um uh any given type of AI is conscious you know let's let's say that LLMs are not yet conscious I don't think it's likely that they are but but there might be some future iterations of um AI that is a candidate let's say for consciousness you know maybe maybe you know it satisfies the global workplace theory or hot theory or what whatever exactly

45:54 know how we think of the nature of property whether it involves close connection with concepts or not. Mhm.

46:27 uh about whether there is a matter of fact about consciousness. I think either way you know David Papino would disagree because he thinks that there's a you know terminal vagueness in because we are physicalist you know we have to admit that there's a terminal vagueness in the concept of consciousness but I don't believe so

47:02 duplicate ourselves you know completely you like some artificial biological um or or maybe Dave Charmer is right and and it's a substrate independent matter and we can simulate you know like down to the you know the the fundamental physical level we can simulate human beings and then those simulated beings will be conscious. um possibly. But but I think because of the way we think about consciousness, that prevents us

47:35 from ever really knowing

48:09 represent themselves. So so that's a very special way of you know no other concept is really constituted by its reference in this way

48:43 zeroing in on in your attention that is really why it refers to that state

49:17 you know whether it's conscious or not but but uh but but whatever criterion like serious criteria we have about it you will never know if that's the right one right

49:51 I think that's a that's a hugely big argument against trying to achieve conscious AI and it's not the only argument I think there is many arguments against that but but

50:25 know that that evolution came up with consciousness and with highly specific ways, you know, with central nervous systems and and so on and so forth. So, so we know that that that happened and and animals, you know, show all sorts of other signs of of their consciousness, but we can rely on the fact that we are of the same process, you know, evolutionary process as they are. But but when it comes to AI, you know, there's nothing like that to rely on. So, so I mean, you can be

50:58 skeptical of animal consciousness at the level of insects and whatever. And I think that that you will never know probably you know where where is the cutoff where does consciousness start in nature you you'll you'll probably never know um so so there's an uncertainty even in the in the biological world but certainly you know with regard to AI it's just never be possible to know

51:32 you're open to the possibility of AI consciousness even if we could never know. It seems like you you're saying there would be a fact of the matter uh possibly right that it it could be conscious

52:08 description in in various functional ways and uh and we just don't know if consciousness is you know requires biological substrate or or it's some sort of functional state and if so at which level because all of it is compatible with what we know about human consciousness. All of that is compatible with everything that we might know about human consciousness.

53:14 physicalist debate, you're saying it's different. That that's what I was trying to figure out like in your in your own thinking like why why you're making that distinction.

53:49 they will that there will be um differences in the way that the world is described with regard to its physical and and conscious the distribution of its physical and consciousness properties both dualist and physic I mean dualist and physicalist that's not what they disagree about um whether you know humans are conscious or dogs are conscious or or you know what physical properties um you know exist in the

54:25 world they don't disagree in that you know what they disagree about is just some you know fundamental arcane metaphysical truths about all of that. So so there are consciousness V properties consciousness P properties and they will be the same you know they you know the same individuals will have them in you know in their respective systems.

55:01 dialectical monism, I will have to say that well, it's equally true that something is conscious and that it's not conscious. No, I think that there is a matter of fact about whether something is conscious. And um and and I I I don't see any reason, you know, why

55:35 about illusionism. So someday I'll you know give up on this and ask about that. But um I thought you were saying that in a way they're both true. Like physicalism and dualism are both true. And it just kind of depends on like which definition of property you kind of uh like. And you could pick either one because there's no really good reason for us to like one over the other. So you could pick the the D property, the dualist property, and then you end up being a dualist. Or you can pick the physicalist conceptual properties and you end up being a physicist. But like

56:07 it's, you know, you know, um, tomato tomato type thing. Six of one, half a dozen of the other. It's like great. Uh, so so it's not so it's not that no one's conscious on your view. I thought I thought just that you were like they're both true kind of as a matter of preference or or inclination or something not not deep. And then I was wondering, okay, so here's another debate about physicalis, not physicalism, about um computational functionalism versus biological naturalism. And here, you know, you want to say,

56:40 well, we'll never know which one of these really ultimately is true in a way because we can't know whether the computer is conscious or the cricket in ultimate some deep sense. Um so so is this a case where it's or both are true that you know from one point of view the the cricket is conscious and the and the uh AI is also or not or vice versa that the other point of view the cricket is not conscious um and and maybe it depends on whether you think that you know consciousness requires concepts or

57:12 I don't know so you would have to spell something out like that but but maybe so I was wondering like on your view is it going to turn out to be simultaneously true both of them in this other debate and you and you were saying no. Um, so that's what I was trying to figure out is not not that you're committed to it being vague or somehow, you know. But anyway, that both were true that the computer is conscious from one like equally plausible way of looking at things and that also the computer is not conscious from another equally plausible way of looking at things.

58:18 crickets are conscious. I'm a physicist. I think they are not. I mean,

58:51 about consciousness. Um and then we have to go yeah we are yeah we are but so like doesn't that it seems to me like that suggests that they really there is something at issue here that that's like that case

59:24 consciousness. They they write that. Okay. So, are they right to say that what physicists say is false? Well, absolutely in their own conceptual scheme, but they don't realize that they're not speaking the same language.

59:58 simple and satisfying explanation of why it's so intractable you know this dispute is so intractable because you know you you're never going to accept you know that the other side you know the the other side's point of view because you simply not speaking the same language. So interesting.

1:00:34 conscious or not and and it doesn't

1:01:07 around for some other kind of terminological fundamental type thing around? That's kind of what I was thinking. Not that your thing about properties led you here, but but rather that once you take your view and you like it and you look over there, wouldn't you want to apply the same strategy?

1:01:42 and and basically I I made the argument that yeah he wins he he gets like a pirick victory because if you have like if you mean one thing by consciousness his view comes out right but if you mean something else by it his view comes out wrong. Um, but that's not exactly what you're saying either because what you're saying you're not saying that the ambiguity is in the in the concept of consciousness since you're you're saying that we both agree or they both agree that consciousness is what it's like from the first person point of view subjective mental stuff.

1:02:16 think that that's that's just the case, you know, and and it's non-negotiable and and I you know, all the kind of new fangled idea that oh no, consciousness really is some sort of representational concept or functional concept or you know it's just a actually a misrepresentation you know it doesn't even represent I think that those views are just wrong. So I'm old school about that. I think there is consciousness and the way we conceive of it is this way of you know of turn by attention turning them into

1:02:50 their own representations and and I think that that explains a lot about many things you know about metaphysics but also about um about um attitudes towards um ethics broadly construed uh about you how we relate to our own consciousness, you know, what what role it plays in our life. So, so it's it it's a very central issue in in my understanding that that

1:03:25 explains many things about human beings.

1:03:58 illusion on the part of the introspector um and that so and I I am very suspicious of illusionists as well. So I think I I like this strand of your work, but you also go a little bit further and make the argument that this is like a final step in a kind of degrandularization of humans or something like that. Um, which is dangerous in in some sense. Um, and so I I wondered, you know, if we could talk about that. I know you're you know have other things to do and if you but if you have time to broach I know

1:04:31 it's a huge topic, but maybe we could spend the last bit of the our time talking about that if you don't mind. Well, I there's nothing I would do rather do than explain this.

1:05:04 rigor and and and the the aiming for clarity that that um that good analytic philosophy gives you. Um but at the same time I I grew a little bit disenchanted with the narrow focus you know kind of the the narrowmindedness

1:05:37 when I started thinking about illusionism and you know putting it in is like historical perspective that you indicated that that I think it's it's an interesting phase in in in the change of how we think about our ourselves, you know, our minds about consciousness and and that it has real ramifications for practical concerns and ethical concerns and so on and and u and it was almost like you know a number of people

1:06:10 um got a little you offended that you know we we are philosophers. We are not you know talking about these you know wishy-washy things you know like culture and [laughter] and um you know uh like um what what you know analytic views in analytic philosophy reflect about the culture god forbid. So, so, so I started um I started feeling like I I am interested in certain ways in I I think I'm an analytic philosopher, but I I

1:06:45 started thinking in ways that might not fit so well anymore into that. And and that's, you know, so one example of this is my views on illusionism and and as you said, you know, I I think it's false. We may even agree in that. I I think it's false to say that we are not conscious and that we merely appear to be conscious and that we misrepresent ourselves being conscious.

1:07:19 think about the Cartisian view, so think about the Cartisian view of what what is a human being and and of course there were many views of human beings, you know, in many different times and cultures and and even in you know the early enlightenment but but this still I think is a representative somewhat representative view you know Dayart's view of of human being is an immortal soul that is um that is libertarian, has libertarian freedom and is immaterial and you know

1:07:55 and has all these powers to influence the the the rest of nature you know any way it wants and and um and so on. So of course there was also the cosmological idea that we are in the middle of the cosmos and we are created by God and all you know all of that.

1:08:28 souls and in libertarian freedom. And of course, our place in the universe is totally shot, obviously. And [laughter]

1:09:03 is to be a human being and and it's what gives us dignity and what gives us importance that we and and then you know no accident I think that it's by the 20th century that that I found no trace of this view in earlier in earlier eras. So there's you know dualism and physicalism and idealism and and you know even pan psychis and everything has been represented for millennia as as ideas about you know the

1:09:37 the nature of mind and place of mind in nature but not illusionism not the idea that we are not conscious that that comes in the 20th century and with Gilbert trial so that's why I was saying that the very first philosophy book I that from cover to cover is the concept of mine and I really was very impressed but but now I think you know it it was a harbinger of something that I think is is not good you know it's it's a pericious thing that that we started now to think of ourselves as not even conscious and and

1:10:11 give up the the subjective um u point of view as a source of knowledge and understanding and and sort of give our entire allegiance to the third person, you know, which is, you know, the third person is of of course best, you know, embodied in science. So, so that's that sort of view of the world

1:10:45 we see the world from our own point of view with with the point of view of of science. But but now it seems like many people are willing to just dispense with the first person entirely. And the reason I think that that's um that's ominous and and it's not a good development cultural development because I I do believe in addition to um consciousness being you know this central feature of being being human but it's also what grounds value all

1:11:20 together. So, so I I do believe that beings that were not conscious and not conscious in in the way in which the world resonates in an evaluative or effective way with them. Um then for those creatures there would be no value. Uh and uh and so if you're an illusionist, even though actual illusionists of course disagree with it because they think that value is also a functional concept, then you can define

1:11:52 it in terms of dispositions and dispositional notions of desire and um um and belief and and and so on. But um but I think you know in in in um in in contrast with with that view I think that it's really consciousness and in particular evaluative consciousness that grounds value and and if that is the case

1:12:26 and and I think that although this um you know this this kind of technical way of talking about It is somewhat recent. But I think that that human beings were always aware of this and and always thought that the way to understand, you know, the human good and how life is to be lived and what it is to be a good life, what it is to to have a good life. They they always understood it in subjective ter you know subjective terms

1:12:59 in the sense that that you have to be able to you know um understand and and evaluate the world. This sorry understand uh and and uh um um goes through your world

1:13:34 um so the illusionist is is basically encouraging us to give up this you know the the effort to understand ourselves you know from the point of view of of our effective engagement with the world. So, so would you say it's like the the concept of humans that comes from the enlightenment is being picked apart and this is the last thing that they're they're taking out and be like and this too the subjectivity what it's like business as well.

1:15:16 being free and also empathizing with others. So, so all of these, you know, human capacities that we have that that comprise, you know, what it is to be free and what it is to be flourishing is tied to our engagement with consciousness. And and so I think that this whole thing, you know, with with illusionism is taking us away from that. And that's why I think it's not a good development. And so you you I think if if I'm remembering correctly, you also want to relate this

1:15:48 to for example social media technological inter the way we interact with each other in our ordinary cultural settings. And if I understood you corre I mean so if I understood you correctly it's like we feel disconnected from each other and illusionism is a theory that kind of makes sense of that in a way. So then they reinforce each other in a way that we go oh this fits with me and then we go I like illusionism but it's really because you already were feeling like alienated from your own experience in a way if you can use that continental term. Um

1:16:59 digital distraction and obviously the digital destruction distraction makes us more receptive to illusionism. I I think I told you maybe maybe heaven that that that I was really shocked you know just not so long ago um I went into a class you know to talk about illusionism and and years prior it was always a haha you know what and and I was asking before the class you know how many people are sympathetic and every hand went up every hand went up it was a graduate class so so so we are becoming more receptive to

1:17:34 it and and once we are more receptive of course we are less worried about the distraction the digital distraction and the loss of um contemplation because you know what's that I mean there's no consciousness anyway and um yeah and this also relates to of course AI and um and even AI consciousness I think in a in a strange you know like maybe paradoxical way works in the same direction because once we once we think that well AI is conscious. We are

1:18:07 conscious. You you start thinking well you know we are like AI but but of course if you think what AI is you know it doesn't contemplate

1:19:12 are very emotive and sensitive individuals who seem to experience the world very I mean when I I know Keith seems very

1:19:46 you're saying is no, actually, it's it's promoting it's promoting this other thing which isn't good. So I So that seems to be interesting because you also seem to be kind and interesting and want to promote good. So it's like when you meet two people like that who have opposite views, one wonders what's um what's been one going on here.

1:20:21 really good you know for old old folks like us you know because we already you know we already you know develop we know how to be creative we know you know how to think and so on but but then the young people will suffer and and Keith already knows you know how to be a sensitive contemplative human being but but then the young people you know that that hear and accept this might not be so lucky. So,

1:20:54 contemplation thing we're talking about. Um yeah and and partially you're encouraged to do that by how you grew up and

1:21:27 that and that's becoming um, and well, we always hated boredom, but you know, I was told as a kid, if you're bored, you're a boring person. Like that's what my grandparents would say to me. And and I always thought that was mean, but in a way they were right because if you're bored, that's because you can't think of something to do basically is what it amounts to. Um, and we're kind of losing that ability to stimulate ourselves to think of something to do beyond the the digital right in front of us. And and part of what we can do is contemplate where where you just reflect and you and you take a breath and you and you step back.

1:22:30 what I'm what I'm trying to say. What I'm trying to get at um is by by by pointing out that people like the illusionists are motivated by avoiding dualism. So that's brings us, I think, back to where we started with, which is that

1:24:10 to what you're saying to him and talking about Shambies and anti-zombies and being like like given your argument like isn't that an argument against illusionism that you could conceive of consciousness being physical? Um, and he was saying, "No, it depends on what it's likeness and so forth." And we agreed to come on on consciousness live and and talk about it eventually, but I've been so busy I haven't got around the scheduling. Things are scheduled so far in advance that I haven't got to that. But

1:25:15 dualist than a than a illusionist, you know, by by many miles more. So So yeah, definitely then I would be a dualist, but but that's not my view. So I I don't think that the that the zombie argument really works, at least not in the sense it tries to work, you know, as a knockdown argument against physicalism. It doesn't work in that way. But but doesn't it not really matter though on your view? But but the Keith people think it really does matter. So So that's what I'm trying to

1:25:50 get at is like it seems like there's some tension here and I'm not sure where it's coming from

1:26:22 of the argument you're giving for illusionism is conceivability arguments.

1:26:56 paper where you say No, you know, contemplation is good and and and this is against that and it's important that we resist illusionism. And then I started thinking, wait a minute, wait, wasn't this a terminological debate? Um, but it sounds like you're no, you're saying they're not really physicalists, I think, is ultimately um so yeah, that's what I'm trying to figure out. It's like how how to fit these two things together in the in this.

1:27:29 that sane dualists will agree with sane physicalist that consciousness agre exists.

1:28:04 uh, that's what that's how they have to be taken in my mind. They have to they if if if you want to be charitable at all I think um then they have to be saying if they're right that there is consciousness. It's just not that we're kind of wrong when we say it's subjective what it's like but but it's still there. Um it's just different than what we think that it is in a way that I hear the compatibibleist talking to the libertarian free will people when they say there is free will. It's just not what you think it is. It's this, you

1:28:37 know, this process of control that's completely, you know, determined in all the regular ways, but uh that that's free will. So, um but that's not the I guess that so you disagree with that way of uh of saying that's

1:29:10 Montero had an article in the times you know in which she says well soon we will discover that AI is conscious and that's not because of some you know pre preconceived notion of what consciousness is but we will learn about what consciousness business is by interacting with with AI. So um so I think that's a little bit similar to what Keith and Danette is saying that well um you know there is consciousness but but it's not what you thought and we finding it out from science what it

1:29:43 really is. But what I'm saying is that you know what they they kind of invented a new concept and they basically denied the existence of what everybody means by consciousness. So it's not really not not consciousness denial. They say they're accepting the existence of consciousness, but what everybody means by it, they deny still. So, so that's still to me that's still eliminativism

1:30:17 concern is introspection and introspective concepts and and to to somehow suggest that

1:30:55 science. You know nothing exists if it cannot be understood and explained from the point of view of science and and consciousness is notoriously like that. And so it you know so you know the only denying that but of course everybody means by you know everybody is sensible [laughter] at least means by consciousness something that know from from a first person experience and they're denying that. So, so they can tell me that yeah, well, we think consciousness exists, but except that they just denied what everybody means by

1:31:28 it.

1:32:01 go that's right. And I I guess I kind of agree with you that I don't think that that's going to happen.

1:32:36 to the to the inner world, right? That that that now science can show us that we are just full of it, you know, there's nothing like that going on because science told us that we are not conscious and so

1:33:08 illusionism is true and I called it diluted Earth. So, I I don't know if I'm a neutral party here, but I do think that a a world where delusionism is true, it would be a world where people were massively deluded. um and not a world where there would be, you know, anything that we would recognize as as as as consciousness. I I [clears throat] would kind of want to say there are other things that are valuable besides consciousness. So, I get I don't know if you would go so far as to say that consciousness is the only source of value. I certainly think it's a great source of value and important, but you know, I think other things can be

1:33:40 valuable without consciousness. So, you know, I feel bad for Roombas that get stuck in corners and stuff, but you know, that I think that's maybe uh a separate issue, but I think it kind of goes with it because, you know, the kind of the cont thing that if you ignore like I still say thank you to Siri and Chachi PT and stuff like that even though it's I know pointless because I just think it's that's just how I after I ask a question, I always say thank you when I get the answer. I don't know why I should stop doing that when I talk to AI even though I don't really mean to express gratitude. I just think is polite or something. And I think I would be losing something if I got into the

1:34:14 habit of just asking for something and and being like, "Yeah, that's right. Do it faster." Or instead of saying, "Thanks."

1:34:49 kind of attachment to it like I think I would otherwise. Mhm. So, so do you think that um this is sort of maybe going back around to something we were talking about earlier, but do you think that runs the risk in the future if you cultivate that sort of attitude of maybe doing some morally uh questionable things to a unknowably conscious agent. So, if you don't know if it's conscious or not, um then having it referred to itself as this model might be harming it. If it's conscious, I'm not saying your chachbt is. I'm saying some future

1:35:22 aversion it might be and we and if we agree with them that we can't know

1:35:56 it's just not I mean what would be the purpose because then then you know if you really seriously think that that you made something conscious you have to liberate it and and it would be just a new species of being and not not our helpers but I thought the whole idea of AI was to you know have a useful tool.

1:36:28 Anyway, okay. So, I agree with you though um that that these these questions about dehumanization, depersonalization, uh the loss of connection to others, um the these are really these are real these are real issues. And I think it's really interesting in your work the way you're trying to bring out that this connection to consciousness. And so, you know, I spend a lot of time talking about consciousness on on with on this channel with people. It gets very abstract and dry sometimes.

1:37:02 living in some sense for us. Um that that's very unique and special about humans and other animals possibly. So, uh, it's it's very good to be brought back to that space and then remember that sometimes these theories might actually matter for things beyond this this stale analytic environment. Um,

1:37:35 come up or could have come up that didn't and the answer can always be no but I always like to leave space at the end to see if there was something that you wanted to um mention.

1:38:41 illusionism gets all the attention, panskism gets all the attention and both of those guys assume that the priori arguments get off the ground so to speak and you know some of us old school physicists are like wait a minute they don't even go that off the ground.

1:39:14 spreading you know the the gospel of concept strategy vigorously enough and my my new ideas but but my my experience is that you know what views are topical is like it's it's very you know unpredictable and and you know very sociological and that's just what it is you know and you're right that that uh um views that have been around and then have have have not been refuted or you know discarded you know they just you know we're not

1:39:50 talking about now because they're not the new kids on the block and but maybe they will come back again I mean I I found that Jerry Porter you know fell out of you know discussion but but it seems like he's coming back a little bit you know it's who knows what happens and Ryan Lure who was I think a super interesting philosopher and many of his ideas remained you know sort of cryptically not developed and and I I sometimes you know would like to develop you know his views of intentionality but

1:40:24 but it's I never get get around to it but so he had so many interesting ideas and of course he came up with the fundamental concept strategy which I I truly think is one of the the great ideas in 20th century philosophy I mean there's very few really influent ial good ideas and I think that's one of them. Uh but but as you say you know he died you know a long time ago now almost 10 more than 10 years ago and he was not really active for 20.

1:41:31 My pleasure. And I I would like to have you back some day in the future to go through those details. But in the meantime, um just hang on for one second. I'll say bye off the air. Other than that, it's been a true pleasure. I appreciate your time.