Consciousness Live! with Claudia Passos-Ferreira (S3 E14)

0:00 all right we are live joining me today is an extra special guest Oh Claudia I forgot I forgot how to ask you how to pronounce your second part of your last name so I know it's Claudia past Passos as fast as perfect yeah you can say Ferreira yeah Ferreira sorry Portuguese would say pastor Shakira oh the R is more as less soft okay I introduced myself in English Claudia Passos Ferreira

0:32 okay perfect happy with with Claudia passes great okay thank you yeah didn't butcher it too badly I was gonna I meant to make a point of asking that before we started so I apologize about that but thank you for joining me today I'm very excited to be talking to you I think your work is very cool or I became aware of it so when I saw you present at the NYU discussion where you were presenting your paper on infants and consciousness and so this seems like a general theme of your work that you're interested in

1:03 kind of different varieties or conscious experience of infants is this so I started interested in the oranges of Pines and oranges of consciousness so their early stages and then I become very fascinated by the field of infant consciousness and I think it's also a field that there are not too many people in philosophy that is working on there are many people interested in mind and mental states and cognition in infants

1:37 unless people work on infant consciousness so I think there was there is still room for explore this this topic in philosophy yeah it's an under explored it comes up occasionally here in there but it really is an under explored issue and the philosophy of mind yeah so it's really cool that someone's paying attention to it and painting and doing some careful work exploring the different options and what the evidence would count and stuff like that so I mean so your view is that infants are conscious and you defend that so you have a paper on that really

2:10 defends that they're conscious yeah yeah go ahead sorry sorry now we're just gonna ask you are there skeptics about this or is this something that you find that people are that you have to convince or is this something that you're just trying to show up with evidence no I think there are skeptical xmarks people that were explicitly weak skeptic about us just presence one of the skeptical ones he's not that his ex kept for that infants are conscious the

2:42 sex is kept for that you can ever know if they are not conscious at the methodology we never allow you to – sure know if they're conscious or not there are some views of consciousness that raise some problems for country for infant consciousness and you have some [Music] so Francis recently sued fielder for have very nice paper claiming that infants are conscious around five months

3:17 he's not explicitly saying that they are not conscious in their stages but his paper in a certain way say that we cannot you have an evidence grab us evidence that our consciousness captures Marone for at least some half half skeptical ones and some group that

3:52 really endorse the view to their conscience and some people that really think that this is not problematic obviously is their cautious group there are some what some people that even see the problem some philosophers I don't know I don't see that there is a problem here yeah I would have thought that the common-sense view was that it was kind of obvious that the tensor skeptic I mean that they're conscious and so that skeptic has an uphill battle here yeah but it's once you start discussing the

4:26 real problems most of them there's this group of people that think that there is no problem there they are busily conscious because haver the similarity of the they are from the same species as us and you have some similarities in brain structure so there are some people that even see the problem but there are some once you start going for the defining the tails of the discussion so then people start to disagree okay so what okay so if their conscience

5:00 how can you what is the good evidence that show that they are conscious then you have lots of disagreements from this okay this behavior could be unconscious you know that's their unconscious paying or not so you can see the disagreement and even those that the fan that is obvious that there are cautions you can see that they don't have a sophisticated way to defend their conscious right we might just sort of intuition that sort of comment tuition to their conscience yeah and I mean as you point out in your

5:35 paper the main source of skepticism is their lack of ability to report so it's like in conscious entities we usually ask for a report they can't do that I mean you know a five week old baby can't report anything you know those that changed their minds like characters Peter characters that had doors before some some sort of view on consciousness that he explicitly said that infants are not conscious it's the and no animals also are not no animal no human animals

6:13 are not conscious and there now he changed his view he has defended sort of a first-order representation of view of consciousness it allows non-human animals and infants to be cautious so have also those that change their minds in the myth of consciousness I mean one thing that I found very surprising when I was reading your work was that I guess I wasn't really aware in the history of science that there was kind of this period of time when they took it for granted that they didn't

6:46 feel conscious feel pain consciously for example and so they would perform operations or procedures you know without anesthesia but that's not common anymore right that's they've changed their mind the medical profession yeah you have this period of the denial of pain in infants and many experimental studies showing that they really did something that I thought was quite painful for infants to test if they were feeling pain or not and many of those

7:22 the recipients was a large period of the history of psychology where they thought that they are not feeling pain the your last sensitive to pen sort of hypo sensitivity to been a basal in the idea that the brain was not sued enveloped that could give robust since our information of pain is true that they saw a common view now that they feel

7:56 that if you pay but also come on the view now is that even if those that the roost you have those skeptical of infant pain even if Wow Sophie yes you can find some philosophers that will be skeptical about infant pain and but but all of them agree that even if they don't have the conscious experience of pain this the information of pain is bad for for

8:32 the work for the organism so they would say that okay which we need really need to avoid the dance a few pen because it's bad for the organism the reaction of the organism to an unconscious pain is very bad right they probably they agree that they have Nasus action that is necessary part of the information and this is the feeling not the feel but the information of the nociception will be bad for the organism

9:06 so you should we should avoid them to feel pain okay so so this view it's become less and less prominence okay there we will have more and more evidence for infant thing and that will the skepticism is less or less relevant but it's – but the bigger the bait is if you have a paint signature or not in the brain so son there is there is a good evidence that probable you have this pain signature in the brain and if you

9:40 have this pet friend signature in the brain and we can show that infants have the same pain signature you can infer that the feeling pain at least similar way that will feel so my claim in the paper is that if the evidence of pain signature and in adult brain is it's true it's good evidence and we can find this evidence as there is some experimental work trying to show that we

10:13 have similar evidence in infants who can in fear infer that they feel pain right so it's an argument to the best explanation okay that's inclination together with their behavior they have a similar behavior reacting to pain States when we adults have so we hit they have all the crime the facial expression of pain they also have many movements in the body that indicates that they feel pain they

10:46 have the famous with a draw response voidance response for pain painful stimulus so i think you can combine the behavior evidence with the neurobiological evidence and and the basics would be that they are feeling pain so I did want to ask you about unconscious pain since I think that's gonna be a large part of I mean as I was mentioning before we start I'm not really a skeptic

11:18 about about FM pain but I played the role of one for our conversation for a little bit at least because I think that's gonna be that place where they're getting us they're gonna dig in their heels and say well you know these these pains even all these neighbors can be explained with unconscious pain so before sort of doing that I wonder what your general view about unconscious pains are do you think that there are pains which are not experienced not not phenomenally conscious but nonetheless have a functional profile of pain so even adult humans or are you skeptic about unconscious pain generally or just curious about what your view about that

11:50 way I I resist the idea that you that can happen conscious pain but I don't have so my strategy in this paper is not deny all those claims so let's let's accept that unconscious pain exists okay so usually when you think in the case of adults about unconscious pain it's very hard someone that claims at all oh the entire experience of pain of an adult is unconscious so you can have

12:23 some states of unconscious pain for those that accept unconscious pain but you don't really think that oh the experience of pain in an adult is unconscious so it's hard for me to claim that all the experience of pain in infant if I accepted the of unconscious pain all experiences would with being unconscious so it's hard for me to really when you say all just sorry to interrupt you but when you say all experience you mean everything strains average' sorry that ever been

12:56 experienced sorry sorry father English no that wasn't so so he says it's like in the case of unconscious perception okay so usually when we accept unconscious perception in the case of adults Oh human adult's is in contracts or with some some percept some conscious percept an x-ray okay so you have to think about really a zombie baby experiences there is no conscious experience at all

13:30 because if you think okay somehow or some of their experiences are unconscious so so another argument to reject the idea of pain experiences this oh it's not like real Pam Peng experiences like an itch you are sensation or they cannot discriminate between a tactile pressure and really painful experience there is another argument okay I'm very imagine that this is there what's going on there okay I would accept this okay because I think

14:06 for us adult a pressure a tactile pressure is this to a conscious experience right now even if different and our knowledge changes a little bit is this your conscious experience of something similar to pain you're in this in the some phenomenological structure that's similar to pain experience so this is one way I would think about unconscious experience so it seems hard to me to think that all kind of

14:42 sensorial pain experience would be unconscious okay so this is because it's to deny unconscious to the ninepenny experiencing infants you would claim that all paying experiences would be unconscious right they really would be as zombies in this at least as many things don't don't be so no pain even if you allowed for other kinds of

15:16 experiences at least you you you need to claim that all or every experience of pain would be unconscious this seems impossible to me okay so maybe some of the kind of experiences they don't have oh they are not able to because some people claim that you need some cognitive capacities to to have certain kinds of experiences of pain I I would

15:54 agree with this and maybe those cognitive capacities this you don't have and maybe they just have the nociception a part of pain and they don't have the affective component of pain so it sounds to recap it sounds like what you're saying is that even if you will admit or allow that there are unconscious pains and adults it's still a much different thing that they're positing in the case of infants are positing that every pain all their pains all their pain

16:27 experience would be unconscious and that seems like a far leap from just that there are some experiences that may occur unconsciously in your mask and in the case I don't know those that claim that you have unconscious pain so do you do we have the same kind of behavior for unconscious pain that we we have for conscious pain yeah I think so they claim that you just you have the same behavior gesture they're not feeling you don't have the feeling component right yeah you may be limping

17:01 and not even be aware that you're limping someone may point out that you're limping and then your eyes oh yeah my foot hurts yeah but you you you you'd have to claim that all the crying all those reactions right would be unconscious certainly might have I I would agree that they might have some kind of experiences of pain that they are not aware okay but certainly I think there are that

17:38 relevant evidence behavior and neurobiological evidence that is very similar of pain experiences that we have that are cautious in adults so you have to claim that those unconscious those experienced a pretty similar to experience that a conscious for us part unconscious for them crying yeah all the crying or the avoidance and all the oh the body reactions they have so that is quite a bit yeah I I would disagree with

18:15 this I would result that oh every kind of pain experiences pain reactions sorry brain reactions are not being experiences so what so what is this can we talk about the neurological evidence for a second I mean what what evidence is it's that there's a pain signature in humans that you think we find similar things in infants yeah just I I would have to remind all the day or the the neuroscientific of the tails there are some regions of the brain that are

18:50 activated when you feel pain okay in adults and from the 20 just to give an example from 220 areas that are activated infants have 18 of those that are similar to so it's pretty similar pattern of activation okay and with similar stimulus because evidence they have is they they tested newborns with their mothers so they keep to the matter

19:27 the same kind of painful stimulus to the matter into the newborn and they see how the newborns brain reacted to this kind of stimulus and they have the similar activation very similar so this is I think it's a good evidence at least they have similar neurobiological evidence for pain that we have for adults okay yeah who are these people letting them

19:59 do the seems like a study I wouldn't want to sign up for that is very it's like you get like a pain band on your on your finger so you feel the pain but it's not a horrible pain I say hey I mean they in front they do with the in the food because it's a very sensitive area right and we can so it's not that bad it's not that bad in the previous in the previous studies when they in the period of the

20:35 night of pain they did really very horrible things like shaking the babies to see if they what kind of reaction they would have wow yeah so they did really I think much more there is one kind of experiment that they put some very hot pacifier and hot hot bar of milk and they avoid the the hot milk so many think that much more painful that

21:11 this very I think much more I think nowadays were much more concerned about paying in infants paying animals with much more concerning and bad thing than if we were before yeah yes brew yeah was pretty Barroso I think I don't know we have you have two children so what is your intuition you think you are your infants they were

21:48 conscious Akbar thought was you were yeah I mean I feel like that kind of anecdotal businesses is doesn't carry too much weight though but I do I mean that's hard to avoid I mean when they make eye contact with you as you point on your paper that's when they when a lot of people first sort of feel like oh there's a person looking at me and when they grab your finger there's a lot of little indicators that seem to not only have consciousness by agency and stuff I hear some the work that we'll talk about later but I mean you could debunk that kind of evidence I think by talking about

22:19 evolution and of course you know there's a kind of evolutionary maybe hardwired circuit in us that responds in that way because it helps keep the infant alive past a certain stage or something like that so but my own feeling was yeah I was I mean if you wanted I mean you know do something without anesthesia to it to my five months old I would say what are you talking about so person I think personally it's when you're I mean I

22:52 know some skeptics about animal consciousness at least and when they're conferring with animals they treat them you know like they're conscious it's just sort of theoretically the question is what would count as good evidence given that they can't like say unconscious sorry I dunno what yeah yeah so I think this argument that comparing infants with animals one thing that we I think it's relevant to have in mind is that even if you don't agree or you reject the idea that animals are conscious you have to

23:25 remember that infants they you will be even if you disagree that they are conscious at Birth they will be conscious at certain point right okay so they are part of a species that will develop consciousness so I think the question for infants is when they develop consciousness yeah because it's you can deny for instance that fish are conscious or you can deny that these are conscious or can deny even the dogs are conscious of cats are conscious but we

23:59 at least we believe that we are conscious and the question is a matter of when they become conscious and so I think this the the line that will that distinguish between one state when previous moment that the infants are who are not conscious and the moment that infants become conscious would be I think a pretty good important debate thinking consciousness so I think it is distinguished a little bit with the idea of animal consciousness it's one

24:32 important I think distinction yeah now that's a good point that's a very good point because I mean I'm not a skeptic about animal consciousness just for the record but I know some people who are hanging out with some of them sometimes so but that's an excellent difference is that there's no doubt that the infant is going to become come even if you think that they're not conscious a five weeks old by you know I don't know well at least like five or three or something there's no denying that would be just quite Outlanders to say that a three-year-old wasn't conscious I would

25:04 say but so there's a question about when they become conscious and that's very different from the animal thing I think you're right about that so it's a good point yeah can I ask about so this kind of brings up the other the other end of the question I was going to ask you because a lot of your work is focused on very early infancy but I wonder what you think about unborn like fetuses like you know eight nine months eight months into pregnancy would you apply the same sorts of arguments at that stage as well or do you think being born is really critical

25:38 or where is the cutoff in review yeah I can't reply to this question in do it in two ways one way is more strategic way to reply to this question I have been avoiding think about the unborn conscience if the importance conscious or not most because I think when you started discussing this use you you are suddenly drawn by the discussion about abortion and all that or debates and I I

26:16 have been strategically avoid in this because I don't think that it's not because I don't think that is a it's a very relevant debate I I just want to avoid this because once you start the bait and there's this become the central point right oh that's gorgeous quiet discussion it hijacks the other stuff yeah it's completely hijacked other stuff so everything you start being afraid of making more risk claiming in in those debates because it seems you're favoring

26:47 one side or another right what we avoid in this it might be that they are conscious before they're born I don't I never see of seeing a very convincing evidence that they are having conscious experience in the world that could really as we have when they are born maybe one me I would agree that they have the capacity at least in the last

27:25 three months of gestation they have the capacity because if they are born preterm I think I pretty much good some similar evidence a babe a nine a gestation of nine months and at the gestation of seven months and they are born with similar capacities so I think we can make the case that at least they have the capacitance okay if they're feeling pain if they are feeling if they are having hearing experience or

28:00 auditory experiences that is another discussion have if they have a tactile or movement experiences in the womb I'm not sure but sure they are sure they have they are the resistor in this information okay yeah they cognitively they have a read the perceptual capacity of resisting those disguise of information so the question would be it's this information being just

28:36 registered by the brain with no conscious experience hypothesis that I'm very sympathetic is with logic I think his name is longer crafters or cratis and be a champion drew they have a paper of emergence of consciousness and they have this idea that what really awake the brain is the birth okay is sure that their their hypothesis is not very well developed

29:12 there are many problems there but in a nutshell is the idea that the there is the the filters would be in a sort of an aesthetic state in the womb and when they are born they forced by all the the respiratory process and the oxygen in the brain to awake and then they become conscious this

29:45 I think it's supplied plausible hypothesis even if I think they don't have still them about their vo very well and we could is I don't think that they the evidence is more i story that they tell of what could have been what is happening when the when we are born but it's less it's less tested the

30:19 hypothesis hypothesis makes sense is more yeah a big picture of what is happening when we are born so if you if this is true maybe we have a rare the capacity of having conscious experience in the womb but we're not having because we are in this sort of an aesthetic state or that we are not really feeling things interesting but when you were born we develop we just like just

30:53 capacity emerges okay yeah interesting I haven't heard of that but I yeah it seems like an idea that would be worth pursuing and trying to yeah I don't know how you would test it but because I don't really know of any sorts of studies like the ones that you point to you know I'm you know sort of behaviors indicating responsiveness to pain they don't do anything like that in the room as far as I know they're developing some some studies trying with because now have

31:27 more sophisticated way to know what's going on in the wall so there are some there is one group I just forgot his name is very I can just send you later but he's trying to really investigate some later stage of pregnancy and try really to understand what's going on in

32:02 the wall okay well that's interesting I didn't know that but I have been as a I said before strategically avoiding making big claims but I think it's it's it's a weakness of my work I think I should be less afraid of debate and I think the next stages features just really I start to think about so one one thing that we there is some good

32:39 evidence is that they have is saying that less the most receptive pathway of of pain the fetus heaviness so there is one debate if it is really registering a c-section or not yeah I mean yeah that would be I think it would be interesting to explore that other like I understand your hesitancy because that debate is orthogonal I'm gonna say interesting an important debate obviously about abortion I'm not trying to diminish that debate it's important to Beth achill debate but it's sort of

33:12 separate debate than the one that you're interested in he's just this kind of abstract theoretical question about what would come as good evidence and is there that good evidence in this case so I could see why you would want to be bogged down in that I mean one of the things that I was this is kind of a non sequitur but one of the things I was just thinking when you're talking was I mean it does seem a bit strange I don't know strange is the right word but it does seem like a bit horrific I guess I'd say that infants would be conscious given you know their likelihood of survival is not guaranteed there's a lot of things that can go

33:46 wrong I mean it's you know if you think about it you know some kind of problem with the birth you know with a skull is split open or something like that thing about them suffering or whatever it does seem evolutionarily you might suppose that there would be good reasons for thinking that at least in the first I don't know a few weeks or whatever that that they would be unconscious do you do you think that's that's not in consideration I mean obviously we can't tell evolution what they do but I was just kind of thinking that maybe there would be some evolutionary pressure for

34:18 not having infants be conscious you say in the first two months yeah I mean I just I just made that up I'm just I just doesn't I did I just knocked her to me so I don't know how serious it is if I just wondered if you'd something like that yeah it's very yeah but so one way should be okay they are not conscious to avoid then do you have any traumatic experience yeah I think I don't need you don't need them to be unconscious for

34:53 this you just need what evolution did very well is not very have a very good memory they did very well have the enemy so that's the damn Fanta I mean easiest so they did this very well so we don't remember those are the stages and I think you don't need to be unconscious for not remember their stages and we have pretty much evidence that you can be conscious

35:25 not have and you have the infantile amnesia because I Fanta the manager it's a prolonged period and it will relax with periods that we think that influences at least we have more agreement that infants are conscious so I think if I will grant something to evolution I agree in the memory so they don't have they probably don't have this you don't have long-term memory they are not resistant registering those

35:59 information in an autobiographic memory okay it's not anchored those events as part of their self the autobiographical self so this is pretty much very protective to them so I think I'll have a very more nice way to explain to accommodate this evolutionary pressure conscious conscious will give them a very good way to develop some futures of what are the relevant information that

36:33 they could register so I think cautions conscience is good lack of memory probably is protective yeah and I am editing a volume on paper Montero's piece on memory and pain and she claims that we don't have the qualitative memory we don't have the classic bane of them phenomenal pain will not have a

37:10 memory for this right so probably they are forgetting all those goes bang they are having the beginning so I think if if I yeah if I would claim that there is some evolutionary pressure was much more I not have memory of those pain painful states am I explain the amnesia in an evolutionary sense yeah it just seems unnecessarily cruel I guess for them to be conscious not that that's evolution cares about being unnecessarily cruel conscience can be

37:43 very productive because can help us to develop some different strategy to avoid pain if you're not conscious probably you just have automatic response and this is one of the claim I have in the paper Chu there is some evidence that they have flexible behavior that they changed the strategies to deal with pain painful stimulus yeah it's yeah I guess that was one of the things that was a

38:16 little bit skeptical of is because I do think that the people who who think that these that their unconscious aren't gonna say that that that that prohibits them from a flexible behavior since you know they're gonna have this idea that the kind of unconscious states that we're talking about can be very flexible just not conscious they could be like just you know it's fun with a flexible as you would like with just ones that don't you don't experience so there's nothing that it's like for you have so I'm not sure I know that a lot of people want to tie a dot and like flexible adaptive behavior to conscious conscious

38:49 experience but I just don't really see the argument there unless you know what you're saying is that the kind of evidence that we have from the current sort of cognitive unconscious or sophisticated unconscious that people possibly now is not going to carry over something like that but that's that's a minor point to me I see why I see the force of the general thing that you're trying to say but so why I mean yeah I guess why do you think that unconscious behaviors that have to be not flexible because it's I think you need to to

39:25 train your strategy I think you need I think you need to have some feelings or I don't it's hard for me to think about flexibility as something that you're learning with the experience without being conscious of that learning so but why wouldn't you all you need is that the information in the states plays a certain role that it's available for a certain calendar I think once you acquire the alert

40:00 I think for the line periods you need that to be more conscious so for instance I'm learning to adjust my behavior maybe you can go for the discussion about agency so I'm allowing you how to adjust my behavior to certain kind of response I think I think you need much more to be conscious about what's going on there once you learn this maybe you can adjust automatically or you can adjust without once you acquire the ability to respond to that

40:35 behavior in a different ways maybe you don't need to to the information as I need to be cautious or every time but I think for the learning period probably see how you could do this without do you think that's a conceptual tie there or do you think that you could like them so is it conceivable that you have zombie babies that act just like ours but are not conscious or do you think that the given that they're weighed their

41:08 behavioral profile just rules out that they that they're coming I'm not saying that the baby's here or infants here or zombies but you know is it conceivable that there be such things as infants on base on your view or is that ruled out by the kind of thing you're saying so so so just just understand a little bit so what's the connection between the fraks will behavior in the zombies well they behave flexibly they behave just like infants do

41:40 currently but without any conscious experience I think I don't have a strong if you notice but I think I would accept that they could be conceivably zombies babies imagine a behavior similar to flex will behave but with no no evidence for instance that no no similarity with zero structure as us okay I don't know a

42:15 robot that is just behavior inflexible okay well no other indication that they have similar because I'm not just using the flag the flag so behavior I'm also using their correlates of consciousness they have similar structure and the brain maybe the the evidence just for flakes or behavior because I think my coat has this line yes is that you're flexible behavior and think that okay so if the robots show flex will behave in a conscious I would have to attribute them

42:55 I think they I think I would I would I would combine this world with other kind of evidence at least imagine a robot that behaves similar with flexibility but we don't see any other evidence that they sit in the structure of their of their computational process there is not

43:37 anything else that we could could could be similar to what we have I don't know maybe maybe they could be just as own zombie robots war zone a flexible robot so I think I don't know some flexible rubber flexible zombie robot zombie robots so could be conceivable flexibility without so and so my argument has disjoint parts like

44:10 flexible actual behavior with similar and there are correlates of consciousness for pain behavior so if you built-in that so I mean when I was talking about the zombie I meant like a biological duplicate high school yeah do you think is your view gonna rule out the possibility of this kind of thing a biological ball with the same structure yeah the same brain structure and all oh

44:46 every flexible behavior would be unconscious yeah I don't know I think I would I would disagree yeah I have to think more about this it's a good point for develop more just say a flexible zombie biological zombie that's a robot zombie

45:17 yes philosophy is so much fun not just for zombie shows on TV anymore okay so I wonder if you could just if you don't mind if I could ask you about the stuff about the specific theories of consciousness because yeah I mean I find myself pretty convinced I honestly the kind of evidence that you presented I think is you're never gonna get certainty that's not the kind of argument that you're trying to give you're trying to give it the best explanation sorts of arguments and so

45:51 let's bring it to that to the infants are conscious and then you want to say okay well let's look at the major theories of consciousness and see what they have to say about this this case here so can you say a little bit about that what so what first of all what do you take these theories to be and what do you think they say about infants consciousness and do you think this counts as an argument against the ones that have problems accounted for it yeah so I I think not so the strategies and the paper is to see if the fears of consciousness could predict or not if

46:27 you infants are conscious so if most of the theories can accommodate infant consciousness I think it's good for my form it's a positive indication for my argument and I think most of them can accommodate the problems would be for the higher order theories some versions of viable fears or the versions that require more sophisticated cognitive capacities and global works pay theory okay then I think it's that it's it is also the only theory that really tried to to

47:02 investigate if infants are conscious or not this famous paper by frame experimental back paradigm by CG cuter and collaborators trying to see if babies have the p300 wave rate that is relevant measure for globe or expiry for measuring consciousness so the problem would be if we have this kind of first from the side of philosophy if you are

47:40 postulating a theory that for states to be conscious it requires some cognitive capacity that we have no evidence that inference had of this cognitive capacity in the case of the empirical theories if you have a measure of consciousness that you can detect consciousness and this that is evidenced that the tact conscious you cannot find in influence so this could be the low phase of rule out the hypothesis that they are

48:13 conscious right okay so my discussion is that for the higher are the figures I think just some very few versions will rule out that infants are conscious so I think I can still accommodate in the last demanding versions of high order theories infant consciousness right global experience base theories a bit more complex because you have this evidence that they they just found the

48:54 evidence for five months old baby that can have the p300 wave okay that indicates the perception of the in the case they are trying to measure if they perceive face the perception of faces okay but you you also can find in the Sun size the hand there has book on consciousness that they are trying to

49:28 find a different kind of measure that probably they could find in other states but the earliest that they can go they find something that could be some kind of evidence would be in three months and four months I don't I don't discuss this in the paper because it's a very structured very noisy results but I think this could be one figure that might be problematic for infant consciousness and one one way I can at

50:03 least see that that I can reply to this to this view is that their way to measure consciousness is correlated to some some way the brain structure right so they they think that there is some activation of the prefrontal context area that is not as developed in infants and that measure that they are measuring this activity in this area as

50:36 correlating with conscious estates so probably one way to to reply to this evidences show that they are not measuring conscious experience with their measurement reports this is one hypothesis that they are actually there's this way of detecting consciousness is not attacking but acting conscious experiences the taxing verbal reports so you need a way

51:12 to detect consciousness that is not associated with the verbal report so we have all this there's new field in consciousness starts trying to come with a good evidence for nonverbal reports the non verbal reports paradigm and I'd you had an ohm report for them so I think this would be how much sympathetic with this new you studies consciousness

51:48 that I think this could be a good way to measure if infants have if they find a very good measure for normal part paradigms and someone that would like to apply those this kind of try to find this kind of evidence in in infants in a in a in a personal communication once with Sid acuter he said you never more try to start early stages of

52:22 consciousness he said that is very hard to do studies infant to really measure that what's going on in their brain and maybe we will need someone that will have the the patience and there yeah that's why they do so much EEG work with them records you can't put them in fMRI very easy it's also it's not just that they cannot put an fMRI but also their brain is so the way the brain is this skew and everything so different from

52:57 ours that is not that easy to really measure the activity so I maybe hopefully in the future they will find any way to to me and really the tack their states what's going on in in their in their brain so this could be one ways okay maybe if you can find an evidence for consciousness Summoner correlates of consciousness that is associated with no reports maybe you can see if the infants have this so

53:33 do you think that this counts as a part of an argument against for instance global workspace theory that it counts against the theory if they couldn't account for int and consciousness do you think the case for it is strong enough to count against yeah I didn't find this in the paper I have but I have another paper I've been working on that's just about the global workspace theory and I'm trying to to Kenda at least this is a problem for the theory okay this is

54:08 this is problematic for the theory and probably there they are not measuring conscious experience they're measuring reports verbal reports okay so it's my trainee might be a I think that might be a problem at least I don't I I like some some aspects of the furia don't think that is not completely and that's not a theory I'm against the fear and I think it's at least maybe the theory that can

54:43 explain certain kind of conscious experience when you have some cognitive capacities but might be might be a problem for the figure if you cannot explain States early states of consciousness or maybe some other way of measuring consciousness in no human animals we think would be a problem for the theory so I wonder what you would say about someone who thought that the kind of explanatory burden should go the

55:16 other way so and I'm not saying I agree with this I just wonder what your response would be so suppose that you someone look what you want to do first is try to figure out what correlates with consciousness and human adult's because we know we're conscious I mean we're pretty certain I know I'm conscious and you know you're conscious and we have good reason to believe that of each other as well so and we can also report which is nice so we can say things like I'm conscious and he give the sort of thing so if you have a theory that's really well confirmed and I don't know I would say this about global works right

55:48 through but suppose that you had a theory that was really well confirmed in human in human adult's and that theory had as a consequence that infants were not conscious then that would be an argument that they weren't conscious or do you disagree with that I mean so what would be so some people might say instead of just trying to start with the infants and argue against the theory of consciousness we should first figure out more about what's a good theory of consciousness and argue the other way yeah no I totally agree so actually I start with the adult case so my strategy

56:25 is not starting with a infants and see if a theory accommodate infants my strategy is okay let's start with out okay so what comes for consciousness or for conscious states whatever evidence we have for consciousness is in a bookcase okay and see if we can find some similar similar behavior and some similar neural correlates and infants so this is the paint case right okay so if you find those oh whoa how is this the methodology with for the adult case and

57:00 a photographer that both cases okay when you have this behavior you report that you're feeling pain okay so when you have avoidance when you cry when you have flexible behavior dealing with painful stimuli you report feeling pain and let's see if infants have similar behavior okay so what are the neural correlates for paying for painful experiences and see what are the real

57:36 it's rabbits and see if we can find similar neural correlates of painful experiences in infants so I started without that case I pretty much agree that they only think we have in consciousness studies the adult case I think we have to start without that case okay so if I if I can't find an infant similar behavior and similar neural correlates that the bestest planation for that behavior the best foundation for the neural correlates are that they are conscious I have a pretty

58:12 good case that there are cautious okay and then let's see what kind of theory can explain there's there's this case so I go through the fury and see what which which theory would reject their conscious and then I think their own problematic theory is is infant consciousness is good work space as it the most problematic but maybe could go even global work space theory might find a way to measure

58:46 consciousness mind find of air might find in the future a very I don't know very restricted global specs global workspace area in infants brains that is activated with just sensorial areas I'm not I'm not saying they they are not able to find this in the future they would be able to find some because one feature of the fear is that you need this globe availability may be the

59:19 global area for infant consciousness I'm just speculating a lot now the global area for forests for information to be available in the brain the infant's brain is not in the prefer brief Precor prefrontal cortex area maybe it's in the back of the brain there is some global availability of his face there don't know

59:50 just very not locally global area and locally global area I don't want I don't want to claim something that we reject but I want to claim something that we reject this evidence that they need this p300 wave right be cautious this specific matter I think there's a specific measure is problematic yeah I mean the p300 I mean it's usually the result of like I mean I'm not really up on I I did work on EEG and event-related potentials that's a as a graduate

1:00:22 student but it was mostly associated with like recognizing the oddball or something out of the ordinary I'm so associated with novelty and you know you don't need that for consciousness so the whole idea the p300 being an index of conscious experience seems a bit suspect I guess I'd say to me but I I mean I'm not up on that literature so I may be out of touch with it but anyway it just seems like the idea of a global workspace in an infant brain is a bit of a stretch given the way that it's defined information being globally available for control of behavior there is some behaviors there like take take

1:01:00 the pain example so you know what we're what we're suggesting is that the infant's feel pain they phenomenally experience the pain and they have the behaviors that go along with it so there's other behaviors as well like you know suckling and things of that nature so are those things do those things require global availability on your view or can they be done without that or do you think that that's just a separate question from I think the flexible behavior requires okay you did oh yeah you you can you can your response to

1:01:38 that information can change in different ways okay so yes I say socratis workspace I don't know if they have a workspace but I think the information needs to be available for flexibility for flex will behavior okay so but I don't know if that measure is the right way to capture this right now I understand about the measure but I guess what I was trying to get out was whether you think so it sounds like what you're saying well I'm not sure so one kind of criticism that you might

1:02:12 have of the global work space theory is that well it develops at a certain time that when your first born it's not there there is no like the connections between the debate various neural areas are not formed well enough such that there is a global work space where information are shared in this kind of way on the other hand so but that sounds like that's not what you're saying because you're saying that to have these kind of flexible behaviors you have to have this kind of global availability so there's going to be some kind of analog at least of a work space in the infant brain in which case they could account for

1:02:45 consciousness it's just a matter of how to measure it so the argument isn't so much that oh there's no global work space in the infants it's just that what they used to measure or find evidence for it is not really measuring consciousness I guess that's where I'm a bit confused like which of those are is though really sure yeah good thank you for points of theirs I had to get him a little bit confused also if I claim that they have the information has to be available and claim that they have the globe works work space right but so if

1:03:26 it's available but now in the work space what is it available for or – I thought it could claim that information is available without commit myself if they have a this specific global workspace area but I don't know maybe I'm kind of think if the for instance integration information theory if they could

1:03:58 accommodate this – so the information has to be integrated in a certain way right – to make the information to make that unconscious but yes so what I think for instance the experience of pain you have

1:04:39 a perceptive you have a sense or experience and you can react to that experiences in different ways okay and for it for this I think this that the experience has to be available for in the information has to be available in different ways but maybe this is yeah yeah I never thought that this there's availability commit myself with the

1:05:16 global space theory there's an ambiguity in the way that talk about this stuff I think a little bit because on the one hand there's the so a one version of the global workspace theory says that the information isn't only just available but it's encoded in a specific place like in working memory in the prefrontal cortex another version says well no it just has to sort of be made available to these areas even if it's not picked up so to speak being available is enough so

1:05:50 I think you know like people like Michael Tighe this is the poised aspect of his view of the poised part is that it's just you know it's its disposition ly liable to do things but it doesn't necessarily need to be encoded in another format or something like that like in working memory and even like people like Jesse I think it printings his view is something similar so is that his view consciousness correlated with the availability of information in working memory not that it gets into working memory necessarily but the way a lot of people interpret it goal

1:06:22 workspace theory is that it has to get into the working memory so it sounds like what you're saying is you just want the first thing it just hasn't yeah available but it doesn't necessarily need to be a thank you for putting there's no very nice way yeah I would totally agree with this yeah the the picture have in mind is what Michael Tighe says about global ability and also David Chalmers has this idea right but not not but not but not commit yourself with the requirement

1:07:03 that would be in the workspace in the working memory and localize in certain areas but nonetheless so it's just so the question I think still that I was trying to ask is still comes up though because what I was asking is so if you're committed to availability there's a question about what it's available to so on your view it's not a it's not going to be working memory I mean infants I don't know I'm the total novice in this area so I don't know if you know this or not but is there a work on working memory and inside of do they have working memory I

1:07:35 don't know I think the problem would have some working memory okay but it's probably very short for instance how all the experimental paradigm in infants they use arbitration okay so you have to arbitrate infants with some information and I get bored with that information and then if you show some new stimulus that they have some surprise or something that has novelty and they they

1:08:08 look for the Nexus stimulus okay so to think that this is similar I have been a rat saying this is similar this is similar as old is the old information I have I think you need some working memory probably less shorter than mass so if that's if that's the case though then I mean I'm not trying to get any global work space theory I'm just trying to get clear on what does dialectic is what it

1:08:41 is if I could accommodate with all the aspects of global space infant consciousness so I'm not that give us the view at all okay by the way Chuck's plenty fun conscious nicely in there I'll be very but even then even bang they think other infants are problematic for their view so yeah but that's because they're sort of look yes yes sorry for interrupting you oh yeah no problem but I was just gonna say that if you allow that there's working if

1:09:13 there is working memory in infants there's also availability to working memory then you have all the components the question is just I mean it's almost a given that if they're conscious then they're gonna have yeah so what the components what the elements we don't have we don't we don't have this strong activation in prefer prefrontal cortex area right we don't have verbal reports so we have some things that are probably not and you don't have be 400 measured

1:09:48 so we don't have some things that they they care a lot okay right right so if they have I'm so is the idea then that they have working memory but that is not in that prefrontal cortex is not or what developed part of it that they do have is not playing a role in that so see it again so if if there's evidence that infants have working memory but they have an underdeveloped prefrontal cortex then well it just seems like if they have less working memory than assets it's due to their

1:10:22 underdeveloped prefrontal cortex what what explain yeah what explained there's I if yeah if it is if it's the under the lack of development in the the prefrontal cortex explain all this I don't know it would be too much but I but I think this is one important part of the theory that if this is if you can disentangle this explore

1:10:56 prefer the frontal cortex area with all the other aspects of the theory maybe you could accommodate infant consciousness yeah yeah it's interesting I mean because they do have some elements of prefrontal cortex and they do have some ability to keep information online as you were disarmed doing so it seems that would be very yeah so I guess I find it a bit puzzling that the global work space theory people would be skeptics in this way they are so we have

1:11:33 so they are not completely skeptics and not saying that they are but they don't think that a so so they don't they don't completely say that they don't they are not conscious okay I never read something like official position on if you read sons voice that has book on infant course as I said before he has a chapter on that he discuss infants and

1:12:07 animal consciousness and what his sad is that they still don't have a good evidence at when this when they develop when not about consciousness so he thinks that might be three months and four months there is some sort of evidence there is not a p300 that measured in a different way that they think that might be some kind of evidence but there is their pseudo they still don't have something that they can

1:12:41 okay this is a good answer they are conscious okay so at least they agree that the way they're measuring the brain now they're that attackin detecting consciousness in the brain now is not enough to claim that they're conscious and that is not enough talk at least to say what moment they become conscious is at three months two maps at but birth he also discussed this fear about emergence of cash and when they they're born with the awake awake mass of the brain right and

1:13:19 he thinks also this a little bit not is the hypothesis interesting but it's not as well developed for really make a good case of their conscious and agree with him that's a nice is a nice description as a nice hypothesis but not still a good evidence so this is what might might might claim in the paper is that at least I'm not saying that there is no room for infant consciousness in global work space fear but I think it's

1:13:53 problematic for them for the way they claim they're more relevant claims they have more evidence that they claim a state would be cautious I say okay so it's a status conscious is for the status available in the works globe workspace and the way you measure that the states is available in the work space is the detection of this wave this electrical wave and if you use this as a

1:14:28 paradigm to detect consciousness to be pupae not be hard to find this and and I think it's not a matter of way to I think it's be very hard for the tech thing this there are the stages if this is really what other have been claiming like Mike repeats have been claimed that this is measuring verbal reports and or reports not and not measuring conscious if it is this consciousness if this is

1:15:01 right I think it'd be very hard because I don't think they have any kind of reports or in the early stages business and also so you mentioned the higher order theories as well you said that there's some there are some versions of the higher theory that can allow that there's in mid consciousness but some don't so okay I was wondering if I could get you to say a little bit more about that yeah I think there are some version of the fears that require some some high other states that for instance if you

1:15:38 need their conceptual structure for this higher-order stages that you cannot find the name funds think of a very hard to claim that they have this okay the same order of you I think it can accommodate this idea of an innate concept even if I think I don't discuss this the problem of above this innate view in this in this this paper discuss another paper but I think chemists you if you accept

1:16:19 so you said that general possesses the idea of innate concept but I thought I thought his sad yes he has a history of all those how those concepts are acquired yeah so I think I mean so this is before we started officially but just so in case anyone's listening so I just jumped in the discussion was whether so if you have to acquire concepts and it

1:16:56 you come if you're born without any concepts at all then if the higher-order states require concepts and that's a problem so I thought Gennaro's view was that there's a kind of core set of concepts which are in a and then the rest are acquired but that sort of the ones that can get you started it would be you know self agency things of this nature which may be cause and effect maybe even numerosity to some degree so they're a core set of them what's our innate which would allow kind of you

1:17:28 know experiences that early stage but not very developed ones not very complex ones and that the as you age or grow and acquire more concepts in your experience becomes more finely differentiated more more complex in the cetera but that at least at the beginning there's a set of core concepts I mean I think some of this is drawn from work like the Alexa's and Carrie that there's a kind of set of these core I think you can accommodate the idea of having core concepts and also have some conceptual content of conscious

1:18:07 experience because you know yeah no conceptual because the core concepts not the idea that I am a born they are born with those core concepts and every time they have an experience those core concepts are being deployed or I think the idea is some they need some kind of specific experiences in the environment for those core concepts should be triggered ok so even if you're born with

1:18:44 some some innate concepts doesn't mean that all when you're born immediately those core concepts are there and they're being deployed by the system ok so there may be triggered relatively early for instance it can be triggered but so for instance you were born you wake you and you have like your first 24 hours are all your core concepts being don't know how we can say activated in this first 24 hours so probably not probably the babies have early stages 24

1:19:23 the first 24 hours our babies thinking about agency I don't know even me that concede that they are sense of agents come very early I think probably I don't know if it's the sense the idea of agency is there in the first 24 hours of exposure being alive or being poor so probably I mean I guess I wouldn't Assam I would allow for some room of some kind of experience that there are not no conceptual okay so so one way to

1:20:02 accommodate this with the idea of concepts is that okay they don't have this cork not all core concepts are activated in the beginning so we don't have that self I think it's very sophisticated concept but they imagine pain that is less sophisticated concept imagine they have pain they have paint concepts in their way we have I think Rakesh on our sides what they have at the most reserved concept this yeah this is that is happening now this pain and

1:20:39 from this the most rigid concept they develop our concept of pain later on but even for this pain I don't know how to articulate to this idea of having a concept that is just deployed once I have this pain so this is a pain so I if I cannot remember the next day I don't remember what kind of paying ahead before maybe the baby the baby's deploy

1:21:14 another concept so this pain this is new pay so I don't know it's it's a kind of funny concept that you don't have maybe enough memory to remember the concept you have before is this the same thing I had before this or I deploy a new concept every time and facing a new kind of pain I don't know it's just like I I don't know how we identification criteria is that is that's part of what you're talking about yeah the same concept yeah there we identified a thing occurring exact what

1:21:49 to be the the constraints of having a concept in this oral stage as if it have the rights of cognitive structure to have this kind of but even it's I'm not I think this is a problematic but I think I I'm I like I could I could accept that they have those innate concepts of pain okay so for this is would accommodate some

1:22:21 certain versions of higher order theory that accept is innate structure okay but so do you have like it is very thin concept are they're very the most active concepts that they can use to make the first order stage conscious okay but I think certain at least some versions of how other theories will claim that we need a more sophisticated cognitive

1:22:57 ability to make the the first rather safe conscious so for those high order views higher other theories that we need a more sophisticated cognitive apparatus I think infant consciousness wouldn't be conscious in for those fields yeah but I don't know you you you are the expert on high order fears so maybe you can help me my argument in this but do you think

1:23:42 that is there any higher order theories a version of the fears that infant conscious would be their problem so you have to like David Rosenthal's view it's I mean his view about what a concept is so first of all there's two things one is that he doesn't think about the kind of thought that you need is very sophisticated so certainly the kind of thing that a squirrel could have or you know a dog or and in front of a certain age that just like I am in pain where it's a very thin

1:24:16 concept in the self it's not very sophisticated it's nothing like you know automatic consciousness if you know that fancy word from the psychology literature there's nothing like that it's just a distinguishing of the yourself from things in the odd in the environment which happens you know typically early but I also know that on his view about what concepts are they're all acquired there there's no innate concepts and and you know I mean he was just teaching this class on intentionality I was sitting in on it to grad centered last semester and yeah we had this discussion of my entrance

1:24:47 because he's kind of a whole list about content and he thinks that content is determined by its relations to all your other intentional states and so yeah at the very beginning infants are not going to have concepts at all they're not going to have any kind of content and so they're not gonna be able to form thoughts let alone higher-order thoughts so definitely I think a consequence on his view that at the beginning stages there's no there can't be conscious experience of infants at what point do they start to acquire the right kinds of

1:25:20 concepts I don't know maybe Munson or something like that but so I don't think he has to rule out conscious experience in infants per se but definitely in the early stages newborns I think he he's definitely got a problem with that sort of thing since he rejects any sort of innate concepts and yeah yeah so I definitely think he's he's he's one of the ones that would have a problem with this but then again I think that the case for newborn pain experience is probably thinner than it is for five months three months two

1:25:55 months even pain experience I mean you think the cakes are equally strong for that that newborns experience as well as like a three month infant experiences so say it again the question is what do you think the cases are equally strong for the newborn experiencing you be quite so that equally is strong in what sense as the case for like a five with old for the eye or the no yeah I

1:26:29 think that the new party is the strongest case for at least what if this is what you are asking I think the newborns of the strong case for that could be a problem for I or the five no oh I'm sorry what I was asking was do you think that the evidence for newborns having phenomenal consciousness is as strong as the evidence that a five-month old has phenomenally conscious experience no I think of evidence for five months is much more strong because they have other sophisticated behavior the prom I think what problem for those

1:27:06 fears that exact innate concept is I think they can accommodate infant conscious but probably would be a very narrow kind of consciousness yeah authorize what so what kind of its hood and this goes for the other discussion about the what are the varieties of phenomenology they can have so I think in in a high other theories such as professionals will be very hard to

1:27:41 accommodate a huge variety phenomenal experiences probably will be a very poor consciousness a minimal consciousness that they have like some some some few elements in there otherwise you have to postulate so many unique concepts right for pain for tactile experience for hearing experience for a sorry for auditory experience for gustatory experience for visual experience they have to really multiply the concepts and

1:28:15 I'm in favor a more a more reach vo of conscious experience for infants and I think one thing that I would resist the high-order theory and the sense is that this will in in the innate concepts version is that we end up with a very poor kind of conscious experiences in the beginning so why is that a problem that if it's just at the beginning I'm not

1:28:48 sure so what reason for is there to think that a one day old infant newborn has a rich variety of experience I think the devil dance shows that they at least they have more than pain right they have a rap they have we have all the discussion about the unit new motto imitation is this there is another also area of interaction with others faces that so you would have to deny so they

1:29:24 do they have so they have to have the concept of self of others so so many concepts they'll have to postulate in the beginning I'm ok if the Fury want to multiply all the innate concepts I just seemed certain that with very plausible so for instance all the the the the behavior evidence we have that they are capable of distinguish so many auditory experiences they distinguish very early

1:30:02 vocalizations for sounds and a very sophisticated way so there are so many concepts that you have to postulate that I think I practically photos this is one of probably yeah maybe you can have a language of thoughts so this could be one way I know every concept is an a on Israel yeah I don't think I am NOT saying that is I'm laughing as I'm

1:30:38 saying it's the reason I don't think that that's a serious this is this is one thing that also I think the people there are some criticism for further that to is also associated it is all concepts I need this could be a problem for the language of thoughts too because okay what is the concept of a plane I warn with this concept or we still have like I don't want you I just think that if the theory could explain also a more

1:31:16 varietal experienced tactile experience and I would be I would be happy with this just seems to me a little bit implausible as the consequence of the theater would have to all the kinds of experiences we have so I don't know what I add more sympathetic with the view I think can accommodate better the big picture of what's going on for infants

1:31:48 if you allow for no concept of contact like like a view the reason why you said self representation though abuse affair or better at least like for your iuck regal is because he allows that there's a kind of non conceptual higher-order state or something like that a non conceptual awareness of the other states yeah even if he hears one of those that are not completely convinced that infants are conscious so he also has some it's not this skepticism but he he doesn't have a rub like strong claim

1:32:26 that there are cultures even as I think his view at least can accommodate better than they're the same other view can accommodate meredith higher order you I mean yeah personally i guess i don't i guess i'm i would be more of a skeptic about neonatal consciousness then i would be about infant consciousness testing like the case isn't as strong for the one day old as it is for the five month old so that if the view ended up saying well yeah in a day one you

1:33:01 have a very narrow range of experience and then at five months you have sort of a wider range it doesn't seem like that would be a terrible bullet to bite I mean I agree it would be a it would be a bullet to buy it but it doesn't seem like a deal-breaker yeah I totally agree and I think we lack we have some attempts but I don't think you have to I'm just waiting for some very good psychologist you have a very good account of development of consciousness that can

1:33:36 explain this we have some attempts of mint account of consciousness but really what is going on in the first 5 months with some developmental stages would help a lot yeah right hey I know that they they change a lot that their behavior from two months or three months old okay and I think is where a sense of agents enter in the picture they started probably having something about sort of metacognition like started maybe

1:34:12 developing at that age some sort of maybe kind of introspection using their own experience to attribute some trying to at least to have great expectations from others behavior that I think it's very relevant to so certain it changed a lot but all the information or the behavior we have because one problem with inference is very hard to measure those experience because they don't have motor control right kind of motor control they develop is first in the

1:34:48 mouth in the area of the mouth and of the muscles to control breathing and swallowing and so this is the area that develop develops first so to have some information if they are seeing you if they are having auditory experiences we test with the pacifier to have some some at least some indication that they are

1:35:22 at least conscious about the conscious or if you don't offer conscious if they are resistant information yeah so I think this is it's probably has the motor control changes a lot from to to from first day of life to two months or three months I don't know if you just all the consciousness experience changed or just you we have more way to measure or more evidence to of that kind of

1:35:59 conscious experiences is sure that they sleep a lot even if they're conscious there at the moment Sarah cautions I reduced okay and probably attention plays a very good role so Alison Gopnik I think it's the one that I think has at least a very interesting way to to talk about infant consciousness so she has this idea that they start with a sort of psychedelic consciousness everything I don't think that's a psychedelic

1:36:35 conscious now explain that you to first month of life but I think it explains a lot to the five months old experience and the one-year-old experience a conscious experience right but I think we still we still need a better account of what's going on in the first two months I totally agree okay okay interesting yeah I mean so this gets I mean we're running we're getting on in time here don't want to keep you forever but I didn't want to

1:37:06 ask about the thing you just mentioned which was the varieties phenomenology that if it's may have I know you spend a lot of time talking about Creakle's taxonomy I think mostly as a way of sort of organizing the discussion because he's done a lot of I think it's one of the only accounts that try to like systematically go through the different kinds of experiences that you would need to count for for for adult human conscious yes and he has these five categories or whatever and you kind of go through each one and say well what can we expect in

1:37:39 the in the infants so I wonder if you could say a little bit about that what are the five what are the different types and which ones do you think the efforts have what aspects of that I liked you very much rise taxonomy because I think it's much more it's a much more pure list account than some accounts that just think that the phenomenology that is more censorial feminine so I like the idea to explore if infants we have the the no sensory components of of his account so what I

1:38:16 think it's interesting for sure they have all the perceptual phenomenology okay probably some of the perceptual experiences are different for us but then the way that our experience is I'm not the fact that they have that type of phenomenology I'm not saying that they that the phenomenology is the experience of the phenomena knowledge is in the same way so for instance I think tactile phenomenology it's very different and explore this I discussed this a little bit there are some kind of some sort of

1:38:51 perceptive phenomenology that requires some some development of our motor capacities that probability don't have so they don't have the different of my knowledge or run or walk or movie in the space so there are many things that there is to know there still requires some but I think they have the basic ones vision auditory tactile or fact is very developed the smell is very

1:39:26 developed is another area of stars with that they also test in the room some some information that probably some smells that they probably experience or some taste this area so so complicated I know I don't know that much to make to order the distinction but probably they have also developed and one interesting thing if they have I think probably they don't have the kind

1:40:01 of at least at Bertha's it's hard to claim that they have cognitive phenomenology but I think probably at two months we have a pretty much reliable evidence with identification of our object probably this is the first catalyst if you agree with Michelle Montagues account that they have that this is an indication of cognitive phenomenology probability have this

1:40:34 there is a huge discussion about emotions I think I think in Mariah's account probably would have to at least to rule out some kind of emotions experience for infants but I try to claim that they have more than or at least they're capable to make more distinctions that Mariah would would accept because in his account for emotions it places in some some kind of cognitive aspects that I think this you

1:41:13 don't have but I think they're the kind of phenomenology that I think that where I discuss that I think it's interesting is the agency phenomenology okay the sense of agency and I don't think that they have so for Riya they call this cognitive phenomenology and they have the capacity of a decision-maker to make decisions of the side and trying probably is not still developed but I

1:41:48 think the sense of agents that they are moving they are making that movement I think it's it's very pretty early I like to months you would say not for I think Jamar soon we'll have a good evidence this is this I'm coming there there are conscious and I'm and I think they are moving before to Mars but I don't think we have a good evidence that they can real claim oh this is an evidence for sense of agency or the for the phenomenology agency so if they have a more basic phenomenology before so for

1:42:24 instance the hypothesis that they are in the the hypothesis of neonatal imitation the minute a mutation if you agree with mouths loss do that the reason you're not numerator mutation I think there is a nowadays ERISA today this is a it's real they're real imitating or not silly race who say that they're not imitating so there is a spurious I don't want to rely my my discussion a sense of agents in this evidence that is very this booth

1:42:58 about stew thoughts of a disagreement so maybe they have some sense of agents who are connected to other stages early stages like at birth but I don't know but I can walk I think I can more sure claim that they have sense of agency and I think another another promoter psychologists that would claim that they have sense of agents at birth especially Porsche have a very interesting discussion about sense of ages in those stages and he thinks that they are born

1:43:31 with a sense of agency I'm very sympathetic with the view I think the strong evidence for a sense of agency is that after months of age so it does metacognition play a role there and because the the sense of agency is like an awareness of themselves moving yeah this is for my this is something that I'm trying to do now unfortunately a SSC was canceled and I was yeah I was very very

1:44:08 Sagat was canceled because I was in a symposium about medical condition that will present okay with other with other people work on on inference metacognition and development of consciousness one one person phone sit Cooter's lab will be Louise copy will be in the symposium too so and I think there is room to connect metacognition that was not as with with not with a

1:44:44 very sophisticated cognitive capacity a sort of more experiential metacognition with this sense of agency in infants so I think this is a sort of precursor or basic form of medical condition this sense of agency in that start at two months or three months old and develops later why because they started regulating lots of their their behavior and expectations around the world with

1:45:18 the information about their cone there with those with this sense of agency but just to be clear on your view that that wouldn't be like a requirement for experience generally and there could be a kind of I mean you would allow possibly that there would be a kind of a sense of agency that was not conceptual or non-mendelian but I think it's there I think this is and I think also there is some not own sense of agency or

1:45:54 self-consciousness that start in this that start with this sort of metacognition but but probably there is some some very very basics I don't know movie this movement that is not associated necessarily with a sort of meta cognition probably would be very hard once we start went metacognitive apparatus is develop is probably be very hard to disentangle this yeah probably will in many

1:46:30 circumstances but so and I want to ask about the emotions as well because so you you you appeal to a kind of basic emotion framework right there are certain emotions which are basic which I know there's a big debate in the neuroscience about basic emotions so you know the cognitive theory of motions are constructivist theories of motions are opposed to that but so you you think that there are basic emotions and that infants have some version of them yeah I think there are some basic emotions that

1:47:05 they are born that yeah they can express very early okay they registration discuss the social things yeah for sure discussing joy or surprise they don't they cannot express in the beginning fear I think fear is a more sophisticated emotion that needs some more sophisticated cognitive abilities that are not there in the beginning you you have at least to recognize something as a threat to you right so and I think

1:47:43 they don't have this in the beginning and and and so I think this could be I think there are order just would you say the same life about 5 or 5 I think there are usually five just trying to remember my my discussion on this I think there are five five or six emotions but me five five basic emotions in the beginning that they are the ones you should deny myself on their sad in this

1:48:20 part of the we've covered a lot we've gotten for a long time yeah but so fear is a more complicated one would you say the same about anger or do you think that down well yeah I mean I think anger they can have some some sort of anger in the in the bikini okay okay cuz I mean I would think some people would connect anger with a sense of being wrong or a sense of an injustice being performed or yeah I'm angry

1:48:55 because you did this and it you shouldn't have yeah so if you think that anger is maybe maybe just maybe so in this sense frustration would be kind of different from so you you I yeah so in this sensing anger would require more I don't think in this sense that your

1:49:33 claim I don't think that they have if he needs an acknowledgement that or at least some representation that the others did something wrong to you I don't think they they have this is some sort of yeah that's not a moral anger I don't think they have this sort of moral anger at listen the begin if I think they have some something that something is bad or or some distinction about pleasure and displeasure okay but I

1:50:11 think for the early stage will be very very very difficult possibly at all this there's moral values in this kind of reactive emotion I think it requires a little bit more yes I don't I I also this is interesting that you are talking about morrow anger because I started interested in consciousness and Dept of consciousness through interested of

1:50:46 some so the way we develop our Marro agency so I start to discuss about empathy and how children acquire their their moral concepts and how they develop that model as more agents and then I start to think that okay I need a better account of how this first hours we develop as a conscious agents to explain some some moral feelings so I

1:51:20 think we needs yeah I think you need some more cognitive capacities for having those kind of experience that I don't think that is there in the beginning but a sort of kind of frustration that is there in the beginning so frustration is so but I mean I don't mean interruption so but so frustration is like I guess I thought it would be connected to the sense of agency like you're frustrating my desire like you're stopping me from moving or you're stopping me from having something that I want but it sounds like

1:51:53 you're saying it starts earlier so it predates or precursor it's not predates but it comes before the sense of agency maybe even the sense of desire I'm not sure so what is what is the frustration emotion on your view then what is it frustration about I don't know maybe it can be frustrated because I want you can be associated to sense of agency but you can try to reach an object that you cannot reach so can be frustrated but it

1:52:27 can be frustrated so usually when you think about sense of agency we think a lot about our hand movement but I don't know what baby can feel frustration because it is they're trying to suck the breath of the mother he was not able to get the milk I can imagine some frustration related to this okay but it's oh but I thought you said that they didn't have trains yeah yeah I'm not saying that they

1:53:06 didn't have tries I don't know if they have oh of the phenomenology of sense of try and sense of so but do you think that for having so frustration also you think that off research I never thought about this but I think precession will you always be associated with some action that is frustrated I wasn't sure I mean I guess I never thought about this but this is a good thing to think about if frustration always is an

1:53:41 emotion that appears always in the context of actions yeah or if it can be frustrated for sure as an adult that can be frustrated with not acting you can be frustrated there are some expectations I thought to be more related to expectations I think I'm expecting so for instance imagine a day that here associate a hearing some sound the way the presence of an object and they hear the sound a knob that's not present maybe this can generate the

1:54:17 frustration that is not here the mother's voice and they don't mother's not there or something yeah something that can be associated with frustration that's not necessary I'm not saying the baby's not trying I don't know if you're destroying phenomenology right I say is it present okay is complete maybe the trying phenomenologist present or maybe the decision of moving is present but I don't know I think I I feel I it seems

1:54:53 to have better evidence that the moving is present and if the move is press the sense of agency probably that they are moving is present but the try am trying to do this and I'm not I don't know it's maybe they I'm not claiming that not there I just think that is it seems to me that it required a more sophisticated notion of how that's about movements and agents and decisions and

1:55:31 your intentions that maybe comes a little bit earlier okay a little bit later yeah but I'm not saying too much it could be like five six months where I have all this right yeah it doesn't need a very sophisticated but might be not in the beginning that maybe just having some feeling that you're moving but it's you don't connect completely the moving with the decision the decisions can be unconscious can be more than just

1:56:07 representing a go I'm not really formulating there's as a decision I'm representing consciously my mind so I could allow that all this aren't conscious and then have some phenomenology of moving right make sense yeah like joy and those sorts of things are gonna be right from the beginning sorry joy like a sense of joy yeah as a notion you think that's gonna be something that's very early so is it on your view then that the emotions are our

1:56:44 feelings yeah if one of these kind of old school feels about emotions were there at least partially individuated by their phenomenology yeah I think you know I think they have some I don't know some a volatile component that might differentiate to them but I don't have my my own view of of emotions I'm just like using some suborders views of emotions and to to see if there's good I

1:57:23 think I think the problem for Riya is that in the rice view of emotions that I don't remember exactly how they how he what or the exactly way he expressed his views his view but I think in his view we will infants we have a more coarse grain experiences of emotion less fine grain and I think because you

1:58:01 need the cognitive component that probably is still not there yeah so I think if you allow for this kind of view you you it you have to say that they cannot distinguish between I don't know joy surprise and all this is a mix of similar feelings that I there is not to meant to and I think if this is right why they react in different ways for different circumstances that for us

1:58:36 seems appropriate this kind of reaction why they react with the more behavior even facial expression to things we would react when we're frustrated or when we are feeling anger and why they react with joy and pleasure in the way we react they should react with a more like similar way in many cases last right if their feelings are

1:59:08 undifferentiated you would expect the responses to be similarly indifferent I think they had another differentiation that maybe might require more finer grain description of emotions without the cognitive component so yeah that's the best way to explain this is possibly that those feelings are basic emotions are born with those the dispositions should have those feelings yeah I like that line about I mean I guess the skeptic would maybe pushback by saying with those

1:59:41 you know there's evolutionary reasons why they would respond in that way to make us more disposed to treat them in various ways so the baby smiles are you you're more liable to be nice to it if the baby cries are more liable to feed it so that those may be hardwired responses that manipulate the parents so to speak may manipulate is not the right word but go depend certain behaviors you don't really need the consciousness experience there in order to have that sort of hardwired reaction yeah so the reason why this capacity words in the

2:00:18 volution I would allow that okay we will smile because we need to survive and this will make parents more reacting positively to us we cry to indicate parents that we are having some discomfort distress I think that this explanation could go together with all these feelings being conscious so if you think that there are conscience if there is some good evidence there are

2:00:51 conscious I don't know why will be smiling unconsciously all the time or why we've been crying unconsciously all the time so I think either they're conscious and those experiences are correlated with most of the time I'm not saying that they don't have unconscious experience of an unconscious state I'm I come from psychoanalysis I'm completely in favor I think we didn't talk about this but I I did my training psychoanalysis as a

2:01:25 psychology interesting I'm totally favor of unconscious of unconscious so yeah I did my degree in psychology so I'm your favor of unconscious so you have the two degrees then you have the one in philosophy and there one in psychoanalysis not my degrees is my thesis was parallel connected to psychoanalysis or I did mine so in Brazil is our education similar to Europe so we all have to choose your area of

2:02:00 expertise ation when you enter in the at the University so I did my undergraduate studies in psychology and then I did a trainee as a with internship in a hospital a psychiatric hospital with psychotic patients and with and I was training as a clinical psychologist in psychoanalysis then I did my first degree was with in actually in in a public health department in in the field

2:02:39 of mental health and but was is the group with psychologists and psychoanalyst and then I became very interested in philosophy and psychoanalysis philosophy psychology and the mind my first book was my first and my own book I'm I'm planning to write a book on different cultures but it's you just a project but my first book wasn't Freud and mental causation and then I get my my my piece my first thesis was

2:03:13 and Donald Dave some triangulation and Winnicott external mind and the relation with transitional objects okay interesting I've become very interested in morality and how we our oranges of our minds is related to their way you become a moral agent and then I gradually moved to philosophy and and up getting the green philosophy this is a long story way highway and that piece we were getting back in the end of our I'm

2:03:49 totally favor of some states of being sorry for this very big oh yeah it's cool that's a whole separate session we'll have to have I want to talk to you about that step to yeah but I'm totally I'm not I'm totally in favor of having some unconscious estates or maybe some things that are in our mind are unconscious but I think once you if you accept they are conscious creatures is be very hard that all their emotions will be not conscious the feelings will

2:04:23 not but as a psychoanalyst also I think that the feelings are conscious okay what are unconscious are the representations or the hour is more our cognitive capacities that would be unconscious okay right even Freud didn't think the wrong conscious pains in the way that modern cognitive psychologists might think they're wrong yeah yeah yeah yeah well that's very that's all that's a quite a story into history that's pretty cool that you have all that stuff going for you by the way I noticed we

2:04:57 are getting on in time and nap time speaking of the babies and it's gonna be over soon so I definitely conscious definitely too conscious of the time but I wonder if there is anything what you were hoping would come up and which has it's the answer can be no but I just want to I like to check yeah we discuss most of the faith maybe for another time we can discuss all the things I think

2:05:32 that those disconnection between feelings and morality I think there is some very interesting aspect but I didn't expect to cover this in our discussion well we'll have to do that I agree there's I mean I did my early dissertation work on emotivism the connection they only send I'm very interested in and have you had back for that but since that'll be hacked a whole different discussion so let's go ahead

2:06:04 and wrap this up I want to thank you for joining me that was great discussion I learned a lot from reading your work I highly recommend it I think it's really it's even if you disagree with that there's a lot in that's really interesting so thank you and hang on for a second I'll say bye out there yeah so thank you so much was wonderful I really learned a lot discussing with you and I have the many things many many many things to do many homework to do after our discussion oh thanks again thank you all right we're off the air we are free