Consciousness Live! with Joe LeDoux and David Rosenthal (S3 E8)

0:00 right we are live joining me today are two supremely special guests the do and David Rosenthal guys for those who don't know you I wonder if you could say just a little bit something about who you are and what you do I guess I'm going alphabetically maybe Joel you could start sure alphabet numbers I'm a neuroscientist I study motion in memory I've done that for many years and I've been interested in consciousness since I did my PhD

0:33 research on split brain patients in the 1970s and have always kind of written about it but have never really researched it since those days and lately been getting more into writing about how emotion and memory might be integrated into consciousness and maybe help that field out a little bit by expanding its content a bit and David I wonder if you could also say something about who you are and what you do sure a professor of philosophy and cognitive science and I work mainly on

1:08 consciousness for some years and also on the nature of mental qualities and excuse me that's good enough today so I'm very much looking forward to this discussion I like your shirt by the way Joe I see the no self no fear Church this is one of your specialty sorts of things so I wonder since I'm

1:41 looking at the shirt here for Mabel Mazal starts by asking you what the meaning of that [ __ ] is okay well in my last book which was published in last August oh the deep history of ourselves the four billion years story of how we got conscious brains I build up the story from bacteria through humans about the evolution of behavior but talk about the importance of oneself as being involved in an experience that that I talked about in terms of I don't know

2:14 attic consciousness a term barred from dental tolling in which the self is part of the experience so it's not just about seeing the Apple but it's knowing that it's you that's seeing ya and so yeah we got no self no fear and these days though it's probably more appropriate got self got fear with all of the stuff that's going on around us yeah lots of exactly these are good times for talking about anxiety I know David yours oh yeah yeah exactly what do you think about this no self no

2:50 no fear view David well I think it a little tricky so I think that there are kind of two levels that are going on here I do think that with the emotions in general as Joe has stressed and some of his recent writing that an emotion in effect has something to do with the relationship of the self to something or another for example the relationship of the self to a

3:26 some object that's perceived as dangerous or threatening or something of that sort in the case of fear but then I think that there's a second level which is completely distinct from the first level about the way in which an emotional state comes to be conscious and I I think the way an emotional state comes to be conscious is that you become aware of yourself as being in that state so the self figures in a second way when

4:03 consciousness enters the picture so I would draw a distinction between those two ways in which the self figures in emotions so I mean obviously my right mind if I have one slight difference which is that for me an emotion is a conscious experience I think for you it's probably not necessarily and so there was only a conscious experience the fear when you know that it's you that's gonna be bitten by the snake so if it's not going

4:36 to hurt you there's nothing to be afraid of and it's that awareness that you are the subject of this thing that is happening it is the emotion for me well let me ask you a question about that Joe so I'm not I'm not so much interested in the folk meaning of the word fear as just what kinds of things happen psychologically and it seems to me that one can subliminally see some object maybe that doesn't automatically trigger

5:12 like a spider or a snake or something but a person one believes has the virus or something and so it's got to be a situation where there's a lot of conceptualization and I see this person and the person is approaching me and but I might see the person subliminally and I might then conceptualize the situation as a dangerous situation but the conceptualization might be

5:45 unconscious and then all of that the perception of something that I conceptualize as a dangerous situation that could all become conscious so there are two levels here and whether I mean what one might want to reserve the term fear just for the conscious situation but there is an unconscious psychological state involving a perception and conceptualization that would be independent

6:17 well it could occur independently I think we're kind of saying the same thing and just talking around each other because you know I think that there's this pre conscious well the higher-order state basically that's non-conscious kind of as a mental model that is conceptualizing what's going on and that the content of that middle model is then what you consciously experience so I don't think it's we're talking about anything very different so fear would be the result of it I wouldn't necessarily call the middle MA I mean I call it a fear of mental model but it's not the experience

6:51 of furia so my main my main thing with different main concern about conscious unconscious and fear is when we put fear into a structure like the amygdala and say they it's bubbling up you know that's where the fear is being made I don't think that's where it's being made because that conceptualization is being done in critical areas right now that makes perfectly good sense to me I just want to reserve a place for something that is the unconscious psychological occurrence that corresponds to conscious fear totally

7:27 agree okay terrific yeah go ahead yeah good bud no you go ahead well just on the level of agreement here because so what I what a part of what I hear David are saying is that even if you detect danger non consciously or subliminal II it still has to be attributing us in some sense that you are the person in danger otherwise it's not going to

7:59 matter psychologically so if it's not just stimulus and response and there's got to be some sense in which the detection of the danger involves the self even at the level where consciousness isn't involved schemas and that's the it's all put into there yes is that the same self that's involved I mean so there's this so we can distinguish yourself like as a bodily self the self that's distinct from merely other animals in the environment

8:32 versus this psychological notion of the self is maybe something a little more substantive or so do you think about this kind of distinction is going to figure these well they definitely I'm talking about the psychological self I think David is to the questions whether there are different versions of the psychological self that we might throw out not the route but it talked about well I'm not sure what you mean by that well you know in some some of the things you and I've written we've talked about

9:06 thick versus thin versions of the cell for example so I see an Apple as its thin version whereas if you know I I know that it's the Apple that is gonna make me sick because somebody injected something into it that I saw so I know that that's gonna now I'm talking about a thicker version because it's involving me not just me as passive witness that there's an apple on the table I don't need to you know have a declarative statement in my head saying I see an apple I just see the Apple I have that kind of

9:39 familiarity with what's going on without having to name a disk myself but maybe once we're talking about something that's gonna harm you it's more that you are front and center in that representation well I mean it seems to me that all of this about the Apple might harm one or something like that is just additional information that's not a different kind of self so you might have more information about the Apple also that wouldn't make it a different Apple you might say well it

10:14 was grown in this orchard and blah blah blah so there's more information about the cell from the second case but I think it's the same self it's one in the same self that sees the Apple and also might get damaged by the Apple namely me so I just want to interject something that this conversation obviously three of us know but the rest of the world doesn't know that we've been having

10:47 these regular lunches at B bar in New York and so now instead of having our lunch discussion we brought this to the world to share it with and they these have always been a lot of fun and so I'm glad we're here under these conditions Thank You Richie its myself I mean it's very nice to be here with the rest of the world although I also miss Bieber but so what do you think about what

11:21 David was saying Joe I mean I appreciate those very fine words but what do you think about this that it's the same self because this is something that I've always been curious about there the difference between in the 12 anoetic and not analytic so what do well let me just ask la do you agree with the idea that's the same self in both cases I you know I think it's let's talk about noetic versus aden already because that's probably a good way to I mean that's where my thoughts are so that's a good way to maybe say what I had in mind so

11:52 noetic a noetic experience is an experience in which you have a kind of semantic or factual understanding of something like you know there's an apple and another neurotic one is one in which you your self comes into it because it's you're relating yourself to experiences you've had in the past and to experiences you might have in the future as well as the one you're having in the present so I mean that is that's really the self when we're talking about the

12:26 self the other thing is more of a you know it's a kind of acquaintance that's there whenever we have an experience but it's not part of the experience yeah I don't have a strong opinion about whether it's a different self or the same self I mean I don't know how we parse that but I do believe that than we are having those two kinds of experiences one being worth of a reflective state in which we are personally involved in the other just being a kind of factual state where

12:59 nothing much is going on that those might be different kinds of cells if there's a self in the first one it doesn't seem to me that there's a self in the first one the seeing an apple case and if there's an acquaintance with an apple it's going to be your acquaintance or Richards acquaintance or my acquaintance or somebody's acquaintance it can't be nobody's acquaintance it can't be a kind

13:32 of acquaintance las' seeing of an apple yes so I do think it's not that I think that there's no difference between the two kinds of case but I think we can understand the difference in terms of the richness of information that's connected with the self in one case and the absence of any kind of richness in the other case yes I was reading something yesterday and today by Stanley Klein who is addressing these kinds of issues and

14:06 I found it very informative I forget what the name of the paper is but it was it's very interesting is this the one you sent us in an email I send you so many things I can't remember which one I say there I am me thing that's the Wozniacki one yeah yeah that's a different line okay so I don't know the claim piece I don't either do you want to give us a rundown on it or should we well it's kind of like what

14:39 we're talking about that you know we don't have to you know we can have propositional statements I see an apple but that doesn't capture the subjective experience of you know what he's interested in is this this feeling of ownership you have when you are having a conscious experience so you have that ownership when there's an apple and you don't need to tell yourself you're seeing the Apple it's yours simply by this acquaintance of being there and it would be the same thing in the other state where you know

15:13 you are more intensely involved but you would also be part of that other state so you be part of the content but in both cases it would be a kind of a familiarity or an ownership by way of association or acquaintance yeah so I mean it cuz so in this non-conscious case where you detect danger in the environment and you so we agree that there's this the schema

15:47 that's being completed in some sense and giving you information about what's out there and also relating it to you it's not conscious yet but there's a sense in what you're that that you're connecting it to the fact that I'm the one that's in danger otherwise I don't think you would care very much that's why I brought in the stimulus response that earlier so if they were just in in this response kind of automatically wired in then you could see why the animal would behave in a certain way but once you start going up to the psychological level then there's got to be some kind of attribution of the states to me but

16:22 that's at a totally non conscious level so far and I thought we all agreed on that a second and so that that self right there well you could have as much information about you and pass States and present States and so forth and they could still be non conscious right I mean you could have all that other stuff although out of noetic stuff and still have it not be conscious if you weren't aware of it at a different kind of higher level right yeah I mean you know the idea is that this you've got all these schema self emotion perceptual scheme while going on

16:57 simultaneously non-consciously these are the active components of the larger body of information you have about your perceptions your emotions your self but the active components that are combined into one representation that would be the mental model which is basically a non conscious higher-order state that could then be experienced what's high order mean here exactly what you mean if the David Rosenthal state

17:29 well a David Rosenthal state is a state whose content is I am aware of myself as being in this state is that what you mean it depends on what the eye is well it's I assure enough to be me why isn't I mean I we may still be sort of talking past

18:05 each other a little bit in this degrees of Irishness yeah but all I mean is so I'm aware of an apple mmm and I'm aware of myself as being in this state it's the same eye mm-hmm yeah no that's fine you know it's I think would be you know the state propositional statements give the eye more eyeness then we're talking about okay but it's if if the Apple is in

18:42 front of me and I see it and then it's me that seeing it in you if you're not around absolutely so they see you know like the this this sense of ownership is most apparent when it's missing in certain kinds of pathology so it's you know when you have associations or psychosis where the person is no longer owning

19:15 their mental states it it's not that the person normally says oh I'm experiencing the Apple but you have this the same Klein is talking about this kind of feeling of ownership or this by acquaintance that who else could it be that's having this state it's just like an implicit assumption you've had so many mental states in your life you don't need to acknowledge each one oh that's me oh that's me it's just there because who else could it be when you don't need to acknowledge it

19:49 like make it think of it but if anybody were to say I mean you know if you came across some weird person in philosophy for example who said to you well actually who is it who's saying the Apple you'd say it's me right yeah that's not something that you you you don't make a point of its being means at seeing the Apple in everyday life you just go about your business seeing apples right but if the question arises there's no issue about who's seeing and it's me and it's it's just as good

20:24 itself as any other self that figures in these conversations I think Richard I just keep getting notices that my internet connection is unstable so hopefully it will Oh being notices okay yeah we broke up a couple of times but it seems like it's going okay so far yeah my breakup at all with me okay but I'm in the country so it's a little weaker yeah mine not to brag sighs excellent your internet connection is the one that

21:04 matters Richard because you're broadcasting to the world yes that's true [Laughter] yes I mean very interesting because I mean for for someone like me I think the self is kind of phenomenologically there in ordinary experiences I mean there's there's me there a point of view from which I'm seeing things and if I sort of reflect on what it's like for me right now I'd say well you know there's someone who's seeing this stuff and that that it's like David said I don't really

21:37 in normal without the reflection part I just take it for granted but if you pushed me I would say well of course it's me that's seeing it and that's different than in cases like you know the thought insertion or something like that we have someone who says these are my thoughts or you know alien limb phenomena where they said that's not my arm or something like that so the sense of ownership I think is it is an important aspect of it but I'm not even yeah so it's not clear to me that that's the necessary for ordinary conscious experiences I'm not sure that I'm understanding the contrast you just

22:10 drew so in a case of thought insertion where I go like that and insert a thought into you it wouldn't be inserting unless it got into you right so it's your thought it's just that the it's not causally your thought so to speak it's not me you don't have an eye gentle connection with the thought that you would with your normal thoughts but it's not somebody else's thought because I put it into you

22:44 yeah no I was thinking of like in schizophrenia where they they deny that the thoughts that that I think really are those are in fact well but but what I'm suggesting is that there's a kind of equivocation here between whether the thought occurs in a particular mind and whether the thought is due to that particular mind and those two things can then come apart and that's interesting but it's not as though the thought is somebody else's I didn't insert it into Jo I inserted it with you

23:18 so this week right but but that would be a case where they don't experience it as theirs but yeah what I'm suggesting is that I mean so it's a matter of how the question is being asked I think that I haven't seen in the thought immersion literature due attention to this distinction that I'm drawing between which mind is the thought occurring in versus which mind is the causal agency for the thought right and I think that when these people

23:54 deny that it's their thought what they're denying is the causal agency thing right they don't think they're the author of the thought that's exactly right yes and that's that's a perfectly good sense for whether it's my thought or not but it's not the only sense right but don't you think there's a sense it's oh I see what you're saying does like there's a sense in which they are they do have ownership of the fob because clearly it's in their mind right and there's a sense in which they don't have ownership of the thought because they don't experience themselves as the

24:27 agent of the thought that's right that's exactly Roy do you think yeah so but in that second sense then isn't there an issue for the kind of thing that we've been talking about because there's a case where they don't doesn't see me or they don't seem to represent the thought is being mayor's so if they were asked who thought it was they would say no I'm not thinking it it's not I'm not the author of it at least well I'm not the author of it I mean I so you were talking in a way that I didn't fully understand about this phenomenology stuff and

25:02 I thought that the phenomenology stuff was mainly about what mind is the thought in as opposed to who was the author of the thought yeah so I guess I would say kind of both of them are there I'm sure it seems both to me so when I mean I wasn't thinking about thoughts per se but you know just ordinary conscious experience so when I'm experiencing something it seems to me that don't literally it's like part of

25:36 my mind but also it's like me that's experiencing it well let me ask you a question about this phenomenology stuff I'm assuming that you would agree that thoughts can occur unconsciously me yes you and then there's no phenomenology no but it's still my thought and maybe I even author it or maybe I don't but anyway I mean all of the things that can happen

26:09 visa Vee it's being my thought can occur and will occur even in the unconscious cases so it can't be that phenomenology is the explanation of the self being connecting what mind the thought occurs in and who the agent is right no I agree with that no my only point was the kind of push on Joe's point from before that there's this

26:40 that the self is not really substantially involved in ordinary conscious experiences oh I see yes well I'm agreeing with you about that yeah yeah well when I said it's not involved what I meant was not in an active sense of you know oh it's me that's doing it it's just you are doing it and it's implicit though well it's it's implicit in the sense that you're not highlighting it well as you said it's not as though when I say to you by the

27:17 way that thought that you just expressed a moment ago whose thought was that you don't have to think about who's what the answer is right it's completely automatic that it's your thought so it's it's right there right I mean it's not a big deal right so I mean it's you know in a way it's kind of you could say it's a mental habit you've had so many thoughts that are yours and there's never been anybody's thoughts that weren't yours

27:49 that you never have to ask yourself or even think about okay I mean I guess I'm not sure what it would I mean I I think I know what it would be like for me to have thoughts that aren't mine in the who authored them sense but I don't know what it would be like for me to have thoughts that aren't mine in the in what mind do they occur sense mm-hmm

28:22 yes oh so you're an essential a dent in deck circle you don't think it can have this kind of failure of a self-identification or what is it failure of reference or misidentification of the self or something like that oh well I think that that's another question which may be I mean I I have doubts about this immunity to identification of myself maybe we can I beg off of that one for

28:59 the moment yeah that's the same thing that I'm talking about I think that in every case where I have a thought where a thought occurs in my mind it's it's second nature for me to identify myself as the individual that has that thought and not just because that that's the way it's always been but that's that's the way it always is yeah so I guess I'm a little more so I

29:34 guess I'm yeah I guess I think that it's possible that you could have a thought and mistakenly experience it as occurring in your head I don't know about my head but my mind yeah Oh like this Datsun is in David's mind I think is a coherent experience that one could have it sounds like what you're saying is that I'm sorry what is this maybe you just had yeah well then if you just

30:09 oh I think we can have certainly thoughts that are identical in all of their mental properties except for which mine they occur in well I meant being mistaken about in which mine that's in which is why I brought the immunity stuff up but so you know take it take a case like what's a good case I guess rubber hand illusion sort of is in the ballpark or not really what's that there are some cases where where people are mistaken about what's a part of

30:43 their body and what isn't rubber hand deletions the only ones coming my mind although I don't think it's the best example of this but you you mistakenly think that the rubber hand is yours people flinch when you swing the hammer at it sort of expecting that it's gonna so so there's a case where you're experiencing seemingly something which isn't a part of your body as as out there so it wouldn't it be conceptually possible that you could have like alien alien limb rubber hand where you you think the the rubber hand

31:20 is is not part of yours it's not your hand but you're experiencing the experiences in it so you'd be wrong about both that it's a part of you and also where the experience is taking place I don't see how that would work I mean I think that the rubber hand thing is the visual and proprioceptive stuff get messed up so it's not a mysterious thing it's that the two senses are not being coordinated

31:54 in the normal way and [Music] I'm not quite sure what the analog of that would be yeah okay I guess I just have a different anyway so let's let this pass cause I'm not sure if it's too technical I'm too complicated but could we circle back around to continue so didn't I interrupt you a bit ago David you were gonna ask

32:26 the question that was gonna send us down a different track or did you already ask that question Oh which question was this that I was going to ask well you said Joe let me ask you a question and then it seemed like oh well I guess so a little while ago I asked Joe Joe used the term higher order and I jumped on that and said what do you mean by high order and he said he meant by high order what I mean by and we talked about that for a while but I guess

32:59 what I would like to ask Joe in this context because I'm not clear about it so there are two Current Biology has these wonderful my word things and Joe has one that's already occurred which is I forget the title yeah right and another that is in press I guess which is called

33:34 thinking feelings not feeling thoughtful feelings and at some point in that second paper I think you say something like this that high order theorists like me like this something metacognitive of something or another but I was wondering what your explanation is so we've established that there is an unconscious

34:07 psychological thing that corresponds to conscious fear and there's of course conscious fear so what is the difference and in particular let me frame it this way one of the things that I really love about both of these my word papers of viewers is that you make a big deal out of what I'll just summarizes conceptualization you call schemas and so forth and semantic memory and

34:42 these conceptualizing factors that figure really in all of our everyday conscious experiences and which I think are very important and which the consciousness literature really has vastly ignored right and I think it's an extremely good thing to bring that to center stage all right they're worried about that and then we'll come please yeah sure yeah the reason you know as an outsider in the kind of visual perceptual consciousness field

35:18 it occurred to me very like such a missing thing that we can't we don't know what apples and snakes are innately and maybe say no but we have to learn these what these things are through our experience so when we see an apple it's not just the visual cortex and prefrontal cortex that it's not a debate between just visual cortex and prefrontal cortex but you also gotta bring in these memory areas that are gonna be supplementing that to allow you

35:51 to know what the hell it is you're looking at exactly it seemed like such an obvious missing thing and you know coming out from the outside if things are obvious that you get maybe tunnel vision sometimes on the inside so that that's why I introduce those but it's really the I guess the other angle on this that I want to mention is that it kind of comes up if you look at something like dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex and ask what are its main inputs and almost the only input that is talked about in the consciousness world is from visual

36:25 cortex to dorsal not of prefrontal cortex is if that's the key thing but the dorsal lateral prefrontal gets many more are more substantial inputs from all these memory and schema areas than it does from the visual wimp but the visual input is almost minuscule compared to all the memory information it's getting about that same stimulus so there's like a flow of like from very very primitive sensory to somatic memory to schemas to episodic memories and schemas and all of this it's coming to bear on

36:59 what it is you're looking at and it all comes from the anatomy of just asking what is connected to the prefrontal cortex in a way so anyway so I just want to kind of state why I did that and where it came from now you can continue it with whatever was here yes so let me say again I just think all of that is terrific and I certainly didn't end by mentioning this mean to downplay the important things that you say in those two papers about the inputs to the dorsal lateral PFC

37:36 right there's another thing I guess I would say so a favorite sort of thing people in philosophy to talk about is a conscious experience of read write and so you you you you imagine somebody is sitting in a chair and the the person is flashed red on a screen it seems to me that even in this allegedly more or less purely qualitative case where you're focusing on in foot

38:14 just from the visual areas there's going to be conceptualizing because you're going to conceptualize this as read you're going to conceptualize it as having all of the semantic memory and scheme in the background that go with read things and so forth and you're going to do that more or less instantaneously so and this is just overlooked in the literature I think and it makes the literature less rich and also less accurate but anyway with all of that said

38:48 it seems to me that you can have all of the conceptualization in the world and still the state the psychological state might not be conscious and we're agreed about that yes so what is it are you then agreed with high-order people like Richard and me that basically speaking what's going on is that what makes the state conscious is that the individual was aware of him or herself as being in that state I

39:23 kind of think that that already happens at this last non conscious step I mean that the higher-order state as you would say is is itself not conscious right the high under state is not conscious but the high or interstate is an awareness of the state of the lower-order state of the first-order state so just to speak in simple terms let's say that the the the first-order

40:00 state occurs with all of the complications about conceptualization and schemas and so forth and it still isn't conscious and then this higher-order awareness occurs the higher-order awareness is not itself a conscious State but it's a consciousness of the first-order state and it's being a consciousness of the first-order state is what makes us feel well we're in the first order state that that's what makes it as it were intuitively light up so

40:35 what I would say is I mean you know Richard and I went off on a horror road especially Richard and I've followed him a bit on that road right and the horror view that higher order state is a state of consciousness phenomenal consciousness in particular well but is it a conscious state a phenomenal consciousness involves conscious states or conscious prior I mean yes it is a conscious state I see so it's a state of which you were

41:08 conscious no oh okay just to be clear yeah it's not a state of which you're conscious by the way someone who's watching this suggested so much of Perak Freni a– as the thing i was fishing around for is a better example of the thing i was fishing for earlier so oh sure i would like to put a pin in that come back Lex I think that's exactly the right road to get explore the kind of question I was interested in but still so on this on this point so for I mean as I understand the debate on

41:42 David's view when you have the higher-order state you know I mean I'm seeing red or whatever the case is then the first-order state is the state that's conscious that's that's the state that you experience you experience yourself as being in that first-order state and I certainly agree about that I just think that for kind of technical reasons why empty higher thoughts stuff like that that it's best to say that the higher-order state itself is what phenomenal consciousness is having that state is what it means to be to consciously experience something and I think David actually has to sort of agree with this at some level because

42:15 you say a lot David that states being conscious consists in having the appropriate kind of higher-order thought around and so depending on how you read that consists in I think you're gonna get a horror type view because that's not just what the property of consciousness is having the higher-order State so that's why I say the things that I said the horror theory that's why I says it's that the things that it says but but this other thing that you got that's a slightly different question I thought that you were just trying to press Joe on because there's a different

42:49 question yeah exactly so I just wanted to kind of clarify the dent there is an issue between David I've I think it's a different issue than the one that we were just talking about because because then what David was kind of working towards I think was in what sense the higher order state is now unconscious so it certainly is non conscious in the sense that you're not aware of being in it so it's not conscious in that sense but in this other sense it's what the consciousness of the first-order state consists in so when you have it you have

43:21 conscious experience but but I think I thought you were denying that Joe so I thought that was what the issue a second ago was you know what I'm concerned with in this is that you know to say that it's the first-order state that you're aware of is going back to what we were just kind of saying is it needs improving which is that it's let's say let's just take it for the sake of argument that the higher-order state is in the dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex to say that it's the first-order state

43:54 implies I think is what you're saying it's the visual cortex state if now you're conscious of what we've been talking about is the visual cortex they may not be the main lower order state upon which the higher-order experience is being founded so if you if you if most of the inputs to dorsal lateral but coming not from visual cortex but from other prefrontal areas that have received inputs from memory areas and also from visual cortex and

44:26 then the question is are you willing to say that what you're conscious of in dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex is these other prefrontal cortex states that are the law of martyr State and seceded to the high-order State absolutely sorry what was that last thing about honey or something the the prefrontal you have prefrontal states that are antecedent to the higher-order State are you conscious of those prefrontal states yes okay yes that that's Jo that's a large part of my

45:04 enthusiasm about you're stressing these other aspects of any ordinary experience that when when when an experience as a conscious experience then one is conscious not only of the visual input but all the other stuff that you stress okay and I think that that's extremely important but I'm reserving the term higher-order I mean this is just it's a

45:38 terminological thing it has no theoretical significance I'm reserving the term higher-order in the way I'm talking for that last bit where I become aware of this kind of combined State the combined state meaning the visual input plus all of the other stuff okay can I just ask really quickly David so David you so what I hear you saying is that you agree that what you call a first-order State can be found in the

46:11 prefrontal cortex well yet pertinently it'll be in PFC and partly it'll be in visual cortex it it may be a complicated thing it may be a multimodal experience like I both see and hear you and so then it'll be an auditory cortex as well and the stuff that's going on in PFC to bring all of that together is going to be even more complicated so I

46:45 think you both of you know I've suggested we not call them first-order but lower order so that you can have different gradations of lower order that some would be equivalent to what you're calling first order and sensory but when you get into memory is that I know it's still about the environment so you would say it's still first-order but I think the terminology that recognizes the gradations of lower order states preceding the higher order state would be useful

47:18 I'm perfectly okay with that it seems to me though that although there will be a kind of a hierarchy in the sense that there will be visual input for example the visual input will trigger various memory things and schema des and so forth so that there will be a progression I'm not sure the the the difference between the differences among

47:50 states at these different levels where the levels are defined in terms of this progression is not the same as the difference between what I'm calling first order and higher order that's just a matter of content so high order is just being aware of oneself as being in a state and first order is everything else so one but so but Joe's point though is that it helps us to call it lower order because then you it's sort of built in that there could be as many things down there whereas calling your first order tends to fuel this

48:23 assumption that it's gonna be like in the visual cortex in the first visual areas or something like that I think that's part of what you're completely right Joe so I mean if we if we have all these levels I mean you know conceivably you could have a higher order state that allows you to be aware of many of these different levels depending on the circumstances so you might you know you might have a kind of redness in the visual cortex it's different from the experience of the redness that's coming from memory cortex or from schema and ventromedial prefrontal cortex but

48:58 you know they would all seem like a conscious experience of read but there could be gradations and how that experience is being built up neurologically that could give us insights into the you know the vast kinds of experiences we could have rather than collapsing it all into one thing I'm very enthusiastic about all that that's not only true but very important and very much under-recognized in at least the

49:32 literature and philosophy yeah but I guess I'm not implying myself to change my vocabulary that is to say I'm perfectly happy to have lots of levels within first order right and you know whether one lower order first order it's it seems to me that the contrast is simply where higher order is awareness of oneself as being in the state okay so

50:06 the I mean the other thing that I don't see us on this so far I don't see absolutely any difference of substance I mean there was I still this I don't think he answered the question that started this whole interesting part of the discussion which was in Joe's sense he said these higher order states are rosenthal higher order states but that they're not they're not they don't generate a conscious experience yet there's a next stage after that so I was that part I'm still

50:38 I don't think has been resolved or did I miss that part of the discussion so this penultimate level for you Joe but it's still not conscious is that a higher-order state in the sense that we've been talking about that it's already attributing to all these steps whether you know David would agree I'm not sure but you know why I kind of punted on on in both of these articles by saying if we could figure out what this penultimate state is we would be one step removed from the experience and you know that wouldn't be so bad but we

51:10 could focus on what this last state is it's not conscious that would be pretty good good to know but but on your view do you think that that I mean we don't know but would you guess that that involves attributing to yourself being in various mental states I would have that information from the self schema that's none conscious you know but whether you would sorry you you'd have the information the information in the self that's generated by

51:41 incorporating the self schema into the overall state that would carry the information that it's my state right well I agree with that but it wouldn't carry the information that you're aware of yourself as being in that state that's different so okay it does seem to me and this is something that I was pressing at an earlier point in our conversation that for unconscious states

52:19 there is the it's my state and it's built into the state that it's my state so that's the contribution that's being made on your picture by the self schema and I agree with all of that but then there's another level which is the awareness of oneself as being in the state so David would you agree that at this point there's metacognitive things going on at least at that penultimate level well I don't know what's in a word metacognition by any other word you know

52:55 I mean I I think that usually when people talk about metacognition there are things like feeling of knowing and that sort of thing that they have in mind and it's not that kind of thing so I think it's somewhat misleading to talk about the this high order awareness as metacognitive but it is I mean if you want to say well it's it's cognitive that is to say it's an awareness of yourself as being in a particular state that was cognitive and it's about

53:28 another state and that makes it matter so right but I met the prior stage so this stage that we're talking about that's non unconscious but still has information about the states and their being yours but no awareness I wouldn't have thought that that was literally a it was about another state I would have thought that it was a state that connected with the information of the other state in a richer way which is a bit different yeah and Joe

54:05 you agree with that well you know what I was trying to do when I used meta-cognitive in the second of these articles we've been talking about is I mean this is what one of the things I've been trying to do in in all of this recent stuff on consciousness is to kind of accept the general format of the modern science of consciousness you know metacognition and all these things that that are being studied and try to add on some things that give it a more real-world like quality so it was kind of a strategic move in a sense to put

54:41 metacognition in there to just include to make it something not something alien to the field but something that is you know kind of talked about and I was thinking of it as a cognition about other cognitions and metacognitive in that sense so which is the same which is what I met when I mean David had the captured what I was talking about when he said putting together of other information so you got you know visual and auditory you got self and you got fear scheme all these things coming

55:13 together I kind of thought at that is a metacognitive operation but you know I'm open to but it's not representing those states it's just connecting information that's in the States or something like that well you might have to represent them to connect them see you have to put in the air you might have to represent the information in order to connect the different informations but that's not the same as representing the different states well let's talk about facts I'm not a

55:48 little not very clear on what that means well so I see you and hear you at the same time and somehow this cross-modal stuff calls for some kind of connecting between the two kinds of information mm-hmm so I have to connect the auditory information with the visual information the auditory input with the visual input but I don't

56:22 have to in order to do that I don't have to have a state that says I am in this state and I'm in this state and the way these states connect is this I can just connect the information I can connect the content of the states without thinking about the states yeah I was thinking of it more as a kind of representation of the lower order states into one representation okay but a representation is just representing the information over again it's not

56:57 representing oneself as being in a particular state yeah I was thinking that doesn't happen till you know after that mega representation is yeah okay I think it seems to me as though we're on the same page but it's there's a bit of difference in terminology right yeah but it does sound like a way Jose thinking about it and I think you got an you're sort of agree now is that there is something metacognitive as like the way typically I mean so metacognition

57:31 has kind of grown past feeling of knowing in tip of the tongue and that sort of stuff and just kind of has been used as a general you know monitoring your own performance or monitoring your own performance as your own performance is different from information processing right and I think that what's going on here is taking the information and representing it over again in a more complicated way which I mean if you want to call that

58:04 metacognitive I mean I think that you know I think that medic metacognition has become a very sexy term so that it's a nice thing to talk about but so I don't mind using the term well I do mind using the term I can live with people using the term as long as we're clear about what the term means and what it doesn't mean that's all so you know that I was sort of waffling and in that diagram that will

58:39 be in the next article where I talked about also talked about it as a mental model which captures better I think this idea of integration of all of these things into something that can be used not only as a precursor to consciousness but to control behavior and language and other things sure yeah so okay so in that sense it I mean it's that's I mean I'm having trouble seeing how it wouldn't be counted as a higher-order State accepting that you're not saying I'm

59:13 aware of myself as being in that state but for me yeah I mean look so higher-order might mean any number of things but the way I introduced the term and in in the context of a higher-order theory of consciousness and I take it the horror I forget always what horror stands for but higher order representation

59:45 representation yeah so that's a kind of a specialized sense of high order and there could be other senses and I don't care about the term I thought that the way you introduced the term was just a higher order means representation of something mental and first order means representation of something non mental no no no no absolutely not okay high order and the way I use the way I

1:00:21 intended to introduce it and I think a well awareness of something mental no not awareness of something mental so here's an example here's a counter example I could be aware of some thought that you have now I'm being aware of something mental right it's your thought higher is a state of awareness in which I'm aware of myself as being in a particular mental state so that's a very constrained kind of

1:00:56 high order but as I say I don't really care about I mean I think it's a little late for me to give up the term because yes I'm somewhat surprised by that because I thought that well there'd be many kinds of higher order states and then a certain sort of special kind which would account for consciousness on your view but that you could have higher your thoughts about you know that you got by inference or by going to a therapist and yeah even states of other person's Minds they wouldn't result in conscious experience

1:01:29 but they still count as higher-order thoughts on your view I would have thought but I guess I you're now saying that you had to go back in Texas I I would have thought that I know where so I could learn I could learn in an inferential way that I'm in some kind of state and according to me that wouldn't result in the state being a conscious state well I don't think I've ever referred to I think the result in you being in a

1:02:01 higher-order State I don't think I've ever referred to that as a higher-order state but maybe I have but look this I don't care about this right if you would like the word let me bequeath it to you know I thought I understood what you had said previously I just okay but I mean I don't think I said that but did then I said something that I don't think I said but that doesn't matter what I mean yeah all that matters is that we be clear

1:02:35 about what we're talking about yeah okay so but I don't think that there's an issue there is it it is there well there know about whether I understood your view this entire time no no whether you understood my use of English that's really not a very interesting

1:03:08 issue yeah because in the like in the repression case you would still have a thought that I am in a state you just get it by inference from a therapist or something like that so still seems like it would be higher order in the sense of you being aware of a certain state that you're in and even okay well I don't care about the use of the term okay all right well we'll let that go then so hey if someone has been asking on the who's viewing this if the distinction between an effect and a

1:03:39 motion might be useful in this discussion enjoy I know you have special feelings about effect so can I get you two because any of muddies the waters you know but you know I'm kind of a stickler for like keeping a motion to refer to the conscious experience so that it we don't get confused when they use it to talk about animal behavior and stuff but you know I can see how effect being a kind of like somewhat lower order in the experiential

1:04:16 hierarchy of things that it could be kind of a non conscious more enduring its kind of presence there it's not a term I particularly want to use but I could see how yeah I see why people use it there's a whole the whole field now it's called affective neuroscience right but you're going to deny the bust where the experiences right I mean I can can the person tell us whether they mean to this experience or is more than non-conscious they mean it as experience it's a eraklyon artist

1:04:48 by the way I think we know I don't know if you know I'm Joe actually but I think David does but his name is Eric Lyon artists okay but anyway so he says you know emotion is more deliberate in cognitive effect as a set of physiological states and experiences that emotions are labeling well it could be and you could call that a lower order state that's being represented in a higher order way yes yeah I mean but you would so the question I was asking was you would deny that it's experiential right yeah

1:05:20 there's no effect it's not what it experienced I'm looking for all that you wouldn't have that feeling of being in that state unconscious after see so would you be okay assigning that kind of property to non-human animals non conscious antecedents yeah I mean you know I don't even you know I'm perfectly willing to say that rats and mice and birds and cats and all other mammals have some kind of

1:05:55 subjective experience it's just not what we have it's not the kind of higher-order stuff we're talking about here today and if you you know I've made diagrams that I've used in lectures showing that there are some areas of the human brain one area in particular the lateral frontal pole that is not present neither other primates their areas in other primates like the dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex that are at present and other mammals and then there's cortex in that all mammals share so these medial prefrontal areas that other

1:06:31 mammals have could be giving them some kind of you know non conscious state the only problem is how do you know what they're experiencing so just as a you know kind of practical point of view I'd like to talk about emotions and consciousness and people since otherwise it's just a guess about what's going on and even with we can understand without bringing consciousness into animal behavior and every time we bring it in it just monies the waters

1:07:06 yeah so I mean this is something I want to ask about the animal issue in a second but it's oh this is something I think is interesting about your view because so in order to have the conscious experience of fear we need to label at us fear so that we we have to we have to have the word but I think it's part of your view Joe this is something I only really fully appreciate it kind of late after all this stuff but I think it's part of you that there is no standard feeling of fear is that right that it said it's everybody's feeling if it was different

1:07:38 right I guess I found that somewhat surprising because I would have thought that fear was that certain well it's identified by certain kind of phenomena I like the way it felt but for you it's just however you feel when you think there's danger so you know what's Universal is danger so every culture has every culture the wristlet language has a word for danger because it's such an important thing in an organism or person's life so we all have a word for danger experiences that happen when we're in danger we can translate those into fear but we know that cultures have different

1:08:12 kinds of experiences even though they're talking about the same word so fear and not in some place and some other you know exotic place in the world's not necessarily what fear is here and by the same token what fear is for me is different from what it is for you because we've all accumulated fear schema based on different experiences of what fear our fear is so whenever you know a danger occurs that activates your fear schema and your personal understanding of what fear is is what you experience and it's going to be kind of like what everybody else has because

1:08:47 it's all about danger and it's danger that's universal will share danger we don't all share the same fear I mean unless it was innate it couldn't be the self also I want to say make a point about you don't have to have a word like fear to experience a state of when in danger but you have to have a word like fear to experience what the English word fear means I'm not sure I understand that last bit but the word words with everything else

1:09:22 words are big garbage cans of information and when you apply that word that kind of solidifies a crawl okay sure yeah it's gonna be different because your brain is acquired different information that no I I agree with all of that and it does seem to me Richard I mean that that's got to be true forget a man any of this cross-cultural stuff which you know is very inviting but I don't know anything about it

1:09:57 some people are very afraid of things and some people are very bold and they experience fear but they they don't get blown away by it and among each group people people vary a lot and so I mean I can only speak for myself but I would imagine that to use the terrible phrase of the

1:10:31 last half century or something what it's like must be different the these different people because they're as joe says they're experiencing it in a different way it's like the conceptualization that underlies your fear is your conceptualization exactly exactly are you guys gonna say that about perception of red seeing dogs I mean my experiences of a dog I take it in many ways are the same as of yours even if I know more about dogs or

1:11:04 not absolutely not I have dogs that you've never met and you don't even know anything about these dogs that I've had and these dogs that I've lived with we're very important in my experience of dogs and how I think about dogs so I went for a walk in the park this morning in order not to go completely stir-crazy staying home and I see dogs and I my associations are very they're channeled and stuff that by my experiences of dogs

1:11:40 that are very important to me yeah there's a little bit less tinged by all of these things but I bet it's a little bit tinged yeah but that's so I mean there's a thing there that's I agree with and a thing which I find is Cora fantastic I mean suppose black and white room and then the first color the first chromatic color that I ever saw was red right this would make red very different from me then red probably is for you it would

1:12:18 give meaning to read that you just don't have fur red right I agree with all that that's the part which i think is fairly mundane but I think it's very overlooked and I think it's important well it's okay so it's not it's not mundane it's important but there's a core thing there which would be similar between us in the experience of red and they're seeing a dog like if we both visually are looking at the dog and you owned one just like it I've never seen a dog like

1:12:49 that so we have all sorts of different associations I can agree with that your experience will be very meaningful mine will be like it's a dog but nonetheless there's a kind of visual person there which is the same between us given that we function the same way have the same receptors and so forth so you know the black nose and the brownish red or whatever the color a dog is gonna I mean that part's gonna be the same or experience that let's say through that that's your visual cortex talking to your prefrontal that's ignoring all the other conceptual and memory circuits that are also talking to it which are

1:13:21 giving the unique properties to dogs to you agreed okay but I don't so there's still something there that's the same between us what I'm so whether there's the differences I agree but is there something that's the same between us when we experience these things so the in in danger there's something that's similar to all of us even though our fear experience that we conceptualize is different so there is a core that starts out in the world that's going to be the same it's going to be the same trigger but the way it gets you know unpacked in the brain it's going to be different

1:13:57 because it's going through different synapses that in my brain and then yours because you haven't had the experiences I've had yeah I just find that really hard to believe that when I feel fear it's different than when you feel fear except for in these richer connections fear isn't responding it it's it's a it's a cultural meme it's just an idea that we have and we we have a word so we can share it but why would it be the same because it's a feeling there's a way of talking about I mean so

1:14:34 cheers Cheers are all the same well they're all different so there's a way of talking about your fear and Richards fear in my fear where it's all the same but then there's another way in which it's all different and I think that I mean there's a heavy overlap among all of our fears and then there are the individual differences okay so you agree there's a heavy loss for what makes them person what makes it personal and unique to you I mean it's

1:15:06 ultimately all filters through its kind of like the same at the beginning but as you go deeper into the system it becomes in and that's the parts that really matter to you is those last ones that that kind of tag it for you is that really matters to me it might just matter to me that I'm going to catch the virus and all of the complications about how I experience that don't matter to me so much or it might be that all of those complications do matter to me

1:15:40 what matters to me what's a big deal to me can vary with the situation so I don't think it's a matter of what matters to me but I agree with you that all of the complicated stuff that makes it an individual it's certainly there yeah no I agree with you too but so the reason why I was found this surprising was because I thought we agreed that fear is a conscious experience the yeah individually about how it feels and I would have thought that

1:16:19 what's this huh is that some fluffy thing [Laughter] means the way you look what it's like so you know what it's like for you what it's like for me wow I don't know what this what it's like stuff is I know I'm supposed to there's you know I was trying not to use that term but I mean that that the emotions our feelings that's what they

1:16:51 are and maybe I was thinking too much in terms of no I think that the there's a problem about the word feeling which is that it's used for a very great many different kinds of psychological states so for example it's used for fear and anger and joy it might be used for love which is a very complicated thing and very variable depending on what you're loving it's also used for pain yeah simple minded discussions in philosophy

1:17:29 pain is contrasted with pleasure which is a little crazy because unless you just mean painful experiences and then it's not pain literally speaking it's just experiences you don't like right so but the word feeling is used in this sort of omnivorous way all over the place and sometimes if it's bodily pain then you might say well there's a what it's like in Tom

1:18:05 nagels sense but it's much more complicated with fear or anger or joy and any of these emotional states there's no simple what it's like in this way what it feels like I think I mean I feel like I can identify fears at different times sure you know when you're afraid and they're the N

1:18:39 it's the same feeling I've identified in each case when I when I'm afraid of I mean I have anxiety about flying I have anxiety about going through long tunnels I think I can you aren't quite the same no anxiety is of thinking about fearing something that hasn't happened yet and the fear is like it's currently in the environment but they're related in that but anyway so whatever you think about that distinction I think I can identify them as the same feeling just about different stuff but you recognize it as your same feeling yeah

1:19:16 have you known people I've known people who when their feelings are hurt they act as though they're angry and then they can sort of come to a realization that they're not really angry at the other person they just feel hurt and that's a very different kind of feeling and so they're confused about what they feel it's not as though one can always just look inside and say well this is this is

1:19:52 what my feeling really is I mean I guess I'd say they're they're having a nun not you know they're having a conscious experience which they're not wrong about and then later they come to reinterpret the cause of it or something like that but I don't think that that's a case where they're wrong about what they're feeling they're wrong about the rightful psychological state that's causing the feeling or something how they're interpreted well I mean there's another model that

1:20:25 one might use I call it the high order Philip theory and on that model there's a first-order state forgive me Joe there and stick with first order and it's a very complicated first order state that has a lot of levels within it I want to stress that I agree totally about that there's a first-order state and then there's a higher-order state in the higher state is to the effect that one is in a particular first-order state and it

1:20:59 might be that the first-order state that one is aware of oneself as being in is the state that one actually isn't in so in the case that I'm imagining one is aware of himself as being in a state of being angry and one is not actually in this state when it's in a different state namely a state of being hurt yeah but what one consciously experiences is anger and you're not wrong about that I'm not interested in what I'm wrong about I mean what I am wrong about is whether

1:21:35 I'm actually in a state of being angry you're in a conscious state of being angry well I'm aware of myself as being angry but I'm not angry you're not in a first-order state of anger but you're consciously experiencing your experience is angry yes okay yeah okay I'm not sure whether there's more than a terminological difference between us here but the thing that I wanted to stress was it's not as

1:22:10 though one can look inside and always tell what emotional state one is in that's all right one can't look inside and tell what first-order state one is in but one I don't think is about what they're experiencing okay so one isn't wrong about what state one seems to be in right but one is wrong about one what state one is actually in right yeah terrific yeah I agree with that but that's about what we

1:22:47 were saying before I don't think that's an objection to what we were talking about before because I do think I mean I do think you're you're experiencing anger in that case and it's not a mistake to say they're experiencing anger you're you're wrong that you're actually in a state of anger but you're not wrong that you're experiencing it that way and so you can tell by looking in which what if what it seems like to you and there's a there's a commonality between those and I get I take Joe's point that yeah I can identify my states of anger

1:23:22 consciously that doesn't mean that they're the same as yours but I just find that that's a very surprising kind of view that people's experiences are different in this way but that's probably my fault I mean I'm not saying it's a it's a bad consequential view I just was very surprised by that because I was thinking that what we're studying is fear and fear feels a certain way and that's just like read looks a certain way let's say news it doesn't mean for the most part feel fear feels the same as it does to you as it does to me for

1:23:54 the most part and that's what we're in the business of studying but that's just yeah I just turns out to be totally the wrong picture on the way you're thinking about this stuff which I found hard to accept very brightly I mean I think of these feelings in terms of you know classic British empiricism yells the feeling that's what an emotion is but for you it's really individual the fear experience I mean I think it really came out to me when we were talking

1:24:26 about the there's a so you're very fond of red I like blue but yeah you're very fond of blue distribution of cones in your retinas and in my retinas are extraordinarily unlikely to be the same oh so you're blue and my blue are extraordinarily unlikely to be the same but there's an incredibly heavy overlap

1:25:01 right so we talk as though it's the same but it isn't the same so there's an there's an individual difference even at the most simple sensory input level yeah I mean I guess I would agree with that but disagree that there's a difference at the conscious experience level if there's a starting point it's different well would we have the same experience I mean it's david says it's

1:25:36 pretty much the same but it's it's the details yes yes but it's the case if it were the case that the mental quality is for you and me were different for the colors you know really different in very tiny ways very likely but still a bit different then the comparisons that you would make in the

1:26:08 comparisons that I would make would be slightly different and then yeah the way we're aware of qualitative states are visual States slightly different but this is more than slightly different because I know we're running out of time so you have to be going here pretty soon so we're about to wrap this up yeah just take think of it this way Richard the there's so many different things that we can say we're afraid of

1:26:43 that even within you you're gonna have different kinds of fears so you could you could be afraid of a snake at your feet or and the virus are being on a mountain you're on a mountaintop and the sun's going down you have no water food protection there's you know those are physiological homeostatic systems that are telling you that you know you're in danger you know as you're getting hungry and you're getting cold but you can be afraid of that so there's

1:27:17 no one thing or you can be having existential fear about the meaningless of your life of the eventualities of death right but that's just a difference in what you're afraid of but what you experience it's fear in each one of those cases those fears are different your fear of death in there at some point in your life is different from your fear of a snake in front of you and I don't I don't see I don't think okay their difference in what their fears about but insofar as their fears they feel the same yeah but let's say this

1:27:50 neck is causing you to you know your heart to race and your palms to sweat but the thought of your eventual death is just it's a more abstract fear you're on a mountaintop in the case of the snake perhaps your amygdala is making all that happen you're on the mountaintop and your lack of food and some regulatory issues with the Sun going down and no shelter and starting to snow those are different sensations altogether that are driving your experience and your fear is not

1:28:26 necessarily going to be one of your heart racing it may be you know you may have a homeostatic response where you're conserving trying to conserve energy so your heart is going to slow down to help you conserve energy but your mental state is what's in fear and that's not it's not the same as a snake yeah I agree with all that but I just think that if it's fear then it's got to feel the same or else it's not faith there it's just your grouping a bunch of stuff together under a name because there's danger there but for me fear

1:28:58 names a feeling like it feels a certain way to be afraid if you don't have that you have fear that someone the word fear again you're putting it into the word fear not to the feeling which I label with fear but that's because you have this concept of what fear is and so when you pattern complete fear you experience what you always experience and if you pattern wait for here to the snake and pattern complete it to a dog or to you know mugger or to you know your death your eventual death then it's because your

1:29:33 pattern completing it cognitively not that because it is itself a unique thing that's mighty yeah yeah I just thought we I was surprised I thought we there was more involved with this idea that fear is a feeling and but it's really the feeling supposing you didn't have the word feeling supposing that word were banned from English and

1:30:07 you had to rely on something else that well I mean because I think that the word feeling is very misleading i I don't think that the idea that fears of feeling and the idea that pain is a feeling I don't think that those two are on the same track I think that pain is a very different kind of thing from fear and to

1:30:41 call them both feelings well that's what we do in English but I think it's misleading and you seem to be taking the pain model you said the British empiricism thing about feelings as though well there's a particular kind of feeling that's like a pain feeling that goes with fear and I guess I I don't think that that's true I know III think that that's not

1:31:13 if I can speak this way I don't think it's phenomenologically accurate I think it's sort of there is a tradition in philosophy according to which that's the way it is but I think it's I don't I don't think it's correct yeah I mean that that's just yeah yeah well I know we're rented wherever out of time because I I think Joe has to head out here so we're need a whole nother session to get to them we I mean after all we should have another

1:31:48 session Richard because it's not as though when the three of us would have lunch at this wonderful place in the East Village it's not as though well we would say okay well we're gonna go now and we'll never see each other again so come back and have lunch and we should come back and do this again definitely absolutely yeah exactly so the last thing like I know we're wrapping this up but I just want to know if there's anything Joe that maybe didn't come up and Dave it as well but that you wished had come up really

1:32:20 briefly I'm pretty happy with what we talked about okay David you too I'm very happy about what we talked about I know that we we sort of touched on non-human animals here and there and that would be a topic to raise another time but I was very pleased I thought I thought we accomplished a fair amount yeah it was very nice and definitely we'll have

1:32:54 to do this again soon so thank you thank you guys for joining me and just hang on for a second I'll say bye off-air alright let's go ahead and get