Consciousness Live! with Susanna Schellenberg (S8 E5.5)

0:00 So people may be confused about where we are. Um, but uh it's being recorded anyway and hopefully sorry guys um I'll have to fix this in the post-production about the name and all that, but we are once again live. Um, apologies for the technological uh frustrations, but philosophers, you know, what do you expect? So Susanna, thank you once again for joining me. Um, since we're kind of running behind, I guess we'll just jump right into it if you don't mind. Absolutely. And thanks for having me

0:33 again.

1:05 content. And I I was trying to work my way into asking you some questions about of the general form like why is it content um with a special emphasis on that saying it like that content like what what what is contentful about this? And I know you have a lot to say about that. So uh I wonder if we could kind of start there and um give us some some motivations for why thinking we need to talk about mental content at all and then in particular singular contents. Right, yeah. Um, gosh, uh big question.

1:41 We like to start small, easy question.

2:17 something in the vicinity of content going on is that perception is accuracy conditions. Um but I think to establish that perception actually has content, you have to do more than just that. Um because you know, anyone can say that, "Oh, whenever there's a perceptual state or perceptual relation, there's some content you can articulate that is that describes or is associated with

2:50 that." Like even an activist or some radical externalist could accept that, right? Yeah, um um that has accuracy conditions. Like, you know, any naive realist can easily accept that. And so just saying that perceptual content has um accuracy conditions, I don't think moves much at all. And you know, I call the view that just focuses on accuracy conditions sort of the association thesis in the sense that the content can be associated with that perceptual state by, like, for example, describing it or

3:23 even one-to-one individuating it. Um Right.

4:29 that's really just sort of you know the old view that there is some kind of stimulus dependence. You know, there's some stimulus that you're discriminating. And if you're not discriminating a stimulus, you're not perceiving. Okay. So you

5:01 know Shakespeare says I saw the dagger, you know, or whoever you know

5:35 like something in folk psycho psychology that you are using to guide your theorizing or is it not that serious when you're talking about like these kinds of platitude and this sort of things? Um Oh, no. I mean, I very much don't Like, I think Sorry. I very much don't build my theories on folk psychology because I think you know, we've folk psychol- psychology has often gotten things wrong.

6:07 question

6:39 don't I wasn't sure like how much of that was in the background of what you were saying, but sounds like you're saying, "Not. Not." No. I basically, you know, I'm very much a truth seeker and you know, which So, however it turns out is fine with you. Exactly. Yeah.

7:13 exercise of those capacities, you thereby come to represent the discriminated um object, property, event, or whatever it is that's out there that you're perceiving. Is that a generally correct statement on your view? Exactly.

8:18 that perception always has a singular content um or that it can and often does. Right. No, I want to say that it always has a singular content, but I guess there's sort of two very different camps in views about perceptual content. One is that you're actually related. Like you're I mean, the way you put it before, and I don't want to put words in your mouth, but the way you put it before is that you perceive the perceptual content. Like I don't want to

8:50 say that. I want to say you perceive the world. But in virtue of perceiving the world, you're in a perceptual state with content. Right. And that's a big difference because um you know, views that on which what you're perceiving is the content you know, face the problem that um there's some kind of indirect perception going on. The veil of perception they

9:22 call it in the old days. Exactly, yeah. Um But hold on. But hold on. Now, hold on. I'm I I agree with what you're saying, but what was I doing that? Because what I was thinking, and maybe I was, but what I was thinking was that there's the the thing out there and you're discriminating it. Um and that's part of the content of the your perceptual state, that thing out there. Okay.

9:57 two different aspects that come apart and play different roles, but at least part of the role is like connecting you in a way that lets you say that you're perceiving the content the thing out there, right? Or is that not correct? Okay. Um I mean, that's an excellent way of putting it and it really sort of shows how there's the view that people these days call a Russellian view, although Russell said that I'll just first state what Russellian view is considered to be, which is that it's constituted by actual like properties and objects.

10:31 Um although Russell's view was really about sense data, but let's put that aside. And so then, if the content is actually constituted by what is out in the world, and you know, in a very different way of saying that is that the the content and the truthmaker are the same, then you're absolutely right. The idea that we perceive what's out in the world and we perceive the content collapses. Um And you want to resist that. I do not I do not endorse that at all. Right, so

11:03 I want to say, you know, what's out in the world is what we perceive, that's the truthmaker of the content. But the content itself, and this is where I'm very steeped in sort of Fregeanism, is I mean, as I put it, it's constituted by, you know, what we in fact perceive and the perceptual capacities by means of which we single that out, but it's not material constitution. It's just that the content wouldn't be what it is without you perceiving and discriminating out what's out of the world, right? There's lots of different views of what constitution amounts to. One is, you

11:37 know, the idea that, you know, this material constitution where, you know, the idea is this pen is constituted by um plastic, ink, I don't know what. I don't know what pens, but but, you know, when I perceive the pen, it's not that my mental state is constituted in that sense by plastic and ink. My mental state is what it is. It wouldn't be what it wouldn't what it is if I weren't related to this particular pen. And in that sense, it's singular content. But, you know, the idea is not that

12:09 suddenly there's plastic and ink in my brain. Right. You know, so

12:42 then, having spent a lot of time in the sciences, I kind of thought representationalism was sort of like the default view, and then I realized naive realism was coming back, and that some people were trying to champion this view. Um except that I became sort of confused what was at issue here over time because so, I guess one way to put it, or the way that I like to think about it, and I want to see if you if this makes sense of what with what you're saying, is that for the naive realist, we think about like the phenomenal red of redness, and the naive realist is someone who thinks

13:15 that's like out there on the in the world, so to speak, and we're related directly to that. And what you're saying in a way is like, "No, that part's wrong because in the world there are no properties like phenomenal redness. There are these other properties like surface reflectances or whatever. But those are the things that we're discriminating by having these phenomenal properties show up in the mind. So in that way you're I see you are trying to split the two, but I'm wondering if I'm misunderstanding this whole debate

13:46 in some way that you could help me or if this is putting it.

14:19 to say to give an account of memory where you recall content you stored or reconstruct content you stored depending on, you know, it allows you to say that um you know, that perception justifies belief. Like you want some content somewhere. Um it's I mean it's you know, there's ways to to say that perception just justifies beliefs without perception having content, but

14:53 it gets really murky. So so it's in service of epistemology is is sounds like

15:26 strange to reorient and think about the content as being the thing you're representing or the thing you're targeting or the thing that's in the world. Um

15:59 my pen thing there's no ink in my brain comment is kind of almost apt in a way because it's like, yeah, it's not that I want ink in your brain, but there's got to be something in your brain that I want to call the content of the state, which is the reason why it grinds the gears in this way and not that way. And saying it's because it's related to the thing out there seems sort of like going beyond that. Um Okay. So, you got a one really crucial thing. So,

16:32 um which is that there's a way what's out in the world is represented. Mhm. And that is the idea that any Fregean focuses on.

17:04 Yeah, um and then there's the way I represent it. Right. You know. Um you know, this is not a very interesting object, so there's not not all that many, you know, options, but you know, to to to kind of just mirror the way Frege introduced his sense reference distinction, you know, one is the famous Hesperus Phosphorus case, Morning Star Evening Star case, and the other is, which is talked about much less often, is a perceptual case, which is you can see this as four-sided or four-cornered, you know.

17:38 Those are different ways of of representing it.

18:12 world. But I can also um employ much more fine-grained capacities, you know, my capacities to distinguish between sherries and um Bordeaux and mustard and I'm running out of um Yellows? Are these yellows?

18:46 fine-grained way. And I guess the way you were talking before, and I'm I don't know whether I'm going to get you wrong here, and correct me if I do. Um you know, we all agree uh not not everyone, but you and I agree. There is stuff in the world. Um I think everyone agrees with that. I mean, um these days, uh there's stuff in the world, you know, there's the field of flowers, and then there's the representation of that. That's what at least, you know, representationists agree with.

19:17 And what you wanted to do, and this is the part where I hope I'm getting you right, is sort of align content with the stuff in the world. And I'm sort of aligning content much more on this side over here. Um

20:25 you could get you could do without it, and like you would just be giving up some epistemological stuff that some people don't care about anyway? You can accept a lot of what I argue for while excising the singular content stuff.

20:57 look so You can accept all that without accepting the singular content stuff. And I mean, I thought I think of myself as an externalist, I guess, or like, you know, I'm come from a, you know, a Millikan, Kripke, Devitt kind of way of thinking about a lot of this stuff because of my personal trajectory through school and I was exposed to those ideas and I found them very influential. But at So at the So I'm friendly to externalism, but I'm just I'm trying to understand like, why are we calling it content when it doesn't it's not making a difference in the gears? So I So I'm trying to locate content on

21:30 the other side of the of the debate in here. And so if you're looking at two identical glasses of water, like, you know, this one and one that's identical to it. And you know, so you talk about cases like this in your book where you're perceiving two indistinguishable objects. And you're exercising all the same capacities in both cases and yet you want to say that they have different contents. Whereas they they relate to you're related different objects, so that your representations have different targets. But why are we calling that content? Because it doesn't affect the way the internal functioning of the brain goes. It goes

22:04 The internal trajectory of the brain, the mind, whatever you I'm sorry, I have brain. Yes, sorry. The mind goes the same way. The same states are generated. They have the same causal effects. They produce the same output. They They're kind of tooling around in there internally, you know, internalist-wise. And their fact that they're related to that cup, whether it's your cup at the party or not, doesn't matter to how the state is functioning internally. So I would think that we would want to call content the stuff that matters to how the state is functioning internally. So that's why I'm wondering how is this stuff out there a content? It It doesn't

22:39 play a role that I would associate with something called a content. Um Right. So look, um I'm with you that the the content is I I I'm is in here somewhere to just, you know, it Oh, so you're not an externalist about content. Hold on. Hold on.

23:45 I really like these pens. They're not Here's a pen, two pens. Let's assume they're let's assume they're actually qualitatively identical. They're actually not, you know.

24:17 this one and that one but one is um but there's a little bit different namely one justifies knowledge um that it's this pen the other justifies knowledge that it's um um or grounds knowledge that it's that pen. Um uh justifies the belief that it's this pen versus that pen. Okay, and so and so you're asking how can they be different

24:50 without and what I'm say and okay so here's the bit that I that I don't I don't put it this way in the book but I'm going to put it this way for the purposes of this conversation, which is that the fact that the first perception, the one of this pen, was caused by the stimulus emanating from this pen matters. Whereas the second perception was caused by stimulus from this pen matters. So, there's So, it's a it's

25:25 So, basically, it's a way of taking very seriously the stimulus dependence of perception. Um so, you know, I have this paper called um perceptual particularity, where I sort of go um into this in um you know, some detail, and I hinge it on I don't put it in terms of stimulus dependence, but I could easily have done so. Um and the idea is um

26:00 you know, your mental state is discriminant It matters whether your state mental state is discriminated Sorry, is your I'm sorry. I'm going to restart that sentence. Your mental state is constituted by distri- discriminating and singling out stuff in the world. And it matters whether it's whether in doing so, you single out, you know, pen one versus pen two, even if you can't tell. Yeah.

26:34 And I And I can't matter to how your mind works. So, even if it mattered, I mean, so you So, it it sounds to me like what you I could be wrong. Remember, I'm trying to understand. I'm not really trying to to uh object to your view. I'm just trying to like fully No, no, no, sure, sure, sure. come understand it. I love controversy. I get a little excitable. So, I'm not really trying to like think of myself as launching some objection to your view. I'm just really trying to focus on it.

27:07 saying to me is that it matters because of justification. Like it matters because in one case you would be justified in saying that's my pen and the other case you wouldn't be justified in saying that. Or in one case you'd be justified in um in in putting a pen in your pocket or in believing that you have the correct pen or all these things that we could like certain actions could be justified, certain beliefs. So, so there's certain things of that nature which would result from you being perceptually related in this way that's

27:41 indistinguishable from the inside to that pen as opposed to that pen. Um which So, first of all, is that a sort of a good summary of what you were saying? Okay, so so two things. One is um Well, actually three things. One is that um yes, the ultimate motivation for saying that perceptual content has singular content is certainly for me um and I think more generally almost without exception

28:16 epistemological. Mhm. You know, perception epistemological and so forth. Right. Perception gives us knowledge of the world. No one disagrees with that. I mean, at least these days. Um and then how can it do so Right. if it wouldn't matter if if there weren't a difference if you're perceiving this rather than that. Right. Now, and this is the second point. Um If you come at issues about perception from thinking about consciousness and,

28:49 you know, for the record I care deeply about issues about consciousness.

29:23 our assumption about having knowledge already. Okay, excellent. And this is that's the third point I wanted to make, which is here's a really bad argument for saying that perceptual content is singular content and, you know, in that paper I mentioned the particularity argument uh, the the perceptual particularity. I I mentioned this as a bad argument for saying that perception has singular content, which is perception gives us knowledge of the world, so perception must have singular content. Like Yeah, that sounds bad. Yeah. I mean, usually it's a little bit more

29:55 sophisticated than that. Right.

30:28 done so, your perceptual state is constituted by that activity of discriminating and singling out that thing. Right. And if it's constituted by discriminating discriminating and singling out that thing, then you represent that thing alpha. And if you represent that thing then your perceptual state is constituted by alpha. And so it follows if you perceive alpha your perceptual state is constituted by alpha. And I'll just repeat again

31:00 that with constitution here Non-material constitution. Not material constitution. It's just the state wouldn't be what it is without you having perceived alpha. Yeah, but what it would be See, that's what I'm trying to understand is it seems like it would be the state that it is cuz it has all the same effects and all the same outcomes. So I don't really understand how it's not the same state.

31:36 not same content, but the perceptual your phenomenal character is grounded in your perceptual content or your representational state. So the idea being you can't have um So the idea being there could be differences in content. Right, but if there's a difference at the phenomenal level, there must be some difference, but it doesn't imply every difference at that first level implies a difference at the phenomenal

32:10 and then present represent pen two is not reflected in phenomenal character. Um but there are there are differences, namely this perception provides you with knowledge of this pen and this perception provides you with knowledge of this pen. Yeah. I guess maybe my problem is that and I know who I'm talking to and that I will risk, you know, outing myself in present company, um that uh, kind of am against epistemology in a certain sense and I've always kind of been a fan of what is known as the swamping problem. And, um,

32:44 I don't know if that's still a thing or not, but I've always sort of just felt like knowledge doesn't matter, it's true belief that matters for explaining behavior. So, it's it's having beliefs that are true that actually get you around in the world. Calling it knowledge or not is like, you know, cool, I guess, but like how I don't see how it makes a difference to like driving the body around that it's knowledge versus not knowledge. What matters is if it's true or not. And if it's your pen or not my pen and I grab it, there's going to be certain consequences if it's if I'm wrong just because I'm wrong, not because it's

33:18 content. You know, you might get mad or whatever. So, anyway, so it just I So, maybe that's my bias cuz I do kind of go like, what are we arguing about in these epistemological debates a lot of the time? And I know Rutgers is a place where I wouldn't be, you know, maybe my views are not No, no, no, no. I mean, I can put everything I just said in terms of true belief. I don't have to bring in

33:51 you know, but let's just go with that. Um, I mean, partly because recognitional stuff comes in and so forth, but just for the sake of argument, let's go with that and, you know, it seems to me this is the pen that I just saw, you know. Turns out it's two different pens. So, I'm my my belief that this is the same pen that I just saw is false.

34:23 Okay.

34:56 a related issue, I guess the question then is how you know, what role perception plays in your life? And I suppose I would say, well you know, my saying that's the same pen as I just saw is based in you know, let's say it's it's a false claim. And but I think I believe this false claim because of my perceptual states, my phenomenal

35:29 character. But why can't it just be justified by the indistinguishability of the phenomenal aspect? They look the same. It seems the same. So Right. And exactly that and that's and that's why, you know, that's why I think you have good reason actually to believe it's the same pen because they look the same.

36:02 seem to be playing a role that I understand as one that's a content? Unless you're talking about knowledge, because knowledge has to be based on it can't just be based on you know, it has to be based on something that's a uh if maybe a special kind of state like a content. So, I don't know other than that what what the real reason for saying that the pen is a content is. Um but but again, this could just be my bias. So, maybe this is my own special problem, you know, not so interesting therefore. Right. Right. Um But but because you know, I like like from coming from my point of view like a Millikan-esque kind

36:35 of point of view is like, yeah, the content is in the mental side of things because that has a function of picking out that object out there. So, the object is in is part playing a role which would make this state not be the state that it is, which is what I thought I heard you saying, but we're not saying that the state out there is a content in a way. We're sort of saying like, you know, the kind of content that gets its set by this evolutionary function thing. So, it's got to be related to something out there

37:07 to set it or something like that. But uh but it's not like a content when you token the mental state as I would understand it. It's the function that's determining that you're related in the right way. It's the evolutionary history of the state that's telling you, oh yeah, that's the thing out there you're related to. Um but but on your view, it's it's like more seems it's more important that the that the object or property or event somehow constitutes in this way we've been talking about the mental state. And that's what I'm trying to figure out is like, what's so important about that that we don't want to give it up? And it sounds

37:40 like the answer is, well, then cuz you can't say you know things. Um and I guess you know, on the Millikan-esque view, you do end up saying you don't know a lot of the stuff you thought you might have known. Right. No, and I'm you know, I mean, there are many things on which we're um on the same page and one is being influenced by Millikan. And I'm deeply sympathetic not so much to her teleosemantics, which I I I realize is a Yeah. significant part of her view. Actually, um you know, I am interested to the teleological part in that

38:14 um you know, perception has a certain function and perceptual states have a certain function. I guess I'm not um as into the um historical aspect of it. And we talked about this last time that I think, you know, like me and my swamp twin have all the same capacities and so forth. And, you know, someone like Williams, uh, not Williams, um, Millikan would have a harder time. I mean, you know, she can say various things, but it's not as obvious that that's the case. They have to do some footwork to

38:50 um, respond to the the last thing you were saying, I I I think maybe one way, sort of a different way than we have so far, just to move the discussion forward, um, where our difference is is that I want to say the function I mean, we're in agreement that it's, you know, it's it's hugely about what the function of the Roman state is and so forth, but I would basically include what you discriminate and single out in

39:25 the world as a crucial part of the function, such that it matters whether you singled out and discriminated this one thing or this other thing. Um, such that there is a difference not revealed in phenomenal character with regard to the first mental state versus the second, where the two mental states are different just in virtue of whether you singled out pen one versus pen two. And that difference, um, makes it the case that,

39:59 um, for example, your belief that's the same pen as I just saw is false, makes it the case that, um, um, in the one case, to bring in knowledge again, you have knowledge of one pen, and the in the other case you have knowledge of a different kind of pen, but you can put it in terms of true belief if you like. Um in the one case case you truly believe Yeah. Um well, you have a true belief about that pen versus the other pen. So, yeah.

40:32 Okay. But anyway

41:42 like I have my Oculus on and I'm playing Fruit Ninja and there comes this banana across the screen and I have a sword and I slice it. Am I correct in saying that I perceive a digital sword and a digital banana on your view or are you going to resist saying that that counts as perception in the virtual environment in the digital environment? Okay. Um Sorry, can you just repeat am I correct in saying that in my view I would see the digital banana.

42:48 this stuff? Are you fine with this or how do you think about it?

43:26 you you know, you definitely have evidence of what's out there. And depending on the details of the case, I would even say you have fact evidence, meaning that that you see what's out there. You know, you have actual perception. You're not just hallucinating. Um so I'm very sympathetic to sort of the the Dave Chalmers approach in that the the Matrix world or the the the virtual reality world is in a way the real world. But to sort of kind of scale back a little bit, I mean, here's

43:58 how I'm thinking, you know, you're um you're there's a lot in common between the good case and the bad case, where the good case is perception, the bad case is hallucination. You employ the same perceptual capacities. They give rise to the same mental state mental content types. Um and in virtue of that, you are in the same phenomenal character. The difference is just the token content. One is singular and the other is not not singular, which I don't want to get get us back into that that discussion. But that's the only difference, right? And

44:31 so, um so And so then the question is, well, what about someone who's always hallucinating, right? So let's first take a case of someone who for whatever reason is always hallucinating. Um and I would say, yeah, they have, you know, they're in phenomenal states all the time, obviously, because that's what hallucination gives you. But then, what about what if and let's say they're always dreaming. Same same response. But then, what about the case where they're in a fictional

45:05 world? They're in a matrix They're They're neon, basically. And then it really sort of depends on the details as in what what do you you know, do the do the perceptual capacities function to single out the actual stuff in the matrix world? If yes, then I would say that case is different from the hallucination case.

45:37 whether it's more realistic, but let's say you know, it's sort of H2O XYZ example. Let's say you get transported into a different world. You employ your perceptual capacities to discriminate and single out water. It turns out not to be water. Right. But then you spend the rest of your life in this new world. At some point your your capacities actually function to single out this stuff, you know. Right. They switch over at some point and how when is the tricky question, but they do, right? Yeah, exactly. And so so um

46:13 so you know, so it it sort of matters what the definition of the good case is. And I know it's in the matrix you might you can align the matrix scenario with the dream scenario, the hallucination scenario or or you can align it with just being transported to a different actual world. Yeah. Where you're seeing things that are in for all respects just like what you saw at home. It's just their material constitution is

46:48 different. Okay.

47:21 you saw your view fitting into that kind of debate. Um so it sounds like you're saying if the details are right, it's going to just work the way it normally works. You're going to be perceiving in the normal way.

47:54 banana, but you're not really like perceiving it and it's not a case of a good case. So, I guess is the way to to put it more in the language that you would be using is that when I put the Oculus on, I enter into a bad case. And and I was wondering what your what your view about that was and and before even getting to the like the Matrix, just a general view about VR as it is now. Is it a good case or a bad case? And I so I'm not sure even now what to think about that.

48:28 I mean I guess that's where I'm just really focused on stimulus input. Like there's a stimulus input, you know, it's not uh you know, the material constitution of the um digital banana is different from that of the but in both cases you are related to something out in the world. Now, if you think the thing that you're seeing when you have the Oculus on is um a physical banana. Then you're getting things wrong, you know. Yeah. I

49:04 mean this in some way relates to um a paper I just published called the polysemy of I um where you know, I have this it's all about how um there's lots of references of I, you know, let's So, let's take a case different game, you know, um you're sitting um um you know, you let's let's leave out the Oculus just to make it even less realistic, but let's say you're sitting

49:35 um on your chair like you are right now playing a game and suddenly you shout, "I just died." You know, like um clearly you haven't just died, you know, you're still talking. So, you know, things are good on that friend. But um you know that's completely understandable. Like it that's of course a metaphorical sense of I, you know. But to the extent that you're taking on the point of view of the avatar in the game and the avatar in the game just

50:08 died. You know, I mean it's disturbing if you then get all depressed about about that because it means you're maybe you're taking a little you're going taking it a little bit too far with identifying with this avatar.

50:40 who I am has kind of been extended. It's like you have a bit of a displaced I, right? I mean here's here's a you know, an example that's a little bit closer to home or you know, maybe more amenable to um people who don't want to think about video games, you know, so take the surgeon who um um you know, does microsurgery via um a remote camera and let's take someone who does it for the very first time, all

51:12 right? Let's hope it's not on they're not doing surgery on a human but they're doing surgery on something else, you know.

51:45 is they still have their point of view because they're looking at a a screen where they see what is inputted in the camera that's inside, you know, the body on which they're operating. And they're moving the hands, I mean, the robot tools. Exactly, yeah. And so that's a case where it's like their point of view is split.

52:20 But if anything, the primary point of view is the one inside the body on which they're operating. I mean, they still have their own in the sense that they're doing the movements from where they are. Anyway, you know, that's a case I mean, and I think the avatar case when you're really embodied and um you know, your actions of the avatar are similar and again, to take a different point a different example that's I hope everyone has experienced. You know, you're sitting in a movie theater

52:53 or at home on a couch if you like, but let's take the movie theater case because people tend to be more immersed in those cases. And I don't know, like something jumps at you. You know, if you have healthy human responses, you're going to like go back a little bit. And you know, but you're not going to run out of run out of the movie theater screaming, right? You're you But you you you know, you're you the only reason you're going back a little bit is

53:27 because you're taking on the point of view of the character in the movie movie enough to wince, you know. So this may be a non sequitur, but I wonder if like this polysemy of I thing you're talking about, would you like cuz what what I'm thinking about is weird cases of consciousness disorders. Um like somatoparaphre- somatoparaphrenia for example, where people have these weird body experiences as not belonging to them, their own body parts not belonging to themselves. And there's one famous case of a woman who

53:58 was consistently claiming that her arm was really her niece's arm. And that when you when you said I'm going to touch your arm, she says, "I don't feel it." But if you say I'm going to touch your niece's arm, she says she feels it. So that's a strange and interesting case. But I wonder, so do you would you use your account to make sense of those kinds of things? Or do you think that's a different thing going on there? If you thought about this at all, I don't know.

54:32 point of view. Um but you know, unless you're really rigid person, chances are your perspective changes when you you know, are talking to, let's say, a toddler versus a colleague or when you're talking to a friend in, you know, at a late-night party versus talking to potential employers. You know, you have a different narrative about yourself, but you also you know, navigate the world differently, right? Um

55:05 and then, you know, you know, contrast that from some pathological cases where um you know, you have dissociative identity disorder or um you know, schizophrenia, where you also have very different perspectives, let's say. And then the question is, you know, what's what's the difference between the pathological case and the non-pathological case? And I think, you know, as most things in nature, there's a huge range. And you know, I think there is a there's

55:38 rigidity on both ends of the range. So, I already mentioned the rigid person that is not typically pathologized who just has sort of one mode of being and is let's say always a philosophy professor like

56:13 that kind of way of always being in the exact same mode I'll put it, you know.

56:46 with what I care about, you know, with my what my preferences are. Did I hear you say that that's also rigid? That No, no, no, no, no. No, so that's not rigid, right? But I can like act So, here's here's a way in which my different let's call them personas is not pathological. It's I can access my one persona when I'm in in one mode very easily, you know. Um so, it's not as if there's a wall between them, you know, and I can Right. um you know, turn them on and off somewhat at will. So,

57:18 there's kind of voluntariness and um and also there it's environmentally responsive and So, the run the runner example is not not such a great example to to to make this case, but you know, like let's say you're a parent, you know, I'm a parent. Um I can access my parent mode voluntarily. Um but I'm also environ-

57:51 in some way respond if their toddler runs in the room. They might choose not to respond, but you know, they're enough environmentally responsive such that uh you know, some something shifts at least temporarily. And you know, in that sense, the person who has um what in the '80s used to be called personality identity um uh disorder um uh multiple personality dis- dis- disorder, and that's not really a a term used anymore. Um um

58:24 has more rigidity in that sense. So with regard to like access, voluntariness That's where the more rigidity was coming from. I get it. I see. They're more stuck in the perspectives and can't voluntarily switch between them in a way like you or I can when I'm talking to my son as opposed to my students as opposed to my Exactly. And then right And then the third is like environmental um responsiveness.

58:58 that in the DID case, there's more of a case that they're separate subjects, but like in you and me, that's less of a case that we're separate subjects ourselves, and that there there's a real polysemy, whereas in the other case, maybe it's not polysemy, like they're really just different I's. I think I missed one word. What is the the ID case? What's the ID?

59:32 and so when they say I they're really referring to the different aspects of the same self that either two identities kind of like you and I are doing or are you saying no on that end they really are different selves and it's kind of a continuum between the two. That's what I was wondering.

1:00:03 perspective just is a self go for it, you know. But I would say um you know, we have different possible active perspectives. A any human has different possible active perspectives. And there's sort of rigidity um and there's a huge range, you know, and there's rigidity on both ends of the spectrum. One form of rigidity is just

1:00:38 being stuck in one perspective. Um and you know, talking the same to a toddler as to a work colleague. Um And the other form of perspective rigidity is having multiple perspectives without the ability to access those voluntarily or those perspectives being environmentally responsive. Um Um and so and you know, I mean I don't want to

1:01:09 I'm not a psychiatrist so I I I feel um Yeah, got to tread lightly. I understand.

1:01:43 problematic, you know.

1:02:16 say. So, so I'm wondering like how in what sense do you think these perspectives are related to phenomenal consciousness? Are we talking about something in the ballpark of that in this instance or not um on your view? Like a perspective, is that just like a subject subjectivity?

1:02:50 you know, like you you gave the example of being a parent and being a professor your the way it feels or what it's like to be in one mode versus the other is I'm guessing at least sometimes different, right?

1:03:23 um uh I think there's just always a lot more going on you know below the level of phenomenal consciousness that's important to take into account. So so you would say uh this is something I wanted to ask you about earlier too. So I'm glad you brought it up just now, but so you're on your view allow for there to be unconscious perception? Is that that's a uh thing that you are like on your view is acceptable or Absolutely, yeah. Okay. So it it it it did make me wonder what it is that is um distinguishing the

1:03:58 unconscious perceptions from the conscious perceptions because in both case you're exercising perceptual capacities, I assume. And maybe even related to the same object one assumes. So maybe you're representing the same object even. Um but in one case there's a phenomenal aspect and the other there isn't. So there's got to be some difference. I'm wondering like if you but I didn't really see that anywhere in the book. So I I mean wondering like if you Yeah, you know um I just said absolutely to your question. Um

1:04:30 and I do have a very brief discussion in the book. Okay. Buried in a footnote, but I actually take a different stance there and this is maybe the main thing on which I've changed my mind. Um So I there say that you know, I mean so in the book I argue that what constitutes phenomenal character is just the the activity is like the of employing perceptual capacities. So I call it mental activism because it's the activity of doing something that generates mental

1:05:02 consciousness or phenomenal consciousness or perceptual consciousness, however you want to put it. Um And so the And then I say, "But sometimes you might not have access to whatever phenomenal state you're in." And so, depending on how exactly you you um interpret that, I basically say there is um no perceptual consciousness. Now, when I responded absolutely to your question before,

1:05:37 um I was very much sort of in the mode of my current project, which is where I've um I've broadened um my approach well way beyond perception, and um much more interested in, you know, the massive amount of stuff that goes on. So, this line here is the line below consciousness.

1:06:09 is to a large extent below the line. Maybe the line is actually a little bit higher here. Not Not that we're being very precise, but And um so, so obviously there's, you know, aspects of your consciousness that are going to be distinct in your parent mode and your um um um um your your uh professor mode, your philosophy professor mode. But, you know, there are all kinds of aspects that chances are going to be distinct,

1:06:42 such as your preferences change. And they you know, even if you're not conscious of that, they might change. Um And what you pay attention to changes.

1:07:13 And so you know, there's like views of belief sorry, views of perspectives in philosophy where a perspective is just a set of beliefs you have a current beliefs. Mhm. That kind of view is subsumed under the way I talk about perspectives in that it's just a very narrow slice of a of how to talk about perspective, but I want to say your typical perspective includes far more than just sets of conscious beliefs. They include non occurrent beliefs. They include preferences, goals, the questions you ask, your dispositions, your capacities,

1:07:46 you know, and then all kinds of stuff at the lowest level that have to do with you know, statistical regularities that um determine how you categorize incoming information. Right. Okay. And so what when you when you unconsciously perceive on the new view of yours um uh so so wait wait did I hear you first of all did I hear you right in saying that in the book you basically say there isn't unconscious perception that all perception is conscious? Yeah, I I

1:08:18 Sort of. Except for maybe It's like it's like a footnote where I briefly address it. Yes, but yes, I do say that. Yeah. Yeah. But you now you're you're saying no, I've kind of come around to thinking there's some unconscious stuff that even could be called perception. Because some people like Ian Phillips would say lots of stuff is unconscious, but it's not perception maybe. Exactly. So it's it's a I think it's a bit of a terminological issue. It really is really a question of where you draw the line with with perception. I mean what you know, like

1:08:50 I mean here's something that I'm I'd be shocked if anyone disagrees with, but there's almost always something

1:09:22 shouldn't call those things representations." Whatever. I mean, there's a lot Let's just The thing that I think no one would disagree with or I'd be shocked if someone would disagree with is that there's a lot going on with regard to perception under the surface that could never be revealed in perceptual consciousness. And I guess um um I'm at this point um I've always been very interested in um what goes on under, you know, the line where just to remind you, this is the line of consciousness.

1:10:28 I think the only change is I'm much more inclined to say, "Yeah, this is all perception." to I mean, at some point you really just have response to sensory input. Does that already qualify as perception? No, you have the you know, the in the response to the input needs to be kicked upstream, but at some point you call it perception, especially if it guides action and so forth. Um And whether or not it's conscious or not, I think um

1:11:00 Sort of irrelevant. Is it is it relevant? Exactly. I mean, it's going to be interesting. Like I'm not I don't I don't want to say consciousness is irrelevant. You know, it's really cool that we have conscious perception and those are really interesting states, but

1:11:31 I'm much more inclined to um go with the latter. Yeah. You okay.

1:12:06 produce it? So, what are you changing in the way you're exercising the capacities in the relevant um mental things you're doing on your view? Cuz I assume that's got to be how you're going to cash out this difference. Or if I'm wrong, I don't know, but I'm just trying to understand like So, I'm exercising a capacity, but it's not conscious, and then I'm exercising the capacity that is conscious. So, what did I do different? It must be like I'm doing it different somehow on cuz what else is is an activity, right? Yeah, no, I hear you. Um So, um

1:12:41 And I'm aware of running out of time, so it's fine.

1:13:15 if there is perceptual perception that is genuinely unconscious and not just conscious perception where you can't access what's going on and so you aren't in a state of perceptual con- you know, you can't then it has to be the case that either you res- you restrict when you're employing the perceptual capacity and have a story about that, or you have to say that there's some perceptual capacities that you employ

1:13:50 way that generate perceptual consciousness and some that you don't. And this is something that I'm working on and I'm not and I'm Not ready to share. Okay. Well, I it's It's not as if I have this giant story up my sleeve that I'm keeping from you, but it's There's still There's still work to be done. Awesome. That's a good good news for us, I guess, that we still have things to do tomorrow. Yes, exactly. Yeah. Okay. Well, on that note of further work, let me go ahead and say I really appreciate you taking the time to have this

1:14:21 conversation with me again and putting up with these questions. It's I always learn a lot from having these discussions and in this case particularly, I really have learned a lot about your view and how to think about it. So, I want to thank you. Well, thank you, Richard. You You are a wonderful interviewer and I really love the way you are both determined to get at the truth but and incredibly knowledgeable in how you approach the issues and it's been a true pleasure talking to you. Well, thank you. I appreciate those kind

1:14:54 words. That's that's very nice of you to say. Um totally unnecessary and undeserved I'll add, but uh a nice thing to