Peter Singer on Climate Change and Ethics

Yesterday LaGuardia College hosted Peter Singer who gave a short talk entitled ‘Climate Change and Ethics’. His basic argument was that by any reasonable standard of justice that one picks the U.S. comes out having a duty to lead the movement to reduce climate change. This is directly contrary to Bush’s stated reason for opting out of the Kyoto agreement (he said it wasn’t an ‘even-handed’ agreement because it exempted China and India…thereby implying that the treaty was unjust). He talked about three reasonable sounding principles of justice.

 1. You break it you buy it– Historically the U.S. has been the number one contributor to greenhouse gasses and so should have the most responsiblity for cleaning up the environment

2. Forget the past, divide it up evenly according to how much each industrialized nation pollutes– The U.S. puts out about six times as much greenhouse gasses (per capita) as any other industrialized nation and so again, we have the greatest responsibility to clean up the environment

3. Benefit the least advantaged– This is the Rawlsian conception of justice according to which an inequality is acceptable only if it is tot he advantage of the least advantaged member of (the global) society. This would (obviously) entail that the U.S. would have to make drastic cuts to the amount of greenhouse gasses that we contribute (per capita).

So no matter how you slice it it looks like the U.S. has a moral obligation to take the lead in reducing climate change, and yet we refuse to be a part of Kyoto because it is ‘unfair’!

He then suggested something very interesting, which was that we might establish a global market for greenhouse emissions. We would have to figure out exactly how much gas the environment could absorb withoout raise the global temperature some negligable amount (say 2 degree celsius) and then we allot each industrialized nation an amount that they are allowed. We could then allow for nations to sell their allotment if there were not using it. So say that it turned out that the envirnment could take 3 tons of gas emitted per person per year (the U.S. emmits something like 5.8 tons per person per year, while India emmits something like 1.1). India could, if they wanted, sell us a portin of their allotment so that we could, if we willing to pay and they were willing to sell, maintain the lifestyle that Bush claims is an American right. This strikes me as such a good idea that it will probably never be implemented.

What is Wrong with Eating Meat

In light of all the jokes about dead turkeys I have had to endure in the last week or so I started thinking about what it is exactly that is wrong with eating meat.

Is there something that is morally unacceptable about eating meat? This is a very interesting question, and having been raised as a vegetarian I have always felt that the answer is a resounding YES! I have argued elsewhere  that eating meat is something that at least needs to have an argument in its favor and that the typical arguments given as to why it is OK to eat meat horribly fail to work. But let me take another look at this issue.

Utilitarianism does not have much to say on this question. The modern Singer-ish view is that it is suffering that matters, the killing and eating are not the morally relevant properties. So, as Singer himself admits, were it possible to kill the animal in a way that did not cause it to suffer then there would be nothing morally wrong with doing so. Suppose that we raised cows on a beautiful farm and delighted their cow senses in all ways science prescribes. We let them live rather long lives, in an open pasture, with their families. Then one night when the cow is asleep we simply come and painlessly kill it.  The cow experiences no pain, and we cannot really say that it suffers in the sense that it will not get to enjoy its life tomorrow because it is not the kind of animal that can have these sophisticated kinds of suffering (they require, as Singer is right to point out, higher mental capacities), nor, because of this can we say that the other cows will suffer very much, or even at all, due to the dead cow’s being absent. If this could be arranged then what, according to utilitarianism, is wrong with butchering the cow and eating it? You might even say that it is better that the cow live this kind of life than no life at all, and so it is morally laudable to raise and slaughter cows in this manner. Singer’s response is to point out that this would severely limit the kinds of killing allowed; so much so in fact that it would rule out the kind of slaughter-house meat industry we now have. It may be the case that Singer is here taking a ‘let’s fix the serious problem first’ kind of attitude, because after all we know that the meat industry is producing a huge amount of animal suffering or it may be the case that he is simply acknowledging a consequence of his theory that he is willing to live with. At any rate there are those who think that there is still something wrong with the cow killing I described earlier. These people are attracted to Regan’s position that makes appeal not to utilitarianism but to Kant.

Regan’s view is that we are forbidden to treat animals as simply means to our ends. This is because to do so is to violate their rights. They have, Regen argues, the right to live in virtue of the fact that they are the subject of a life. To be the subject of a life is to have experience such that it matters to you what happens to you. That animals express preferences is evidence that they are subjects of a life and so they have the right to live. We know that cows must have this right on Regan’s account, because to deny that cows have it is to deny that infants do. So, on Regan’s view all subjects of a life have what Kant called value beyond compare, or dignity. A lot of people balk at this point because of intuitions about what it takes to have a right.

I have argued that we can get the same results that Regen wants without having to say that animals thereby have a right to be treated in certain ways. Rather what we argue is that we, as moral agents, have duties towards animals in spite of the fact that they don’t have rights. These obligations towards animals are grounded in the two concerns that Regen and Singer each point to. We ought not to cause animals to suffer because suffering matters, we also ought not to kill them, even painlessly, because their life matters to them. It is not that they (the animals) recognize this that makes it important. It is the fact that we recognize, through our ability to universalize, that we cannot but help but contradict ourselves when we make it be the case that sentient beings are used simply as a means because that would entail that we, as sentient beings, could be treated that way. No, as Kant rightly points out, we want it to remain the case that we cannot treat sentient beings in certain ways but then make an exception to that universal rule (in the case of nonhuman animals).

So the critics of Regen (I’m looking at you Cohen-lovers) are right that animals lack the capacity for morality (though there may be rudiments there, to be sure I think there are) because they lack the ability to apply general rules to particular situations. But wecan do this, and doing so reveals to us that we are obligated to treat sentient beings in certain ways. Thus we get Singer’s prohibition against suffering. Then we can argue about what we are to count as sentient (insects? Plants? Etc..) but we know that cows are and so we have an obligation not to cause them unnecessary suffering. We can similarly get Regen’s intuition via universalization arguments. We cannot will that it is morally acceptable to take the life of a creature who prefers to live because that would mean that someone could take my life even when I prefer to live and that can’t be right. No, we of course want murder to remain immoral, but we want to make an exception in this case (nonhuman animals). None of this suggests that animals have rights, that is none of this suggests that animals make claims on us.  We make claims on ourselves; morality is a law that we give unto ourselves. It is literally irrational to act immorally and to the degree that we respect reason we respect morality.

All of this is very well and good but all that it says is that we ought not to kill animals in order to eat them. Why can’t we be like some Buddhists who argue that if the animal dies of natural causes it is OK to eat it? Thus we finally arrive at the question we have been considering. Is there something morally wrong with eating meat? So far in answering this we have found instead that there is something morally wrong with causing suffering, and with treating animals as a means only. But if we avoid doing this and we still end up with some meat, should we be allowed to eat it? It is hard to see how you would be harming the animal, and overcoming its preference to live was caused by something that you were unrelated to (I hope!). It is helpful to think about this in the human case. Why don’t we want to eat people who accidentally demise? Besides the obvious answer that we don’t need to because of all the animals that we eat, the point here is that even so we would think there was something wrong about it. No doubt we could get over it, we know that there are and have been cannibals, but we would still feel that something was wrong (as evidenced by the fact that it normally takes desperate situations to even get people to consider this option). So what is going on?

One natural kind of thing to think is that we somehow don’t respect that person as a person when we consume them. We feel as though we are treating their body simply as a means to our ends, i.e. whatever we use the energy derived from their flesh to do. You turn that person completely and ultimately into a thing when you eat it. Now of course I understand that there have been cultures where eating someone is not thought disrespectful in this way but rather seen as a way to make the deceased person a part if you in a very intimate way. Notice however that this is implicitly the same thing as I have been saying in that it acknowledges that you ought not treat the body simply as a means (to get nourished or gustatory delight). You eat the body out of a profound sense of respect, with a sense that they are becoming one with you. I think there is an interesting question here about  whether or not there is a way to determine what the correct answer is in this respect.

So if this is right we can say that the reason it is wrong to eat meat is because it fails to be universalizable, which surely is a basic requirement for what counts as moral. If something remotely like physicalism is true then eating the person’s body is eating the person, and so we are treating them as a means only. Granted they are dead and it probably does not matter to them (or maybe, as Nagel has argued, you can harm the dead) you still use them as a means. This may actually be the psychological reason that people feel compelled to respect the dead (i.e. the body). They want to respect the person, as they want to be respected. This is the sense that you cannot but help to notice that you are eating that person. Now if we grant the likely hypothesis that animals are very much like us in certain respects (yes, yes, I know NOT ALL!) then to the respect that they are like us is to the respect that we ought not to eat their flesh as purely a means to get nourishment or even worse gustatory delight.

Notice also that if we did the above mentioned kind of cow slaughter it would be very likely that we would become attached to the animal and this would further make it evident that we were eating an individual.  On this view it is wrong to eat flesh because you treat the creature whose flesh it is simply as a means to nourishment.

One objection may be that on this view it seems possible that there be a person who would not mind being eaten after he was dead. So it is not the case that we are talking about something truly universilizablile. Not everyone will see that they simply want to make an exception of themselves to a general moral rule. They may be convinced that there is more to the person than the body (I doubt this, but even so remember that in most major religions you will get your body back (i.e. in the resurrection)) or they may think that even if the person is their body, when it stops working and you are dead there is no longer any reason for you to care what happens to you. Each of these critics agree that in some sense the person is no longer there and so you are not using them as a means. Sure you are using the body, but not the person so why should you care if that happens to your body when you die? Do you feel that way about your car? To see that you don’t imagine that your kids had your body stuffed and mounted in their living room simply because they thought that it made the room look nicer and perked them up as well. It seems to me that this is imply a case where they treat the body in a disrespectful way. Not because they harm the person who used to be (in) that body but because the person who does it sees that they are using the person strictly as a means. They are not respecting the person who that body belonged to. So if one buys this line of argument, have we arrived at the conclusion that it is immoral to eat meat?

There is a further wrinkle. Scientists are now starting to make cloned meat in laboratories. This meat is cloned from a few animal cells and so it seems as though a vegetarian should not have a problem with it. The problem here is that the texture of the artificial flesh is not like that of regular meat because the muscle is not exercised. So what they do now is to stretch the cultured meat over a think flexible sheet and grow it in layers. They then try to stack those layers. Alternatively they have tried to grow it in little balls that expand and contract. It looks like they will have to just build artificial legs and grow the meat on that. Next thing you will now they will say that they need to add some regulatory functions to the legs to let them run on their own. Pretty soon it looks like what you are saying is that in order to cultivate meat you need to cultivate a cow. If that turns out to be the case then lab meat is just as bad. But what if it doesn’t? What if they can grow it on artificial legs that are controlled by very simple brain stem-ish mechanisms? Just the body without any of the other things that make cows alike to the way that we are. Could we eat it then? I don’t know that we would. Again it is useful to consider the human case as an analogy. Would we allow people to grow human cultured bodies that were run by the computer equivalent of a brain stem? If not why not?

Shsesh! That turned out to be a lot longer than I thought it would be!!!! Guess I better get to actually doing some grading!

Day Two of the Yale/UConn Conference

Earlier I began to give a brief report on the first day of the Yale/UConn Graduate Conference that I recently attended…while I have a minute today, and before I gorge myself on some veggie turkey, I figured I would finish up…

Sadly, I missed the morning sessions due to having a jaccuzi-tub at the B&B I was staying at 🙂 I intended to show up for the afternoon sessions, though I missed the first presentation on emodied cognition and mind reading (by Shannon Spaulding of the University of Wisonsin)…judging from the comments and questions the paper was very interesting.

The next talk was on Moral Advice and the Structure of Moral Explanation (by Uri Leibowitz of U Mass). He argued that normative theory and a theory of moral advice are seperate. For instance, our normative theory may be a utilitarian one, and our theory of moral advice may be ‘do what Grandma says to do’…totally seperate. He then argued that a plausible theory of moral advice is something like ‘if after reflection you do not judge the action to be immoral, then perform the action’ (this is an approximation…the conference was a couple of weeks ago!)…He then argued that utilitarians could not account for why this is good moral advice because they could not account for how agents could keep track of the ‘goodmaking’ properties that utilitarianism postulated.  Now I think that it is very odd indeed to think that our normative theory can be seperated from our theory of moral advice…I tend to think that a normative theory is a theory of moral advice…that to say that something is right just is to say that it ought to be performed…though I can see why utilitarians think they way that they do (and in fact I think maybe Kantians should to)…but at any rate, once you really seperate these two (as, for instance Sidgwick did) Leibowitz’s argument against utiliatarianism falls apart (this was brought out nicely by Jeff Sebo in discussion). The commentator on the paper (Gwen Bradford of Yale) pointed out that the moral advice that Uri argued for was wierd because it wouldn’t be of any help to someone who did not know what to do. During discussion he was pressed on this and he said that he would give that advice to anyone, no matter their moral thoery. So I pointed out that the relativist and ammoralists out there would use his moral advice to do some very immoral things, and that makes the claim that it is good moral advice seem very strange. His response was that, more people, on average, would do good acts when using this advice…I don’t share this intuition. It seems to me that most people would reflect and conclude, for some bs reason or another, that there was nothing imorral about the action and then proceed to do all kinds of immoral actions…

During the break I had some very interesting discussion about the aims of cognitive science. I was arguing that in order to have a ‘completed’ cognitive science we would have to have a ‘completed’ scientific understanding of the world. Cognitive science is not a special science in the sense that it is not autonomous from, say, physics. I was suprised to find that quite a few people disagreed with me. It seems that they thought that we could have a complete theory of the mind even if we did not fully understand the full nature of physical reality, or indeed, whether there were anything else besides the physical. This seems wrong to me because, for instance, in order to give a theory of mental content we have to assume that the world is some way or other. So, if we take the view that the causal theory of reference is right then we are committed to materialism or to the view that non-physical entities can causally interact with our mind. In both cases we have to wait until physics is decided until we can have a completed theory of mental content.

This discussion was interupted by Paul Horwhich’s keynote address (how rude! 🙂 ). The title of his talk was ‘The Nature of Paradox’. He spent a lot of time talking about Schiffer’s view that paradox arises from ‘defective concepts’…a defective concept is one whos possesion conditions pull us in different directions and so result in paradox. For instance, our concept of truth (i.e. that ‘p’ is true if and only if p) leads to the semantic paradoxes. Horwhich argued against this view and for the Witgensteinian view that paradox results from our bewhichment by language. So, in the case of the semantic paradoxes, we see that the ‘truth’ predicate works in a certain way in one kind of discourse (scientific discourse aimed at explanation and prediction) and then we over generalize and think that it must work that way in all cases. The job of philosophy is to correct this over generalizing tendancy that we have. Now this seems to me to be commiting the very same kind of mistake that he sees others as making. So in the one case we are being overly scientific and so think that all of language must be like the language we use when we are doing science. So we think that ‘true’ must stand for some property. But this is a mistake. Recognizing this mistake lets us see that the deflationary view of truth is correct and this resolves the paradox. But isn’t this still to be bewitched by language? Someone like Horwhich sees that there are different uses of the word ‘true’ and so concludes that there is no thing which ‘true’ stands for. The only difference is that he is bewitched by language use in general and not in one particular area (science). I raised this issue in discussion in the following way. He was arguing that the existence of the semantic paradoxes (and others as well) is evidence that our naive theories about truth are wrong and we should just reject the assumption that the truth predicate acts like the predicate ‘electron’. So his view recommends that we not hold on to assumptions inspired by the way language works if they lead to paradox. But his own view leads to paradox. So, we may have evidence against some view and yet not have a reason to reject that view (as in a known about Gettier example). This shows that he is overgeneralizing in the same kind of way as the people who he is critisizing…OK< but that is enough for now!  

Mirror-Touch Synesthesia

via one of my students I found out about this very interesting article on a recently discovered kind of synesthesia where people report feeling the touches they see on other people (Here). One of the interesting things about this  is that, to some degree, we are all mirror-touch synesthetes. That is, we all have neurons that mirror activity that we see other people do, these people just have an over-developed mirror neuron network. I wonder if it is the same for all forms of syesthesia? Do we all taste words just a little bit? Do we all hear colors just slightly?

Of course, also interesting is the fact that a significant number of these people report thinking that their experiences were perfectly normal (the article has a nice anecdotal story about this)…

Back to the Grind & Meta-Metaethics

So, I am back from the Yale/UConn conference (semi-summary here), which was a huge success! A very well organized and interesting conference. Hats off to all involved! Things have not changed much since I left in 2003…it is still cold as ever (but it was nice to see some familiar faces)

I have a little time today before I have to re-work the final chapter of my dissertation (and avoid playing Manhunt 2) so I figured I figured I would report on the conference…but first…

The Importance of Graduate Conferences

It’s funny because I know a certain UConn alum who is famous for arguing that graduate conferences are a wast of time. His point is that when you are on the job market no one cares about your presentations at graduate conferences. All that matters to search committees is your presentations at ‘real’ conferences.  I must say that I was convinced by this for a while, but I think I have come to change my mind a little about the overall importance of graduate conferences.

For one, they are often far more competitive than regular conferences. They are usually only one day, with no concurrent sessions, which means far fewer slots. So, for instance, their were only 8 papers accepted out of hundreds submitted (I am assuming this from my experience with the CUNY grad conference). This makes for something like a 4% acceptance rate. Also, each paper has a large audience, say 20-30 people, and will usually include some well known philosophers (in this case Paul Horwich and Austen Clark); an audience like that at a regular conference is unusual (unless the person is well known). Not only that, but with fewer papers presented there is the opportunity to actually have a semi-significant amount of time for discussion. Whereas I have been to many regular conferences where there is five minutes for discussion, which in my opinion is something like absurd! Lastly, we were all treated to dinner, courtesy of the organizers!

So, why aren’t hiring committees more interested in graduate conferences?

A Brief Summary

Sadly, I showed up two seconds before the session I was commenting in began; It was a bit dramatic. Jeff was arguing that there is something right about the Korsgaardian strategy of arguing for a constructivist metaethic based on the success of constructivism as a normative theory. Any one who is interested can see my comments here. The jist is simple. I argued that 1. Either constructivism is not a distinctive metaethical position or it is just a version of relativism 2. The success of the normative claim that the constructivist makes is not evidence for any metaethical view. Any metaethical view is compatible with any normative view. 3. The success of the normative claim is not evidence against the semantic claim that the realist makes. Imagine that there were a group of people who were taught the Platonic semantics for ‘good’ and ‘right’. They were told that the word ‘good’ stood for some mind-independent property and that the role of the word in a sentence was to predicate that property of some object (ditto for ‘right’). It seems to me that these people would eventually start using those words to talk about the things that they value (i.e. constructed properties). If this is true then the fact that people use these predicates to talk about constructed properties (if they in fact do) can’t be evidence against the claim that the realist makes.

After this session, Austen Clark gave his talk on modeling sensory awareness. His was trying to answer the question ‘how could we build a creature that could have an experience of purple?’ During the course of this he presented the evidence ofr what is called ‘proto-objects’. A proto-object is a term for what happens at the early stages of visual processing. The idea is that the brain processes information about the ‘basic features’ of objects (info about shape, orientation, color, etc) and then stores this info without putting the basic features together. So, the proto-object is ‘a shapeless bundle of features’. It is not until selective attention is focused on the proto-objects that they are arranged into the shape that the stimulus has. During discussion I asked why we should think that there are proto-objects. It seems to me that what is likely going on here is that the stimulus produces a representational state in the perceiver which is a representation the fully formed object and  that the reason why subjects are unable to report accurately is due to the fashion which their higher-order state is representing the first-order representation (of the fully formed stimulus). Austen responded that this is unlikely because we don’t see the ‘pop-out effect’ in these experiments. But how do we know that. So, I tried to think of an experiment that might show something one way or the other. This is what I came up with. We take the standard pop-out effect stimulus and present it subliminally, so that the subjects cannot consciously detect its presnce. We then put soem markers up on the screen (one of which is at the location where the attention would have been drawn had the subject consciously saw the stimulus). We then force the subject to pick a marker by saying ‘I know you did not see anything, but if you had to pick a marker, which one would you pick?’. If they picked the one that marked the pop-out location then we could conclude that there was unconscious pop-out and so conclude against proto-objects.

Shesh! That’s a lot!! And I still have the second day to talk about…I guess I’ll do that some other time.