Steve Fleming joins me to discuss his new(-ish) book Know Thyself: The science of Self Awareness, the recent ‘IIT letter’, and a whole lot more!
Steve’s blog post on IIT: https://elusiveself.wordpress.com/2023/09/09/iit-vs-gnwt-and-the-meaning-of-evidence-in-consciousness-science/
My struggle with technical issues continues! But after we work that out Eric and I have a really fun discussion about his new book The Weirdness of the World.
Join me for a discussion with Michael Graziano. Still having trouble with OBS, but slowly getting it together for a nice discussion.
Join me for a discussion with neuroscientist Rachel Denison and to see me comically flustered. For the first thirty-minutes or so of our discussion I thought we were live-streaming when we weren’t! That hasn’t happened to me since the old days of Spacetime Mind. I must be rusty!
2024 is here and I am slowly coming out of my book-writing-induced coma to return to normal daylight activities. I have submitted the manuscript and we’ll see what reviewers think. In the meantime, I am slowly getting a line up for some Consciousness Live! discussions in the New Year.
I started off the New Year with a great discussion with Felipe de Brigard (below) and have a few more in the works. Should be fun!
I just read this very interesting paper out in Cortex taking a novel approach to assessing the role of the prefrontal cortex in consciousness. The interesting idea in the Rowe, Garrido, and Tsuchiaya paper linked to here is the idea of looking at whether there is even enough information being sent to the PFC to account for the contents of consciousness. What they seem to have found was that there is, and it is there whether or not the subjects have to report or are likely aware of the stimulus. They say,
Most strikingly, during Phase 1 (that is, no-report and half of participants unaware of the face stimuli), when prefrontal theories would predict that classification accuracy should fall to chance for the IB participants, we found above-chance classification of face stimuli using the pattern of connectivity between sensory and prefrontal locations regardless of awareness. Further, this classification accuracy remained largely the same, regardless of the presence or absence of reports and awareness (Figure 4). This aspect of the finding is hard to reconcile with any existing theories of consciousness and call for a revised account whereby PFC involvement may be ubiquitous regardless of awareness.
Potentially, a phenomenon that is close to our finding may be “unconscious working memory” (see Soto et al., 2011 and review by Gambarota et al., 2022), which also implies non-conscious prefrontal activity (Soto & Silvanto, 2014) and challenges HOT and GNWT.
They go on to say why they think this challenges GNWT but do not elaborate on their proposed challenge to higher-order theories. There may or may not be a challenge to a certain implementation of higher-order theories, but there is no challenge to a model like Joe LeDoux’s which sees the lower-order states of which we become aware to be themselves in the prefrontal cortex.
Either way, I think this highlights the importance of talking more about how it is that these psychological level constructs (higher-order representations, etc), get mapped onto the brain.
I made it through an entire semester with no teaching responsibilities at CUNY! For the first time in 20 years! Oh, and I wrote a book!
I started as a graduate student at the CUNY Graduate Center, as well as an adjunct instructor of philosophy at Brooklyn College, in the Fall of 2003. I came to the Grad Center with an M.A. in philosophy (from the University of Connecticut, where I thought I was going to get my PhD but didn’t), and some teaching experience from SF State (where I was supposed to complete my M.A. but didn’t, it’s a long story!). Brooklyn College was the first time I had been hired to teach philosophy at a college I did not attend (even though it was part of the university I attended). The rest is, as they say, history.
I started thinking I maybe should write a book back in the summer of 2021, when I was preparing for this talk. It seemed like it would be a lot of work, and it was easy to forget about it once the fall of 2021 hit. I was once again plagued by thoughts of writing a book in the summer of 2022, and by that time there seemed like there may even be some interest in such a project. I wrote up a book proposal and started seriously working on a draft in July of 2022.
I worked on it in every spare second I had from August 2022 until early January 2023. This mostly consisted of dashing out thoughts before rushing off to class, or running out in the middle of dinner to implement a change that occurred to me. During that time I felt like I was barely keeping the ship afloat. It was at that point that I knew that I needed to devote more time to writing the book, or wait until I wasn’t teaching to work on it. I put the project on hold in January 2023, when the Spring semester started, and applied for research leave for the fall of 2023. I figured that if I got it, I would devote my full effort to the book. If I didn’t, I was going to put the draft on my website and leave it at that. I did get the research leave and I have been spending 9-10 hours every day since September 2023 to get to where it is now. All in all it has really only been 9 months of writing time (spread over a year and a half), but it feels like an eternity!
It is now in a state that I would consider ‘good enough for government work’ and since I am a government employee, that is good enough for me. I haven’t put anything up here because there is still a small chance that this may be published. However, if anyone wants to see the current draft email me and I’ll send it.
I am still on research leave until March 1st at LaGuardia and I will also be co-teaching the Neuroscience and Philosophy of Consciousness course with Tony Ro at the Graduate Center starting at the end of January. In the meantime, I will be taking a break for some family time until early January. When I get back I am still hoping to get into Consciousness Live! and my YouTube channel more generally. Stay tuned!
Things have just been off the charts hectic around here, and I’m not just talking about Zelda: Tears of the Kingdom! I have always taught a lot but since 2015 it has become overwhelming. I did a little number crunching on the train and found that before 2015 I was teaching about 10 classes per year but since 2015 it has gone up to 13.43 classes per year (and that’s with two semesters of parental leave without teaching which throws of the average). This year I got to 15 classes but my record is 17 from back in 2020. And that’s with different preps across several disciplines to boot! These are the classes I taught this academic year (plus summer).
I felt like I was keeping up with things during the pandemic but It has become increasingly difficult to do anything else besides teaching and has left me feeling like I am doing a poor job at everything. For example I gave up on my Consciousness Live! Podcast because preparing for those discussions took away from time grading and prepping lectures. I also had to miss a bunch of the recent Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness meeting, which I had a small part in helping to organize, because it conflicted with my teaching schedule (which changed at the last minute because of class cancelations). I could go on and on.
I hate to complain because I know things are tough all around and things could always be worse. Plus I know in the grand scheme of things I am incredibly lucky to be able to support my family with the work that I do. Even so it has made me a bit grumpy. There is some good news though in that I was awarded research leave for the Fall 2023 semester, which for Laguardia goes from early September until March (don’t ask). An entire six months with no teaching; it sounds like a mythical creature from some fantasy.
Haha…as you can see I enjoy being dramatic. Still, I have been teaching since graduate school and haven’t had an entire semester off like this since my first year as a graduate student. I did take parental leave but that is only a few weeks and then I had to come back and while I wasn’t teaching I still had to come into my office and ‘teach’ logic (that is when I recorded my online lectures for my logic course). Not to mention the stress of a newborn! This will a bit different in that both of my children will be in school, my wife will be at work, and I may once again have time for “reading and sauntering and lounging and dozing, which I call thinking…”.
My hope is to use that time to think about my alleged “book” and possibly some other fun things as well. By the by, I did actually produce a very rough first-ish draft of something which someday could possibly resemble something some people might think of as a book. I haven’t been able to work on it since January of this year because of my teaching schedule but I am hoping to get back to it at the end of August. I decided not to post the material for various reasons but anyone who its interested in seeing the supposed draft can email me and I’ll send a copy. Any feedback would be greatly appreciated, especially if it came in sometime before October/November of 2023.
Word on the street is that I am allegedly writing a book on consciousness…woah betide us, this is certainly the final indicator that we are in the most absurd of simulations! At any rate,I don’t have a contract or anything but there is ‘some interest’ in my completing a draft from a press, which is cool I guess (I can think of at least 4 people who would actually read a book like this!). To help motivate me I have decided to put up chapters here as I draft them. My plan is to officially start this summer, since I seem to be only teaching one class in my summer session (I usually do 3 so it feels light). I don’t have anything I want to share yet, but below is the plan of attack i.e. the proposal for the book). Stay tuned!
I. Traditional HOT is mistaken
The science of consciousness is at a point where we would like to narrow the range of theories that are serious contenders. The field has seen a number of theories being presented, from various disciplines, but as of now we have not seen empirical evidence that the various theories can’t interpret in a way favorable to, or at least compatible with, their theory. Theories should be developed in enough detail to see what predictions they make and how we could falsify them. Higher-order theories have enjoyed some support recently but as of yet it is not clear what would count as falsifying the theory. As they are generally presented they (a) aim to explain the difference between a conscious mental state and an unconscious mental state and (b) this explanation takes the form of positing two mental states, one of which is directed at the other. Each of the above claims problematic. The problem with (a) is that it begs the question as to whether there are any unconscious mental states, which is an empirical question and (b) obscures the distinction between relational and non-relational higher-order views. I want to present and defend a version of the non-relation view I call the Higher-Order Representation of a Representation (HOROR) theory. This seems to me to be a promising version of the theory and as of yet has not been developed in detail -because of the way the debate has been set up- and distinguished from other versions of the theory.
II. Starting Over: The HOROR Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness
Higher-order theories of consciousness appeal to inner awareness as part of the explanation of phenomenal consciousness. ‘Inner’ means higher-order, an awareness of my own mental life (‘first-order’ thus mean awareness of something which isn’t mental). ‘Awareness’ at a commonsense level means sensing, perceiving or thinking that something is present -these are all representational states. ‘Phenomenal consciousness’ means: what it is like to be a creature or what it is like to be in a mental state/ so appealing to inner awareness amounts to appealing to ‘higher-order representations of representations’ -HORORs- as part of the explanation of phenomenal consciousness. I take a theory of consciousness to primarily be a theory of phenomenal consciousness. Panpsychism, Global Workspace Theory, whatever theory one may have, if it is a theory of consciousness, it is a theory of phenomenal consciousness. This makes the theory I will defend not a version of illusionism. HOROR theory is an empirical conjecture about the nature of phenomena consciousness.
III. Relational v. Non-Relational higher-order theories
Relational theories are familiar from the traditional approach. Non-relational theories deny the traditional account and instead hold that the relevant higher-order representation is itself enough to account for phenomenal consciousness. Non-relational higher-order theories can be understood to be versions of representationalism, but from the higher-order point of view. Representationalism about consciousness, as I will defend it, holds that for any phenomenal experience we have there is some representational content such that having the phenomenal experience consists in having the representational content. Non-relational theories hold that the right kind of content is a higher-order representation with the content ‘I am aware of (perceptible) red in a distinctly visual way’. Having that state is all by itself enough to account for phenomenal consciousness. Higher-order theories can be distinguished by the kind of content they posit at the higher-order level as well as by the proposed relation, if any, between the higher-order representations and their targets, the states they represent.
IV. Two Kinds of Relational Theory: Joint-Determination and Split-Level
Joint-determination views hold that both the higher-order and lower-order state contribute to phenomenal consciousness. Split-level views hold that the higher-order state is a mere pointer that points to a first-order state, which then contributes to phenomenal consciousness. The difference between these theories is that on Joint-Determination views just having the higher-order state without its target will result in an atypical experience. On Split-level views the first-order state and its content, once it has been pointed to, completely determines what it is like for one but without the higher-order pointer the content remains unconscious and so not experienced. Traditional objections to higher-order thought theories (like those from Dretske on change blindness, the problem of the rock) apply mostly to relational theories. In addition it is not clear that these theories can offer an explanation of consciousness and have to settle for fitting the data. Some find these objections serious enough to disregard these kinds of theories but nature may just foil our desire for understanding and explanation. Relational theories make empirical predications and though I would prefer non-relational theories we should base our credence on the data not philosophical objections.
V. Two kinds of non-relational theory: HOT and HOROR
Traditional HOT (THOT) theory is non-relational. But none the less maintains that the first-order state is the conscious state. HOROR theory holds that the higher-order state is itself the phenomenally conscious state. The higher-order state is itself the state which there is something that there is like to be in. The THOT theory holds that the higher-order state ‘engenders’ phenomenal consciousness but that is difficult to make sense of and the ‘traditional’ objections to higher-order theories can be seen to be problems only for the relational view. For example, ‘the problem of the rock’ which asks why thinking about a rock doesn’t make the rock conscious when it does make my mental state conscious, clearly assumes the relational account of the higher-order theory. Which version of non-relation theory is preferable? HOROR theory is more plausible for several reasons to be discussed.
VI. HOROR theory and Current Neuroscience
There is much debate about the neural correlates of consciousness and there have been some attempts to use empirical work to challenge higher-order theories. One area where this has occurred is with Ned Block’s argument from phenomenological overflow. If consciousness ‘overflows’ what we can report on at any given moment then is that a problem for higher-order theories? Do we have any reason to believe that there is phenomenological overflow in this sense? HOROR theory is compatible with either view in this area. We could have a ‘Rich’ HOROR theory on which the rich contents of the higher-order states overflow what we can report or what is in working memory. We could also have a ‘sparse’ HOROR theory on which there are sparse contents of HORORs. Because of this there are versions of HOROR theory that are compatible with either way you interpret the findings from Sperling, Landman, etc. Part of the problem is that we haven’t really seen scientists explicitly try to falsify versions of non-relation theories and so we need to get clear on what kind of predictions the theory actually makes. The same issue arises with other previous empirical attacks on the higher-order approach (like Dretske’s change blindness argument, and Ned Block’s response to Lau and Brown’s use of Rahnev et al as evidence for HOROR).
VII. Empirical Predictions: A Study in Misrepresentation
Misrepresentation occurs when HO state misrepresents a first-order state. Radical misrepresentation occurs when FO state missing. Misrepresentation can be seen as an empirical predication of higher-order theories. Split-level views predict there will be a first-order explanation of misrepresentation. Joint-determination views predict there will be a ‘partial’ experience. Non-relational views predict conscious experience follows higher-order representation (and could be sparse or rich depending on the contents of the HORORs).THOT has to say non-existent first-order state is conscious! One can make sense of this with certain views about intentionality and representation but those views are very controversial. HOROR theory says misrepresentation is evidence that it is the higher-order representation which is phenomenally conscious. Radical misrepresentation is a case which shows that the state which there is something that it is like for one to be in is the HOROR itself. The overall lesson from thinking though cases of misrepresentation is that we should postulate that there are two kinds of content in the relevant HORORs: a descriptive content and a pointer/teleological/causal-historical content. The descriptive content accounts for phenomenology while the other content accounts for which first-order state is picked out. This pointer kind of content will have a functional role (keeping a represented state online, sending it to the global workspace, etc). This puts HOROR theory in between relational views on one end with solely pointer content and THOT on the other with solely descriptive content. Thus different versions of relational and non-relational higher-order theories can be tested by looking at/for cases of misrepresentation.
VIII. Implementing the Theory in the Brain
The theories as so far presented is a psychological theory. By itself they make no predications about how these various kinds of states are implemented in the brain. We have various proposals about how the implementation should go. Starting at the first-order level we might ask, ‘where are the first-order states, the targets?’ We have several candidates: recurrent processing, mid-level contents, globally broadcast contents, etc. Some of these candidates are in ‘sensory’ areas, others may be in frontal cortex (there is evidence that representations we would think of a first-order are in the prefrontal cortex at least sometimes). So it is not yet clear where the first-order states are. What about higher-order states? Lau argues they have overlap with metacognition and so prefrontal cortex. LeDoux argues anatomy suggests different circuits in prefrontal cortex with different jobs. Genaro suggests that we look for self-consciousness and focus more on parietal cortex. Cleermans argues anywhere in cortex. Not clear where higher-order states are. This doesn’t mean we can try to empirically test these theories. We should formulate different versions in as much detail as we can and test them (like the Prefrontally-implemented Rich version of HOROR theory Templeton is testing). To really test these theories though we need a hypothetical ‘Brain clamp’ -something that allows us to hold the activity of the first-order representations constant while we vary higher-order content (and vice-versa).
IX. Animals, Infants, and Robots
The discussion so far has centered for the most part on adult human beings and sought to develop a possible account of the kind of conscious experience we enjoy. But can these ideas help us answer questions about whether animals are conscious? Can we know if infants and newborns are conscious? Is artificial consciousness possible? And what does the HOROR theory predict about these kinds of cases? Can we use animal models to test the HOROR theory? These questions may be somewhat more speculative and less connected directly to the issue of empirical testing but the higher-order approach has been thought to have a certain position on these questions. My own view would be that animals and infants are conscious and *maybe* we could have artificial consciousness but that as of right now we don’t have any real strong evidence that this is the case. However the ideas presented here would at least give us some ideas about how we might -at least in principle- be able to empirically test HORORs predictions in animals and infants.
Like most people (I assume) I can’t believe that 2021 is almost over. This year has really flown by and I am feeling very burnt out. I feel like I am getting less and less done and yet at the same time being more and more overwhelmed by what I do manage to get done.
Because of class cancelations (don’t get me started on how CUNY has handled the pandemic!) I was only able to teach 10 classes this year and I have to admit that it was nice not teaching as much as I usually do (I average around 13-14 a year and last year I did 17!!!). I am looking forward to 2022 and being able to teach the Neuroscience and Philosophy of Consciousness course with Tony Ro at the Graduate Center (in Spring in person!) and possibly even a class on David Chalmers’ book Reality+ (in Fall), though I am not sure if that will go through or not (I hope it does!)…but I have to get through my three classes in the short 6 week winter session first (starting in January)!
I also had a lot of fun with Consciousness Live! in season 4, doing 18 conversations! This was less than I planned and less than I did in 2020. Even so I did start to find it a bit overwhelming towards the end and I felt like I was underprepared for some of these conversations. I didn’t even get to schedule all of the people that agreed to come on and talk to me! If there is a season 5 I think I need to do fewer and prepare more. Aiming for one a week is just too much with my teaching load. We’ll see what I can do once I come back in January and start missing talking to cool people about consciousness 🙂
I wrote only one blog posts and tried another short story but my mostly I have been using Philosophy Sucks! (the name of my blog) for Consciousness Live! podcasting.
Part of the reason for the lite blogging is that I tried putting more time into my YouTube channel posting some videos of my recent attempts to re-learn how to skateboard, some ‘philosophical reactions‘ and other cringey things…it turns out this is a lot of work! I was experimenting with one or two of these kinds of videos per week in November and I think that if I do more of this kind of content in 2022 that I need to limit it and do fewer. I don’t think there is any way I could keep that up when my teaching schedule returns to ‘normal’.
I had two co-authored publications come out
I have another co-authored piece in the pipeline and I am hoping that makes it out someday. It’s funny because all of my recent publications have been co-authored and I actually heard through the grapevine that maybe I should publish more single authored stuff (philosophy is weird about giving credit in co-authoring situations) and I do have some recent talks that I gave which could be written up and some other projects as well but lately I have been finding it really hard to produce anything that I think is any good. Part of the reason for that is that I teach a lot, and had my first child in 2015 (the year of my last single authored piece and the year I got tenure coincidently). But the other part of the reason is a bit more complicated.
I used to jump at every publication opportunity I got because I needed to get tenure and then when I sort of thought I had done enough to get tenure I thought maybe someday I could get a job where I could teach less and have more time for all of these other projects I am constantly starting and getting overwhelmed by (like the New York Consciousness Collective and the Qualia Fest, the Online Consciousness Conference, and all of the other stuff I do as the Director of CONSC -the Center for the ONline Study of Consciousness 😉 but if I had my way I probably would have chosen not to publish them or to wait longer. Writing philosophy and enduring the publication process takes a level of self-confidence that is hard to sustain…but I did recently pull of my first feeble and smith grinds on a (small) quarter pipe and that helps a bit 🙂
See you in 2022!
Richard Brown 