Very happy to say that Hakwan Lau and I have completed our jointly authored paper The Emperor’s New Phenomenology?: The Empirical Case for Conscious Experiences without First-Order Representations which is forthcoming in a Festschrift for Ned Block edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar (MIT Press). The book is slated to have a response from Ned which I am very much looking forward to!
announcements
Southern Fried Spring Phenomenology
Winter is winding down and I am prepping for my Southern Fried Spring Phenomenology tour.
1st stop is the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology March 22-24 in Savannah Georgia, where I will be commenting on Benji Kozuch’s paper (on lesions to the prefrontal lobes and the implications for higher-order theories), as well as giving a talk in an invited symposium “Explaining Consciousness” (with Josh Weisberg and Kenneth Williford); “Phenomenal Consciousness Ain’t in the (Back of the) Head”. I am putting the final touches on the presentation and hope to record a practice run of it sometime this week (look for it on my YouTube channel). This conference should be a lot of fun since it seems like I know everyone on the program! Kudos to Pete Mandik for assembling such a great group of people!
2nd stop back to New York for Funkomenological Overflow at the Local 269 Tuesday April 3rd. This free event in lower Manhattan features the music of the Space Clamps, the return of Quiet Karate Reflex, and the William James Trio…all three of these groups feature me on the drums! We have been rehearsing a lot and each group has a unique sound and set list…where else can you find jazz/funk, 8bit experimental breakbeats, and funk/awesome rock played by philosophers, neuroscientists, and psychologists?
3rd stop is back to the south for the Tenth Biennial Towards a Science of Consciousness conference in Tucson (ok, ok, so that’s a different south, but c’mon!). I will be giving a talk in the Dualism and Modal Arguments concurrent session which will be a ‘all-things-considered’ statement of my 2D argument against Non-Materialism. I haven’t been to Tucson since 2008 so I am really looking forward to it!
Hope to see you on the road!
4th Online Consciousness Conference
has now officially begun and will run until March 2nd. Stop by http://consciousnessonline.com to get in on the action!
Scientist on the Science of the Self
Check out the new blog of Steve Fleming on the science of the self: The Elusive Self
CO4 Program
The program for the 4th Online Consciousness Conference is coming together nicely and is nearly finalized. Check it out!
The Conference is scheduled for February 17th-March 2nd. Papers will be available online one week before the conference begins. Mark your calendars and spread the word!!
Clip Show ‘011
It’s that time of year again! Here are the top posts of 2011 (see last year’s clip show and the best of all time)
–Runner Up– News Flash: Philosophy Sucks!
Philosophy is unavoidable; that is part of why it sucks!
10. Epiphenomenalism and Russellian Monism
Is Russellian Monism committed to epiphenomenalism about consciousness? Dave Chalmers argues that it is not.
9. Bennett on Non-Reductive Physicalism
Karen Bennett argues that the causal exclusion argument provides an argument for physicalism and that non-reductive physicalism is not ruled out by it. I argue that she is wrong and that the causal exclusion argument does cut against non-reductive physicalism.
8. The Zombie Argument Requires Phenomenal Transparency
Chalmers argues that the zombie argument goes through even without an appeal to the claim that the primary and secondary intension of ‘consciousness’ coincide. I argue that it doesn’t. Without an appeal to transparency we cannot secure the first premise of the zombie argument.
7. The Problem of Zombie Minds
Does conceiving of zombies require that we be able to know that zombies lack consciousness? It seems like we can’t know this so there may be a problem conceiving of zombies. I came to be convinced that this isn’t quite right, but still a good post (plus I think we can use the response here in a way that helps the physicalist who wants to say that the truth of physicalism is conceivable…more on that later, though)
6. Stazicker on Attention and Mental Paint
Can we have phenomenology that is indeterminate? James Stazicker thinks so.
5. Consciousness Studies in 1000 words (more) or less
I was asked to write a short piece highlighting some of the major figures and debates in the philosophical study of consciousness for an intro textbook. This is what I came up with
4. Cohen and Dennett’s Perfect Experiment
Dennett’s response to the overflow argument and why I think it isn’t very good
This was big year for me in that I came into possession of some long-lost recordings of my death metal band from the 1990’s as well as some pictures. This prompted me to write up a brief autobiography of my musical ‘career’
A collection of philosophical jokes that I wrote plus some others that were prompted by mine.
Some reflections on Ned Block and Jake Berger’s response to my claim that higher-order thoughts just are phenomenal consciousness
Online Philosophy Class
I am happy to say that I have just uploaded the final video of my online introduction to philosophy course! I have all of the videos up at my youtube channel but I also started a special blog for them here: http://onlinephilosophyclass.wordpress.com
I have slides for my philosophy of religion class, which I may or may not record lectures for, but I have been thinking about doing a philosophy of mind class…maybe for when I teach it in the Spring of 2012.
Final Call for Papers
Dec 5th is the deadline for submissions! Note the updated special sessions!
I am pleased to announce the call for papers for the fourth online consciousness conference. The Invited Program includes,
Bernard Baars, The Neurosciences Institute
Special Session on Attention, Awareness, and Expectation organized by the Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition, and Behavior featuring,
Floris P. de Lange, Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior
Jacqueline Gottlieb, Columbia
Marisa Carrasco, NYU
Special Session on Action Consciousness organized by Myrto Mylopoulos, The Graduate Center CUNY
Élisabeth Pacherie, Institut Jean Nicod
Christopher Frith, Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging
Special Session on the Social Conditions of Self Consciousness organized by James Dow, Hendrix University
Radu J. Bogdan, Tulane University
Peter Carruthers, University of Maryland
Papers in any area of consciousness studies are welcome (construed broadly to include philosophy of mind and philosophy of neuroscience). Papers should be roughly 3,000-4,000 words and subsequent presentations, should the presenter choose to make one, should be about 20 minutes (though longer papers/presentations are acceptable). Submissions, suitable for blind review, should be sent to consciousnessonline@gmail.com by December 5th 2011. Those interested in being referees or commentators should also contact me. Authors of accepted papers are urged to make, or have made, some kind of audio/visual presentation (e.g. narrated powerpoint or video of talk) though this is not required to present.
For more information visit the conference website at http://consciousnessonline.com
Find Consciousness Online on Facebook! http://www.facebook.com/pages/Consciousness-Online/361010842469
News Flash: Philosophy Sucks!
Via the latest philosophers’ carnival I learn of a recent kerfluffle, started here, and continued here over the usefulness of philosophy and I can’t resist throwing my $0.02 in.
One thing that I have little patience with is the view that dismisses philosophy all together. The view that there is no progress in philosophy is itself a philosophical view. The view that all knowledge is scientific knowledge is also a philosophical view. When people say that philosophy is a waste of time they invariably mean one particular way of doing philosophy is a waste of time. This is clearly illustrated by people like Richard Feynman who spend a lot of time denouncing philosophy in general when a closer looks reveals that he was pissed off about the method used by particular philosophers (that he happened to encounter). This is also born out by the anti-philosophy comments at the linked posts. If you do not like thought-experiments, analysis of ordinary language, or scholastic proofs for God’s existence that is fine, but that is not the same thing as not liking philosophy.
Philosophy is unavoidable. You cannot even say why it is worthless without actually doing some philosophy; that is part and parcel of its suckiness. I think it was Aristotle who first voiced this sentiment, (though I can’t seem to find the passage any where in my Barnes anthologies)…anyways. Deal with it.
Some Drafts
Here are some recent paper drafts I have been working on, in various stages of being rewritten for various projects. Comments are most welcome!
- Zombies and Simulation
- a brief paper arguing that one way to conceive of philosophical zombies is conceiving of a ‘perfect’ simulation of a creature for whom a consciousness-as-biological view is true. Thus physicalists who think of consciousness as biological can admit that zombies are conceivable (even possible) with no consequence to physicalism.
- The Identity Theory in 2D
- a short paper sketching an updated version of the type-type identity theory in a two dimensional framework. The resulting view is similar to Lewisian functionalism but combined with a posteriori identities and gives a unified response to all a priori arguments (part of a larger project of taking back a priori reasoning for the physicalist. It seems to me to be a historical accident that a priori arguments are primarily used to argue against physicalism)
- The Emperor’s New Phenomenology? The Empirical Case for Conscious Experience without First-Order Representations
- a longer paper written with Hakwan Lau arguing that some kind of higher-order approach to consciousness can make better sense of some key empirical evidence.
Richard Brown 