Update 7/27/11
The paper is now available on Consciousness and Cognition’s website: The Myth Of Phenomenological Overflow
————
I have just finished my contribution to the Special Issue of Consciousness and Cognition that I am editing featuring descendants of papers from the second online consciousness conference and made the pre-print available at my PhilPapers profile. Discussion and comments are welcome.
The Myth of Phenomenological Overflow
Abstract:
In this paper I examine the dispute between Hakwan Lau, Ned Block, and David Rosenthal over the extent to which empirical results can help us decide between first-order and higher-order theories of consciousness. What emerges from this is an overall argument to the best explanation against the first-order view of consciousness and the dispelling of the mythological notion of phenomenological overflow that comes with it.
Richard Brown 
[…] and Dennett want to argue against phenomenological overflow, which is a debate I am currently in the middle of myself, by showing that it is essentially an unscientific view. To do this they introduce what they call […]
[…] about Sid Kouider’s recent presentation at the CUNY CogSci Colloquium. Sid was addressing a topic close to my heart, which the the issue of phenomenological overflow (I am pretty sure his talk was based on his recent […]
[…] argument that perceptual consciousness overflows cognitive access from several recent objections (including from me). It is important that Block is defending overflow from cognitive access since he admits that […]
[…] and Dennett and Cohen in Trends in Cognitive Science (Block’s paper criticized, among others, my recent paper on this stuff). These articles spawned a response by me here and here, which I still stand […]